Findings of the 2024 Committee on The National Defense Strategy
Strategy Central - By Practitioners, For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth, August 4, 2024
Task Force Smith Retreating in Korea, 1950.
Introduction
A bipartisan panel reviewing U.S. defense strategy found that America's odds of fighting a major war are the highest in 80 years, and its military isn't prepared. The most damning sentence in the Committee’s report is that the “U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat.”[i]
The 2024 Commission on the National Defense Strategy assessed the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in a nearly 100-page report criticizing the Pentagon for being slow, Congress for partisanship, and multiple administrations for complacency towards threats from China, Russia, and the Middle East. The report released in July, produced with the help of outside experts, underscores the urgent need for public awareness and readiness, comparing the current deficit of preparedness to post-Vietnam, Cold War-era readiness.
The report emphasizes the urgency of modifying the U.S. defense strategy to better address significant global threats, such as the ongoing war in Europe and potential conflicts in the Pacific with peer adversaries. It suggests implementing an "all elements of national power" approach, restructuring the Department of Defense's operations, boosting industrial production, resolving workforce shortages, and increasing defense spending. The Commission points out that the United States was slow to recognize the threat of terrorism before 2001 and was late in understanding the growing strength of China and the renewed threat posed by Russia. Despite this recognition, the response has been uneven, slow, and inadequate across government agencies and Congress. The report underscores the necessity for fundamental changes to enable the U.S. to tackle current security challenges effectively.
In another harsh rebuke of the Department of Defense (DoD), The Commission demanded a significant departure from the current bureaucratic practices. Bloated, slow, and unresponsive won’t work against more agile, focused peer competitors. Even with a nimbler bureaucracy, the defense department cannot do it all or without the interagency. Integrated deterrence is impossible without facilitating a more achievable and comprehensive "all elements of national power" approach to national security. The report also recommends Congress allocate resources wisely and increase spending across various national security agencies
The Bottom Line: The Commission emphasizes a revised NDS and that substantial changes are needed immediately to alter the operations of the DoD, transform the strategic focus of other national security agencies, and improve the functionality of Congress. Additionally, it calls for closer U.S. engagement with allies and the mobilization of the public and private sectors.[ii]
Commission Findings and Recommendations for Policymakers
In its report, the Commission makes the following findings and recommendations for DoD and Congress:
Strategic Environment. The United States faces the most challenging global environment with the most severe ramifications since the end of the Cold War. The trends are getting worse, not better.
DoD. The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot and should not solely be responsible for national defense. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the need for an "integrated deterrence," which is not currently being implemented effectively. A comprehensive approach that involves all elements of national power is necessary to coordinate and utilize resources across the Department of Defense, the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.
Technology. Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental changes in how the DoD functions. When the threat approaches wartime urgency, the DoD operates at the speed of bureaucracy.
Force Size. The NDS force-sizing construct is inadequate for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force Construct—with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners—sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East.
Production. U.S. industrial production is currently insufficient to meet the needs for equipment, technology, and munitions, especially in the event of a major conflict between world powers.
Readiness. The Joint Force is currently struggling to maintain readiness. Adding more responsibilities without providing the necessary resources will only lead to further breakdown.
Interagency. DoD should seek to better align its concepts with other parts of the interagency to better coordinate military tools and other instruments of national power in pursuit of integrated deterrence.
Congress. The United States needs to spend its resources more effectively and efficiently to build a future force rather than maintaining the existing one. Additional resources are required, along with greater wisdom on where to place investments. Congress should approve a supplementary budget to kickstart a multiyear outlay in national security innovation and the industrial base. Furthermore, Congress should remove the spending caps outlined in the 2023 Fiscal Responsibility Act and ensure real growth in national security spending for both defense and nondefense in fiscal year 2025, at least in line with the recommendations of the 2018 NDS Commission. Future budgets must allocate funds to support defense and other national security efforts to a level similar to the U.S. national effort during the Cold War.
The Key Flaw In The NDS: Integrated Deterrence
The 2024 Congressional Committee on the National Defense Strategy highlighted several deficiencies with integrated deterrence. Their findings pointed out the following key issues:
Coordination and Integration: The committee noted that there were significant challenges in achieving seamless coordination and integration across different domains (land, sea, air, space, and cyber). This lack of cohesion was a vulnerability in the deterrence strategy.
Resource Allocation: There were concerns about the adequacy and allocation of resources necessary to support integrated deterrence. The committee emphasized that the effectiveness of deterrence efforts could be compromised without proper funding and resource management.
Technological Gaps: The committee identified technological gaps that could hinder the implementation of integrated deterrence. These gaps included outdated systems and the slow pace of adopting new technologies, which could leave the U.S. at a disadvantage against more technologically advanced adversaries.
Interagency and Allied Coordination: The report highlighted deficiencies in interagency and allied coordination. Effective integrated deterrence requires close collaboration with allies and other government agencies, and the committee found that existing mechanisms were insufficient to ensure this level of cooperation.
Strategic Communication: The committee pointed out that strategic communication efforts were not robust enough to support integrated deterrence. Clear and consistent messaging is crucial to deter adversaries, and the current communication strategies were found lacking.
These findings underscore the need for a more cohesive, well-resourced, and technologically advanced approach to integrated deterrence to effectively address the evolving security challenges.
How An Old Cold Warrior Might Critique The New Cold War Strategy
The DoD stands accused of being ill-prepared to defend the nation. The Commission makes clear and striking findings and recommendations that the DoD, the interagency, and Congress must follow to best prepare our national defense. Given the Committee’s description of the environment, a Cold War perspective might be useful. There are similarities between the U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam and our current withdrawal from the war on terror. In that vein, what might a Cold War strategist conclude about the 2022 NDS, and what recommendations might he have?
Henry Kissinger, renowned for his Cold War diplomacy, strategic insight, and historical perspective, would likely offer a nuanced critique of the 2022 NDS and its implementation by Secretary Lloyd Austin. His analysis might focus on several key areas, as imagined by Strategy Central’s StratBot, to play the role of Kissinger. StratBot was asked to examine the Commission’s findings and the 2022 NDS and explain how Kissinger would view both documents and make recommendations.
Kissinger might begin by diplomatically by commending the NDS for its clear prioritization of threats, particularly the emphasis on the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Russia. However, he could argue that the strategy needs to better articulate how to balance these priorities without overextending U.S. resources, a concern he has historically emphasized. Kissinger might be less kind in scrutinizing the concept of integrated deterrence, questioning whether the current implementation effectively synchronizes efforts across all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber or even attempts to incorporate allies. He might point out deficiencies in interagency and allied coordination, stressing the importance of a cohesive but attainable approach to deterrence.
Much like the Committee, Kissinger would critique the adequacy of resource allocation, emphasizing that without sufficient funding and rapid technological advancements, the U.S. might struggle to maintain a credible deterrent posture. He has often highlighted the need for a sustainable defense budget that supports long-term strategic goals. A strong military threat is necessary, but well-reasoned and funded actions are the heart of the game in great power competition.
Lastly, Kissinger might address the importance of strategic communication, noting that clear and consistent messaging is crucial for effective deterrence. He could argue that current efforts are insufficient and must be bolstered to ensure adversaries understand U.S. resolve and capabilities.
It seems very likely Kissinger would advise Secretary Austin to revise the NDS to better articulate an integrated, well-resourced, achievable, and clearly communicated strategy. Synthetic Kissinger complains that the current NDS is somewhat muddled. Secretary Austin would be wise to heed Congress and “Synthetic Kissinger’s” advice to address the deficiencies in the 2022 NDS. The new version should incorporate the findings of the Committee and be accompanied by a plan to revise the ossified DoD bureaucracy.
Conclusion
If Congress finds that the “U.S. military lacks both the capabilities and the capacity required to be confident it can deter and prevail in combat,” there ought to be a surge in concern by voters, lawmakers, and the military. Defense remains one of the largest government outlays and is the key to our national defense. So far, the response has been muted.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) presents a robust framework for addressing the multifaceted threats posed by global adversaries such as China and Russia. However, despite its clear threat prioritization, the document falls short in several critical areas that undermine its effectiveness. The Committee’s critique underscores the need for a more integrated and well-coordinated approach to deterrence, highlighting deficiencies in resource allocation, interagency collaboration, and strategic communication.
The Committee finds that the NDS’s emphasis on integrated deterrence is laudable in theory but lacks practical cohesion. The failure to synchronize efforts across land, sea, air, space, and cyber domains reveals a vulnerability that adversaries could exploit. This disjointed approach is compounded by inadequate interagency and allied coordination, which is essential for a comprehensive deterrence strategy. Without seamless integration, the U.S. risks presenting a fragmented defense posture that could embolden opponents and leave gaps to be exploited.
Furthermore, the strategy’s resource allocation is a significant concern. Cold War National Security Advisor and Secretary of State Kissinger has long advocated for a sustainable defense budget that supports long-term strategic goals. The current NDS, however, does not adequately address the need for rapid technological advancements and sufficient funding, leaving the U.S. potentially ill-prepared to maintain a credible deterrent posture. This gap between strategic ambitions and resource commitments could severely handicap the U.S. in a protracted conflict.
Strategic communication is another area where the NDS falters. Clear and consistent messaging is vital for effective deterrence, ensuring that adversaries understand U.S. resolve and capabilities. The current communication efforts, however, are insufficient and must be bolstered to project a unified and strong stance. The Committee emphasized the importance of strategic narratives reinforcing U.S. commitments and deterring adversarial actions through psychological and informational superiority.
While the 2022 NDS sets a strategic direction for addressing contemporary threats, it requires significant refinements to be truly effective. A more integrated, well-resourced, and clearly communicated strategy is essential to navigate the complex global security landscape. By addressing these critical areas, the U.S. can enhance its defense posture and effectively counter the evolving threats from global adversaries. The path forward necessitates a recalibrated approach that combines strategic clarity with practical execution, ensuring that the U.S. remains a formidable force in the face of emerging challenges.
[i] Congressional Committee on the National Security Strategy. 2024 Report on the National Security Strategy. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2024.
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