By Jeremiah Monk
Introduction
As global competition evolves, U.S. military strategy must adapt to a reality where conventional warfare is no longer the primary arena of conflict. In his 2015 article, Philip Kapusta defined the Gray Zone as “competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality.” Kapusta noted that the U.S. has engaged in only five conventional wars over the past century, compared to 57 non-traditional actions. This data highlights that the Gray Zone is the norm rather than the exception.
Additionally, as I emphasized in the August 2024 Strategy Central article “What Are We Deterring,” effective deterrence today is less about preparing for open warfare and more about leveraging influence, intelligence, and hybrid capabilities to deter adversaries before conflict begins. Reorienting the U.S. military to treat the Gray Zone as the primary operating environment means shifting from a combat-centric force to a structure focused on flexibility, influence, and deterrence across unconventional domains. This article explores how each branch of the U.S. military—Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Space Force—can adapt to prioritize Gray Zone operations while maintaining a secondary capability for conventional warfare.
Redefining Deterrence: A Strategic Shift
The Deterrence article underscores the need for a deterrence model that extends beyond combat capabilities, noting that the Department of Defense (DoD) has traditionally equated deterrence with combat readiness. This approach fails to address adversaries who operate below the threshold of armed conflict, using economic, cyber, and influence tactics to achieve strategic goals without triggering military retaliation. Meanwhile, DoD’s focus remains on prevailing in combat rather than preventing and dissuading adversarial actions that could alleviate the need to engage in combat in the first place. This juxtaposition demands a redefined approach that integrates all elements of national power to achieve effective deterrence.
The DoD could restructure its forces to prioritize the Gray Zone as the default state of international conflict. This shift would entail developing capabilities optimized for unconventional, cyber, intelligence, and influence operations while retaining readiness for conventional warfare as a secondary focus. Here is a breakdown of a proposed force structure and organizational approach by service:
Army: Prioritizing Mobility, Special Operations, and Cyber Capabilities
In the Gray Zone, the Army’s primary focus would shift to small, mobile units and special operations forces (SOF) that can conduct intelligence gathering, cyber operations, and irregular warfare. The aim is to create an agile force capable of competing in complex, hybrid environments rather than preparing for large-scale, conventional battles.
Special Operations Expansion: Increase the size and operational support for Army Special Forces (Green Berets), Rangers, and Psychological Operations units. These units specialize in counterinsurgency, influence campaigns, and partnering with foreign militaries, making them ideal for missions that require a nuanced, on-the-ground presence in the Gray Zone.
Cyber and Electronic Warfare (EW) Units: Establish dedicated cyber and EW units at the brigade level to engage in cyber-psychological operations, disrupt adversary networks, and safeguard U.S. operations in contested environments. Cyber capabilities are essential for modern warfare, allowing the Army to counter adversaries in non-kinetic domains.
Forward-Deployed Hybrid Forces: Position small, resilient Army units in regions where hybrid threats are prevalent, such as Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific. These forces would act as rapid responders to Gray Zone activities, with multi-domain capabilities for intelligence, reconnaissance, and influence operations.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID): Emphasize FID missions, where Army units work alongside allied militaries to counter irregular threats. By building local defense capacities and enhancing partner resilience, the Army strengthens leverage in regions vulnerable to adversary influence.
Divestment Strategy: To support these shifts, the Army could divest from some heavy mechanized units, such as certain armored brigades and main battle tanks like the M1 Abrams. Heavy armor is optimized for large-scale combat but offers limited utility in irregular warfare. The Army could also reduce its reliance on large artillery units, focusing instead on portable precision-strike capabilities that support flexible, asymmetric operations.
Navy: Agile, Distributed Fleets and Enhanced Maritime Domain Awareness
In a Gray Zone context, the Navy’s primary mission would be maritime domain awareness, influence operations, and controlling contested waters. While the Navy retains a secondary readiness for conventional naval combat, it would prioritize capabilities that provide intelligence, agility, and non-escalatory responses.
Distributed Maritime Operations: Restructure the fleet to include smaller, multi-role vessels (e.g., Littoral Combat Ships, Unmanned Surface Vessels) capable of rapid response and agile presence operations in contested waters. Distributed fleets allow the Navy to operate effectively in constrained and littoral zones, making it harder for adversaries to predict and counter U.S. naval presence.
Maritime Special Operations: Expand Naval Special Warfare units, such as SEALs, to focus on covert, Gray Zone missions. These missions could include countering hybrid threats, conducting maritime reconnaissance, and deploying in key maritime areas where conventional forces would be too visible or provocative.
Intelligence and Surveillance: Equip Navy vessels with advanced intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems for continuous maritime domain awareness. Gray Zone operations often rely on intelligence-driven strategies, and the Navy would require persistent ISR to monitor adversary actions, from covert supply routes to proxy activities.
Cyber and EW Integration: Place cyber warfare teams on key naval assets to disrupt adversary navigation, communications, and supply chains through electronic and cyber operations. By integrating EW with maritime forces, the Navy can operate non-kinetically to influence and deter without escalating to open conflict.
Divestment Strategy: The Navy could divest from large, high-maintenance platforms such as Ticonderoga-class cruisers and certain aging aircraft carriers. These vessels are resource-intensive and vulnerable in contested waters. By reallocating resources to smaller, more versatile platforms, the Navy can optimize its force structure for Gray Zone missions.
Air Force: Emphasis on ISR, Rapid Mobility, and Influence Operations
For the Air Force, the Gray Zone requires a focus on ISR, rapid deployment capabilities, and influence operations rather than traditional air dominance. The emphasis would shift toward unmanned systems, cyber capabilities, and intelligence assets that enhance flexibility and responsiveness.
Unmanned Systems and Drones: Expand the fleet of drones and unmanned aerial systems (UAS) for persistent surveillance, reconnaissance, and influence operations. Drones can provide real-time intelligence in contested regions, support psychological operations from above, and maintain a low-profile presence in Gray Zone conflicts.
Cyber and EW Squadrons: Create dedicated squadrons for cyber and electronic warfare to disrupt enemy infrastructure, degrade communications, and perform cyber-enabled psychological operations. These capabilities enhance the Air Force’s ability to operate in Gray Zone environments with minimal kinetic engagement.
Influence and Information Operations: Develop capabilities to conduct influence operations, including air-dropped propaganda, broadcasted messaging, and non-lethal psychological operations. These tools enable the Air Force to influence adversary populations and sway public opinion without direct conflict.
Rapid Air Mobility: Invest in rapid airlift platforms to enable quick deployment of small, specialized teams in contested or unstable areas. Rapid mobility enhances the Air Force’s ability to respond to hybrid threats, providing deterrence through an on-the-ground presence.
Divestment Strategy: The Air Force could divest from some legacy fighter programs and manned bomber platforms, like the B-1 Lancer, which are costly and focused on conventional air superiority. Shifting resources toward drones, ISR platforms, and rapid airlift assets better aligns with Gray Zone priorities, allowing the Air Force to adapt to complex, hybrid missions.
Marine Corps: Stand-In Forces for Coastal and Influence Operations
The Marine Corps would shift from traditional amphibious assaults to operating as “stand-in” forces with a focus on coastal and influence operations. Marines would prioritize small, multi-role units capable of conducting reconnaissance, intelligence, and influence missions in close proximity to adversaries.
Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations (EABO): Develop small, agile bases in key regions for low-profile operations that monitor adversary actions and establish regional leverage. EABO allows Marines to engage in Gray Zone missions without escalating tensions, providing deterrence through presence.
Influence and Counter-Influence Units: Form influence-focused units that specialize in intelligence gathering, psychological operations, and counter-influence. These units enable the Marines to conduct missions that support U.S. influence in vulnerable areas, countering adversary propaganda and sway.
Hybrid Warfare Teams: Equip Marine units with hybrid warfare capabilities, such as cyber tools, EW, and drones, for multi-domain operations. These teams can counter irregular threats and enhance tactical flexibility in contested coastal regions.
Local Partnering and Training: Emphasize foreign internal defense (FID) missions, where Marines train and assist allied forces to bolster local defenses. By building capacity in partner nations, the Marines create regional leverage, supporting long-term stability and deterrence.
Divestment Strategy: The Marine Corps could reduce reliance on traditional amphibious platforms like the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicles (AAVs), which are costly and focused on conventional amphibious assaults. Scaling back heavy artillery and armored units also aligns with the Marines’ pivot to lighter, more agile forces for hybrid missions.
Space Force: Enhancing Resilience in Space and Cyber Domains
In the Gray Zone, the Space Force’s mission would emphasize protecting U.S. space infrastructure, gathering intelligence, and leveraging space-based assets for influence and cyber operations. Instead of focusing solely on conventional space warfare, the Space Force would prioritize building resilience against adversarial actions in the space and cyber domains.
Space ISR and Cyber Defense: Develop enhanced ISR capabilities specifically for monitoring adversary activities in space, such as satellite movements and potential cyber threats. This includes bolstering satellite defenses to prevent cyber infiltration or jamming, ensuring that U.S. space infrastructure remains secure and reliable in the face of adversarial interference.
Satellite-Based Influence Operations: Use satellite systems to conduct influence and information operations. This could include broadcasting messages or digital content in denied or restricted regions, allowing the U.S. to maintain influence and visibility even in adversary-controlled environments.
Anti-Satellite and Electronic Warfare Readiness: Although the focus remains on non-escalatory deterrence, the Space Force would maintain defensive anti-satellite capabilities, such as satellite jamming and electronic countermeasures, as a deterrent against adversary space attacks. These measures enable the Space Force to protect critical space assets without relying solely on kinetic solutions.
Cyber-Resilient Space Infrastructure: Invest in distributed, resilient satellite constellations that reduce dependence on large, stationary assets vulnerable to attack. Small, rapidly deployable satellite networks can ensure continuous coverage and redundancy, enhancing the resilience of U.S. space capabilities in contested environments.
Allied Space Partnerships: Collaborate with allies on shared space monitoring and deterrence frameworks. By coordinating ISR and counter-space efforts with partner nations, the Space Force strengthens collective deterrence and ensures a unified response to adversary actions in space.
Divestment Strategy: The Space Force could phase out large, high-cost satellites and associated infrastructure that are increasingly vulnerable to adversarial threats. By reallocating resources toward smaller, distributed systems and cyber-resilient space infrastructure, the Space Force would build a force structure better suited for Gray Zone competition, while reducing reliance on assets designed primarily for conventional space dominance.
Conclusion: Rebuilding the U.S. Military for Gray Zone Dominance
To be prepared for the challenges of the future operating environment, the U.S. military must pivot away from a predominant focus on conventional warfare to address the persistent reality of Gray Zone conflict. This paradigm shift calls for a force structure oriented around flexibility, influence, intelligence, and deterrence, where traditional kinetic engagements are secondary to a broader strategy of maintaining leverage.
By prioritizing unconventional capabilities across each branch, the military can more effectively counter adversaries who operate below the threshold of war. This restructuring allows the U.S. to maintain regional influence, bolster partnerships, and counter adversarial influence operations without relying solely on the threat of large-scale combat. Each service’s divestment from outdated, combat-centric platforms frees resources for investments in agile, hybrid, and cyber-enabled assets that are essential for Gray Zone operations.
In adapting to this new operating environment, the U.S. military acknowledges that the Gray Zone is not an exception but a norm—an arena where influence, deterrence, and resilience determine success. Rebuilding for the Gray Zone positions the military to better protect national interests, uphold international stability, and deter adversaries who seek to achieve their aims without triggering conventional conflict. Doing so also presents an opportunity to divest expensive, legacy platforms that are tailor-made for situations that generally should be avoided if the military can dominate in the Gray Zone. This strategic evolution is essential for ensuring the U.S. military remains effective and capable in the face of modern, hybrid threats.
References
Kapusta, Philip. "The Gray Zone." Special Warfare, October-December 2015, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, p 19-25. https://www.swcs.mil/Portals/111/October%202015%20Special%20Warfare.pdf
Monk, Jeremiah. “What Are We Deterring?” Strategy Central, August 2024. https://www.strategycentral.io/post/what-are-we-deterring
