America With No Understanding of Red Lines and Rivals That Do
Strategy Central
By and For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth, October 26, 2024
Introduction
The conflicts between Israel and Iran and Russia and Ukraine reveal the most intense form of Great Power Competition today. With an emerging coalition of adversarial autocracies—Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea—the stakes have risen for the U.S. and its allies. Each of these rivals is supporting the others through strategic cooperation, undermining U.S. interests across multiple regions. This concerted challenge demands that the United States not only reconsider its National Defense Strategy (NDS) but also adopt a scientific approach to understanding and responding to adversaries' red lines. The hesitation in Washington to act with conviction, often stemming from flawed assumptions about rivals' boundaries, has emboldened these alliances and risks undermining American security.
An Axis of Autocratic Partners
The cooperation between China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea is strategic and deliberate, with each nation bringing its unique assets to bear against Western interests. Russia, once a global power in its own right, is increasingly relying on China for technological and manufacturing capabilities as it becomes ever more dependent on Beijing. Russia also provides intelligence and resources to Iranian proxies such as the Houthis, even as it taps Iranian drones for its war in Ukraine.¹ This dynamic is pushing Moscow into a client-state relationship with China, a development that has significant implications for the U.S. and its allies.
China’s alliance with Iran also underscores the growing complexities of Great Power Competition. Although limited by China's strategic caution in the Middle East, Beijing's support for Tehran remains strong enough to disrupt U.S. influence in the region. In recent diplomatic events, China has asserted itself as an anti-Western ally, promoting Iran’s membership in the BRICS coalition while taking advantage of Iranian oil under sanction. Despite the limits on China’s influence in Iran, Beijing's posture as a diplomatic and economic partner remains a crucial factor in the cohesion of the anti-U.S. bloc.²
Meanwhile, North Korea’s contribution to Russia’s war efforts is another component of this collective threat. Pyongyang has reportedly dispatched thousands of troops and is providing munitions to aid Moscow in Ukraine, with geolocated footage showing North Korean soldiers in Russian uniforms at training facilities in Russia’s Far East.³ This military cooperation provides North Korea with valuable combat experience and, critically, deepens its strategic ties with Russia and Iran. Such interactions are not merely transactional; they signify an ideological and strategic alignment against U.S. hegemony.
Challenging the Concept of Integrated Deterrence
The current U.S. defense posture relies on Integrated Deterrence, an ambitious approach that seeks to achieve a unified, global deterrence model. While theoretically comprehensive, Integrated Deterrence falls short in practice, attempting to address diverse threats “everywhere, all the time, perfectly coordinated.”⁴ This idealistic goal has proven unfeasible, creating gaps that embolden adversaries. The coordination between U.S. rivals exemplifies this, as they increasingly act in concert across multiple theaters, defying isolated U.S. deterrent measures.
The lack of clear, enforceable red lines has only exacerbated this issue. The recent attacks from Hezbollah and Iran suggest that the U.S. has overestimated these adversaries' boundaries, assuming they would avoid actions that might provoke a Western response. This miscalculation, based on flawed intelligence and speculative analysis, has led to what can be described as a “paralysis of deterrence.” The U.S. hesitates to act decisively, fearing escalation without properly understanding rivals' tolerance levels. This caution often results in emboldening those very adversaries, as seen with Iran's expanding influence in the Middle East and Russia’s sustained aggression in Ukraine.⁵
Revising the National Defense Strategy
To effectively counter these combined threats, the U.S. must reconsider its approach and focus on a collective, rather than isolated, strategy for its National Defense Strategy. A focus on addressing threats from one rival at a time will not suffice against an axis of autocratic states that operate in tandem. The NDS must evolve to encompass a multidimensional approach that does not only focus on China or Russia independently but recognizes the interconnectedness of these global threats.
A potential model can be seen in the proposed U.S.-Saudi defense treaty, which aims to integrate U.S. allies into a broader security network that requires less direct intervention from Washington.⁶ By building a framework of regional security partnerships, the U.S. could limit China’s influence and redirect Saudi and other Gulf state resources toward mutual interests. The alliance system needs to move beyond transactional, issue-specific deals and foster more durable, comprehensive partnerships. This shift in strategy would enhance the U.S.'s ability to counterbalance the autocratic coalition with a network of committed allies.
Conclusion: Scientific Red Lines and the Need for Decisive Action
The United States' historical reluctance to engage assertively, often due to misjudging adversaries' red lines, has created a pattern of inaction that now threatens American security interests. The assumption that certain actions would automatically trigger an unacceptable response from rivals has repeatedly proven inaccurate, as Iran, Russia, and their allies have demonstrated a far greater tolerance for risk than the U.S. anticipated.⁷ This misperception has only fueled adversaries' confidence, encouraging them to push boundaries without fear of meaningful retaliation.
To remedy this, the U.S. must adopt a scientific approach to defining and enforcing red lines. Rather than relying on vague, speculative assessments, the NDS should be informed by data-driven analyses that accurately gauge rivals' tolerance levels and identify actionable boundaries. Implementing clear, enforceable thresholds for adversarial actions would strengthen deterrence, moving the U.S. away from a defensive stance and toward a proactive policy that addresses the unified front posed by these adversarial states.
This is not a call for aggressive action; rather, it is a call to bridge the gap between our cautious stance and a more assertive approach that stops just short of crossing red lines. Integrating data, modeling, AI, and other predictive tools could replace the current reactive, opinion-based responses that have defined U.S. foreign policy decisions. The need for such an evolution is clear, especially given recent events (misjudging Hezbollah and Iran’s red lines) and the failure of deterrence to prevent Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. With all four of our main rivals collaborating to undermine U.S. interests, our approach to deterrence must become more decisive, moving beyond the timidity of the past two decades.
By committing to a strategy that combines realistic deterrence measures with a scientific approach to understanding red lines, the U.S. can regain its footing in the global arena. This recalibrated strategy would not only prevent paralysis in decision-making but also signal to adversaries that the United States is prepared to act decisively when its interests are threatened. If Washington hopes to maintain its strategic advantage, it must evolve beyond the constraints of Integrated Deterrence and forge a new path grounded in actionable intelligence and fortified alliances.
Footnotes
1. Katrina Northrop, "China’s Influence on Iran in Mideast Conflict is Limited, Analysts Say," Washington Post, October 25, 2024.
2. Ibid.
3. Choe Sang-Hun et al., "Videos Appear to Show North Korean Troops in Russia Amid Ukraine War," New York Times, October 25, 2024.
4. Michael Singh, "The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement," Foreign Affairs, October 17, 2024.
5. Northrop, "China’s Influence on Iran in Mideast Conflict is Limited."
6. Singh, "The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement."
7. Ibid.
Bibliography
Northrop, Katrina. "China’s Influence on Iran in Mideast Conflict is Limited, Analysts Say." Washington Post, October 25, 2024.
Sang-Hun, Choe, Arijeta Lajka, Christoph Koettl, and Shawn Paik. "Videos Appear to Show North Korean Troops in Russia Amid Ukraine War." New York Times, October 25, 2024.
Singh, Michael. "The Real Purpose of a U.S.-Saudi Security Agreement." Foreign Affairs, October 17, 2024.
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