The Advantage of Competitive Campaigning Over Policy by CONOP
Strategy Central
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth, February 2, 2025
Introduction
This article is PART II of the concept of campaigning outlined in "SOF Competitive Campaigning in Great Power Competition" by Monte Erfourth, published on January 24, 2025, on Strategy Central. That article explored the evolving role of Special Operations Forces (SOF) in the strategic framework of great power competition. Unlike traditional warfare, this form of competition prioritizes continuous national-level campaigns designed to protect U.S. interests while avoiding costly conflicts.
The concept of competitive campaigning, emerging from the 2022 National Defense Strategy, emphasizes synchronized operations across the competition continuum to deter, degrade, deny, and defeat adversarial threats. The article envisions a SOF-led campaign operating in the gray zone (leveraging special operations capabilities not found elsewhere in the DOD) to counter China, Russia, and Iran. Success in this domain requires SOF to enhance its understanding of adversaries, integrate advanced intelligence tools, and adapt training and deployment strategies to meet evolving challenges.
A core element of this approach is Joint Integrated Campaigning (JIC), which aligns military activities with national security objectives across land, air, sea, space, and cyber domains. The principle of "campaigning forward" underpins this strategy, emphasizing proactive engagement with allies and partners to shape the security environment before crises emerge. Competitive campaigning extends beyond military operations, incorporating diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to influence adversary perceptions and actions. However, challenges persist, particularly in grasping campaigning concepts and requirements, integrating military activities with interagency and international partners, navigating bureaucratic constraints on operational authorities, and ensuring effective assessment mechanisms. Without developing a more structured approach to nation-state threats and demonstrating measurable outcomes, SOF risks losing strategic relevance and funding in an era where simply executing operations without demonstrating results is no longer viable.
"SOF Competitive Campaigning in Great Power Competition" proposed a structured campaign cycle encompassing post-deployment analysis, mission preparation, campaign execution, and adaptation to evolving threats. This cycle boosts SOF’s strategic flexibility through AI-assisted intelligence gathering, wargaming, and real-time operational adjustments. To stay effective, SOF must enhance its training, planning, and assessment mechanisms, ensuring operations align with national security objectives while upholding transparency and accountability. Competitive campaigning thus represents a modernized approach to great power competition, leveraging SOF’s unique capabilities in the gray zone to sustain U.S. strategic advantage. The article concludes that SOF must take the lead in this domain by out-competing and outmaneuvering rivals through innovative, well-coordinated campaigns.
This article highlights the requirements for campaign development and underscores the importance of grasping the broader theoretical, political, and practical aspects necessary for effective campaigning. One of the most significant challenges faced by Special Operations Forces (SOF) in creating and executing long-term campaigns is a notable lack of “buy-in” to long-range planning. By connecting theoretical concepts to specific operational strategies, we can bridge the gap between making sound decisions at the moment and making those decisions with a clear understanding and attainment of long-term outcomes.
CONOPS vs. Campaigning
Decades of counterterrorism (CT) operations have led SOF units to adopt a singular concept of operations (CONOPS). This approach often avoids seeking approval for a series of actions that would outline a long-term campaign utilizing special military capabilities to achieve desired political outcomes. The term "Policy by CONOP" is commonly used in this context, reflecting a reluctance among senior military and political leaders to employ the military once, much less over time and even more activities. This stems from the perception that the military is primarily a singular tool—essentially, a "hammer of violence."
As discussed in Part I, this perception can be addressed by incorporating risk considerations into the campaign plan. The key to SOF's future as a legitimate contributor to American statecraft—and its ability to gain and maintain an advantage in great power competition—is to develop a solid plan, demonstrate tangible results, and ensure that the approach is repeatable.
Political will is an ongoing challenge, but it can be addressed as outlined. The SOF view that this issue is solely political is mistaken. The organization must not become complacent about previous experiences. While operations are more likely to gain approval under the Trump administration, poorly developed, haphazard, or limited CONOPS should not become the norm. Take the time to study the environment, understand the threats, learn to identify opportunities, utilize technology to your advantage, and earn the trust of leadership through patience and professionalism. This is not meant to diminish past efforts but to emphasize that the best strategy in the new political climate is to bring your “A” game. Request the Trump administration's permission to do more than just the bare minimum.
Up Front: First Principles
A fundamental principle of military strategy is the necessity of studying one's rivals, whether in war or competition short of conflict. A deep understanding of an adversary’s strategic habits, desired ends, and methods of achieving those ends is essential for shaping effective policies and operations. Sun Tzu’s timeless assertion that knowing oneself and the enemy leads to victory remains central to modern strategic thought (Sun Tzu, The Art of War). In contrast, failing to study an opponent results in miscalculated responses, wasted resources, and strategic paralysis. While tactical adaptability is often necessary on the battlefield, an overarching strategic framework must guide these decisions. Simply reacting without a structured understanding of an adversary’s motivations and capabilities leads to strategic drift, where military actions become disjointed, inefficient, or even counterproductive (Clausewitz, On War).
The consequences of ignoring the deep study of the adversary are stark. Historical missteps, such as the U.S. failure to appreciate Vietnamese strategic culture during the Vietnam War or the Soviet Union’s underestimation of Afghan resistance in the 1980s, demonstrate the perils of projecting one’s own strategic logic onto an opponent (Kissinger, World Order). In contemporary great power competition, where actions occur in the gray zone between peace and war, adversaries like China, Russia, and Iran employ asymmetric means—economic coercion, cyber warfare, proxy conflicts—to advance their interests (Brands, The Twilight Struggle). Understanding these approaches allows military and political leaders to anticipate moves, develop counterstrategies, and maintain the initiative. Making things up as one goes may work in a fluid tactical engagement, but at the strategic level, such an approach breeds reactionary, short-sighted decisions that fail to achieve long-term objectives (Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace).
The study of adversaries must be methodical, interdisciplinary, and continuous, integrating military intelligence, historical analysis, and cultural awareness. It is not enough to focus on enemy capabilities alone; decision-making processes, ideological drivers, and risk tolerances must be examined to predict behavior and shape proactive strategies (Freedman, Strategy: A History). The best military campaigns, from Eisenhower’s deception operations in World War II to modern cyber operations, succeed because of deep enemy analysis rather than haphazard execution. In an era of strategic competition, where outright conflict is undesirable, but the stakes remain high, understanding adversaries is not an academic exercise—it is a national security imperative. Without this foundation, military and political leaders risk squandering opportunities, misreading threats, and ceding strategic ground to more disciplined rivals (Gray, Modern Strategy).
Twenty years of counterterrorism operations have conditioned SOF—and much of the broader Department of Defense—to focus overwhelmingly on rivals’ tactical actions and immediate threats rather than the deeper strategic approach of adversaries who challenge American hegemony. The habitual emphasis on tracking activities—movements, cyber intrusions, influence campaigns, arms transfers—has created the illusion that knowing what an adversary is doing is sufficient for understanding them.
However, this approach is reactive and fundamentally incomplete. Studying an adversary’s strategy—their objectives, methods, and available resources—provides the foundation for shaping effective U.S. responses that do more than deter or disrupt isolated actions. Without this deeper comprehension, SOF and the U.S. military risk playing perpetual defense, constantly responding to individual threats rather than undermining the broader strategic designs of China, Russia, and Iran. Counterterror operations allowed for target-focused approaches because non-state actors lacked cohesive grand strategies on the scale of great power rivals. However, competition rules have shifted the way the military must approach and execute missions. In short, a US military strategy that seeks to merely deter specific actions—whether China’s gray zone coercion, Russia’s hybrid warfare, or Iran’s regional destabilization—will fail.
To compete effectively, the U.S. must attack adversary strategies at their core, disrupting their logic and momentum rather than chasing individual manifestations of their intent. This requires a profound shift in mindset: intelligence and military planning must prioritize the why and how of adversary decision-making over merely cataloging what they are doing at any given moment.
What To Compete For
Though inherently endless, great power competition can yield desirable outcomes by creating the conditions for national security stability, economic growth, the flourishing of the American way of life, and technological advancement, even if only temporarily. Strategic maneuvering among nations vying for resources, influence, and control of global systems can lead to periods of equilibrium where deterrence mechanisms hold adversaries in check, trade flourishes under managed competition, and international norms structure engagement. While these conditions are rarely permanent, they can persist long enough to secure national interests, enhance alliances, and shape global governance in ways that benefit certain actors over time. As the global leader and enforcer of the current international political, economic, and military system, sustaining these areas in a stable condition is a paramount long-term objective.
Military strategists must move beyond the idea that a single decisive victory can resolve great power competition (Think Taiwan). Instead, the goal should be maintaining favorable conditions, ensuring our nation can influence and adapt to changing power dynamics. Success lies in sustaining relative superiority through strategic positioning, economic resilience, technological leadership, and diplomatic leverage. The competition itself is not a problem to be solved but a reality to be managed, requiring continuous engagement rather than the quest for a final, absolute victory.
The Joint Staff defines competition as the interaction among national actors pursuing advantage through accrued power to influence other states and secure their interests. These actors often cooperate and compete simultaneously across various domains. Competition is perpetual and lacks clearly defined end states, requiring actors to leverage tools of power to build influence, create leverage, and secure strategic advantages. The aim is to preserve favorable conditions while maintaining readiness for potential escalation to armed conflict.
The three core concepts of competition—influence, leverage, and advantage—are interconnected. Influencerepresents the ability to affect the decision-making processes of other nations, which can be cultivated actively or generated passively. Leverage refers to the application of power to limit other nations’ options by creating a disadvantage or a feared outcome to compel a particular action or condition. This applied leverage can come at the expense of others or be mutually beneficial. Advantage involves achieving a superior position or condition over other nations, which creates an opportunity. Some combination of these three elements is established through the effective use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic tools (DIME). Together, these elements enable actors to protect and advance their interests strategically. You can think of DIME as a source of potential power, while influence, leverage, and advantage are the results created through applied and perceived power.
Any contemporary effort to define competition must acknowledge related concepts that influence inter-state power dynamics, with deterrence being chief among them. Competition does not alter deterrence theory, definitions of horizontal or vertical escalation, or how the levers of national power are employed in concert at the right time and place. It also does not indicate a change in SOF core activities or imply that new capabilities and concepts are necessarily required. However, competition does influence how planners appropriately utilize existing doctrine, concepts, and capabilities, considering the perspectives, priorities, and outcomes that the SOF enterprise aims to achieve.
Know Thy Enemy: Studying Competitors’ Strategy
At the strategic level, studying a rival nation's desired national security ends and the means and ways they employ to pursue their interests requires a multidisciplinary, long-term, and methodical approach. The study must integrate intelligence, history, economics, military doctrine, political science, and cultural analysis to comprehensively understand how a competitor defines, prioritizes, and pursues its national interests. This is not merely an exercise in tracking activities—understanding intent, decision-making processes, and strategic preferences is far more valuable. The most effective strategic analysis examines declared policies and actual behaviors, distinguishing between rhetoric, deception, and true objectives while tracking how rival nations adjust their strategies over time.
The first step is systematically reviewing national security documents, strategic white papers, military doctrine, and official statements. Nations such as China, Russia, and Iran publicly articulate elements of their strategic outlook in documents like China’s Defense White Paper, Russia’s National Security Strategy, and Iran’s Sacred Defense Doctrine. However, these must be scrutinized in context with historical patterns of behavior, as adversaries often engage in strategic deception or rhetorical posturing. This demands a historical comparative approach: how have these states pursued power in the past, responded to similar pressures, and adapted to constraints and opportunities? Additionally, studying elite discourse, leadership decision-making styles, and domestic power dynamics provides insight into how rivals define their strategic imperatives and red lines.
Beyond doctrine and history, a capabilities-based analysis of the ways and means used to achieve national security objectives is essential. This includes military procurement trends, economic coercion tools, diplomatic maneuvers, technological investments, intelligence operations, and information warfare strategies. A rival’s force posture, war-gaming exercises, patterns of alliance formation, and responses to past crises reveal their military capabilities and preferred methods of achieving strategic aims. Economic instruments—such as China’s Belt and Road Initiative, Russia’s energy leverage over Europe, or Iran’s proxy network funding mechanisms—must be considered national strategy extensions. The final step is integrating intelligence from multiple domains, using AI-assisted wargaming, scenario modeling, and red-teaming exercises to anticipate and counteract adversary moves before they gain strategic momentum. A military strategy that merely seeks to deter or counter isolated actions will always be on the back foot; actual strategic competition demands an offensive mindset that undermines the coherence of a rival’s strategy itself.
Know Thyself: Defining US Interests
Great power competition imposes two critical requirements on SOF planners. First, they must integrate influence, leverage, and advantage into country, regional, theater, or global plans by deeply understanding what the United States seeks to achieve, as expressed as national security interests. These long-term aspirations are articulated in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and the National Defense Strategy (NDS), which outline nested political and military objectives. The NDS translates desired political conditions into military requirements.
At the same time, the additional study of policy—akin to a FRAGO to an OPORD—clarifies the specific actions and objectives necessary to achieve broader national aims. Second, SOF planners must thoroughly analyze what threatens these aspirations. This requires a focused study on which U.S. interests are at risk, identifying the actors responsible, and assessing the nature of the threat. Additionally, a deeper understanding of the adversary's strategy, capabilities, and credibility is essential to shaping SOF efforts that counter threats and create enduring advantages in the ongoing contest for influence and control.
In his masterclass book on foreign policy-making, Foreign Affairs Strategy: Logic for American Statecraft, Dr. Terry Deibel outlines a clear framework for developing and evaluating strategy, beginning with national security interests. He emphasizes that threats and opportunities are defined by their impact on these interests. A threat exists when it jeopardizes an interest, while an opportunity advances it.
Actors use their power to tackle both threats and opportunities through their influence, which reflects how that power affects a specific target. Understanding competition relies on key strategic elements: interests, threats, opportunities, power, and influence. For Special Operations Forces (SOF) strategists, these components are essential for developing military objectives. SOF strategies should aim to protect interests from threats, create opportunities, or generate influence that can provide either immediate advantages or potential benefits in the future.
A significant drawback of the current threat-focused culture within the Department of Defense (DoD) is the tendency to categorize a nation as a threat, resulting in an automatic labeling of all actions as hostile. This approach has several negative consequences, starting with the basic assumptions made in planning. When a rival nation is regarded as an absolute adversary, it becomes too easy to misconstrue local security issues as threats to U.S. interests, often without thorough analysis. This reflects the classic mindset of "if you are a hammer, everything looks like a nail." From this framework, the planner usually fails to recognize that U.S. interests—the elements perceived to be under threat—define what constitutes a threat. The planning trick is to understand interests and use them to distinguish between significant threats and benign activities. Target what is important for conventional and asymmetric actions, and don’t bother with everything else.
Being a warfighter should not confuse the SOF planner. Competition involves a conservation principle that war does not. Conflict should be avoided, as the costs and risks associated with war can diminish power and the ability to control the geopolitical environment. In contrast, war resorts to violent conflict to achieve objectives. However, warfighting approaches can often be flawed means of creating protection, advancement, and influence in a competitive landscape. Relying solely on violence as the primary solution to political problems fosters an over-dependence on military action, potentially neglecting other methods for protecting and advancing interests or generating influence. This reliance can lead to strategic exhaustion, much like the operational choice to conduct only frontal assaults against well-fortified enemies, as seen in World War I. Planners must recognize the political nature of power struggles and adapt their strategies accordingly.
An effective strategy for competition can be guided by Liddell Hart's concept of the indirect approach. According to Hart, strategists should aim to disrupt an adversary's balance rather than confront them head-on. This means undermining the adversary’s system, strategy, and core logic. By grasping the driving forces behind interests and the principles of the indirect approach, one can create a strategic advantage essential for effective competition. Know thyself and thy enemy. Differences in values, sociopolitical systems, strategies, strengths, weaknesses, and ability to create opportunities can be used to gain and maintain advantages over other nations by inducing strategic errors, inaction, or inability to carry out their strategies to completion.
The United States, as a leading global superpower, adopts a defensive stance focused on deterrence to maintain the status quo. However, this doesn't mean being merely reactionary. Deterrent strategies should be dynamic and comprehensive, aiming to influence rival behavior. A broad approach using conventional and nuclear forces is crucial for national survival, as it dissuades destabilizing actions from other nations while promoting positive options. Similar to operant conditioning, we use incentives and consequences to shape desired behaviors.
To effectively shape a rival's behavior through deterrence, the U.S. must employ unconventional punitive measures that quickly and clearly address violations of established "red lines." Red lines lose their significance without strong enforcement, but there's always the risk of political overreach in responses. Unorthodox options should adhere to three key principles: first, consider both the rival and the domestic audience; second, set clear, limited objectives for the response; and third, target recoverable assets that deliver immediate results without causing long-term harm.
Current assumptions about other nations' "red lines" limit punitive actions; exploring broader competition may help leaders create more effective strategies, especially in fait accompli or gradual aggression. Unconventional responses should be employed to make US reactions to aggressive actions seem unpredictable, instilling doubt in rivals about the wisdom of their aggression. It follows that a deterrent strategy encompasses the full range of national power instruments, the innovative use of conventional forces, and the dynamic application of unconventional forces to create predictable and unpredictable responses.
Lastly, unconventional options should offer decision-makers opportunities to achieve their objectives proactively. Positive messaging, partner development, security cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and civil affairs are examples of proactively showcasing an appealing competitive strategy. Contributing positively to the global order remains a powerful tool in an asymmetric approach. This capacity emphasizes promoting interests rather than merely defending them and will likely be appealing to a majority of nations.
These dimensions of deterrence are by no means solely a military approach. The NDS makes clear that the role of the military concerning its interagency partners is also a critical area of emphasis:
“A long-term strategic competition requires the seamless integration of multiple elements of national power: diplomacy, information, economics, finance, intelligence, law enforcement, and military. Our government partners are often the lead in key competition areas... The military, for its part, must continue to fulfill its role of deterrence, but must also consider ways to apply the military instrument differently to better enable diplomatic, information, and economic elements of power.”
Assembling National Power: A Multifarious Approach
Collaboration with interagency partners and allies is essential to SOF’s success. Improved communication and education can align SOF efforts with the mandates and priorities of partners such as the Department of State, CIA, USAID, FBI, Border Patrol, Department of Transportation, Agriculture, or any other member of the National Security Council. Additionally, deepening relationships with the Departments of Justice, Treasury, and Commerce can enhance efforts in counter-threat finance and population-based solutions. Aligning with international allies and partners ensures that shared interests and collaborative planning support U.S. objectives.
When executed effectively, competition achieves U.S. policy objectives without escalating to conflict. However, the Joint Force must remain prepared for potential high-end conflict due to strategic miscalculation or deliberate hostility. The asymmetric advantage of the Joint Force lies with SOF. SOF’s ability to provide access, conduct sabotage-IO-PsyOps, support populations, rescue hostages, work with indigenous forces, and execute precision strikes ensures the Joint Force’s readiness for both peace and war. Through its unique competencies, SOF remains a critical tool for advancing and protecting U.S. interests through hard or soft power.
Both orthodox and unorthodox applications of force are essential elements of a comprehensive military campaign. The Joint Force must continue to meet its traditional responsibilities, such as maintaining strategic deterrence and preparing for high-end conflict, to keep conventional and nuclear threats at bay. Positioning combat-credible forces in contested theaters reassures local allies and partners while also effectively acting as a tripwire for conventional military aggression. However, this approach has not deterred actors from maneuvering to avoid the strength of U.S. forces. As the Joint Force maintains orthodox approaches to maintain strategic deterrence and readiness for conflict, it should also explore unorthodox approaches to emergent and enduring problems.
Critically, joint SOF should integrate its approach with civilian counterparts across the Interagency, from planning through execution to assessment. From this more dynamic position, a strategy should articulate unconventional options for deterrence and punitive actions if deterrence fails. Finally, the Joint Force must also provide unconventional options to achieve strategic gains proactively in situations short of war – explicitly seeking to create decision dominance by exploiting asymmetries of understanding, position, and capability. In doing so, the U.S. can evolve strategy beyond a binary construct of war and peace and develop actionable options that better reflect reality.
Campaigning in Competition
The competitive campaign does not simply begin and end with a CONOP. Over the past twenty-five years, this well-established approach has exemplified the “mother-may-I” method regarding tactical and operational requests for conducting SOF actions to counter terrorists or insurgents. It represents a distinctly singular way to apply SOF capabilities. The process of requesting to conduct an isolated action typically results in a standalone effort that does not foster iterative, long-term strategies. This method complicates the ability to connect actions in a series that accomplish specific ends, making the idea of campaigning nearly inconceivable. This assumption holds when any single CONOP receives a "no," it likely eliminates subsequent actions.
An approved campaign plan must replace the CONOP. The military adopts a campaign plan instead of improvising operations on the fly because strategic success demands deliberate, coordinated, and long-term efforts that align with national objectives. A well-structured campaign plan ensures unity of effort, efficient resource allocation, and flexibility while minimizing the risks of reactionary or disjointed actions. Here’s why a campaign plan is essential:
Strategic Alignment – A campaign plan ensures military actions support broader political, economic, and diplomatic goals. Without it, operations risk being tactically effective but strategically meaningless, failing to advance national security interests.
Operational Coordination – Military campaigns involve multiple forces, domains (land, air, sea, space, cyber), and sometimes interagency and allied partners. A plan synchronizes these efforts, preventing fragmented or contradictory actions.
Resource Efficiency – Warfighting and competition require finite resources—troops, logistics, intelligence assets, and funding. A campaign plan ensures these resources are used effectively, rather than being wasted on short-term, uncoordinated efforts.
Anticipation & Adaptability – Planning allows for contingencies—predicting adversary responses and preparing options in advance. While flexibility is crucial, having a framework for action enables more effective adjustments when situations change.
Decision Dominance – Military success is not just about reacting to enemy moves; it’s about shaping the environment and forcing adversaries into unfavorable decisions. A campaign plan enables proactive operations rather than reactionary firefighting.
Historical Lessons – Wars like Vietnam and Afghanistan have shown the dangers of fighting without a coherent strategy. Tactical successes without a clear end state lead to prolonged conflicts, wasted effort, and strategic failure.
Avoiding Strategic Drift – A lack of planning leads to strategic drift, where actions become disconnected from overarching goals, and the military loses sight of what success looks like.
In the gray zone, where competition is perpetual, a campaign plan allows SOF and the broader military to shape adversary behavior through influence, leverage, and advantage. Iterative planning—constant assessment and refinement—prevents stagnation while ensuring operations remain aligned with national objectives. Making things up as you go might work at the tactical level in individual engagements, but at the strategic and operational level, it leads to confusion, inefficiency, and failure. This can be gotten away with against a terrorist organization, but not a peer nation-state rival. A campaign plan provides a structured yet flexible approach to ensure military efforts contribute to long-term success.
Conclusion
The evolving landscape of great power competition necessitates a fundamental shift in how the United States employs Special Operations Forces (SOF). As traditional military engagement gives way to strategic competition in the gray zone, SOF must move beyond a reactive, tactical focus and adopt a proactive, long-term strategic framework. As outlined in this article, competitive campaigning provides the blueprint for leveraging SOF’s unique capabilities to shape the security environment and counter adversary influence without escalating into full-scale conflict.
A critical takeaway is the need for SOF to integrate into a broader Joint Integrated Campaigning (JIC) approach, synchronizing efforts across military, diplomatic, economic, and informational domains. SOF’s ability to operate with agility and discretion makes it an ideal force for shaping conditions before crises emerge, but success requires deep adversary study, adaptive training, and better interagency coordination. Without measurable strategic outcomes, SOF risks losing relevance in an era where military funding and operational priorities are increasingly scrutinized.
SOF’s role in great power competition is to exploit asymmetries—leveraging influence, leverage, and advantage to disrupt adversary strategies at their core rather than merely reacting to individual provocations. This requires shifting from a mindset of deterrence-through-response to one of decision dominance—actively shaping adversary behavior through dynamic, multifaceted competition. Integrating conventional and unconventional deterrence mechanisms, alongside collaboration with civilian and allied partners, will allow SOF to enhance the United States’ ability to compete effectively without resorting to direct military confrontation.
Ultimately, SOF must embrace an offensive strategic posture within competition, applying the principles of Liddell Hart’s indirect approach to undermine adversary cohesion, strategic confidence, and operational effectiveness. By harnessing its asymmetric capabilities, SOF can ensure the United States maintains its strategic edge, preventing adversaries from gaining decisive advantages while securing long-term national security interests.
Bibliography
Brands, Hal. The Twilight Struggle: What the Cold War Teaches Us about Great-Power Rivalry Today. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2022.
Clausewitz, Carl von. On War. Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.
Freedman, Lawrence. Strategy: A History. New York: Oxford University Press, 2013.
Gray, Colin S. Modern Strategy. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999. Kissinger, Henry. World Order. New York: Penguin Press, 2014.
Luttwak, Edward. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Revised and enlarged edition. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2002.
Sun Tzu. The Art of War. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. New York: Oxford University Press, 1963.
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