By Jeremiah Monk
INTRODUCTION
The military design thinking movement represented a novel and adaptive approach to strategic problem-solving that rose to prominence in the 2010s as Western militaries grappled with the complexities of global counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency operations. Design thinking promised to revolutionize how military organizations approached complex, dynamic, and uncertain environments, helping them become more agile and effective. However, despite its early successes, the military design movement within the United States military has lost momentum as conventional warfare paradigms have reasserted dominance, especially following the war in Ukraine in the 2020s. As a result, strategic opportunities that might have been realized through a more design-centric lens are now routinely missed by the US Department of Defense. This article traces the rapid rise and decline of military design thinking in the United States and examines how the contemporary focus on conventional warfighting has caused military organizations to sideline the design movement at the expense of strategic flexibility.
The Emergence of Military Design Thinking
The roots of military design thinking can be traced to the broader movement of design thinking within civilian sectors, where it was employed as an approach to solving complex, ill-defined problems. Military design adapted this thinking to its own specific needs, particularly in the realm of strategy, operational planning, and decision-making, and connected design to the concept of Operational Art. The military version of design thinking, as it emerged in the late 20th and early 21st centuries, borrowed from several fields, including systems theory, organizational learning, and creative problem-solving frameworks.
The U.S. Army, for example, began exploring design thinking in earnest in the 2000s. This interest was driven by the recognition that traditional military planning models, which were linear and prescriptive, were insufficient to address the complexity of modern conflicts. The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan illustrated that conventional approaches to warfighting did not adequately prepare military forces for the unpredictable and adaptive nature of counterinsurgency operations. Moreover, traditional military frameworks were designed for state-on-state conflict, leaving gaps in the ability to respond to the decentralized, asymmetric challenges posed by non-state actors, insurgencies, and transnational threats.
Military design thinking offered an alternative. It emphasized critical thinking, iteration, and the ability to define problems from multiple perspectives. It promoted a holistic understanding of the environment, the adversary, and the relationships among various stakeholders. It was about recognizing that modern conflicts often presented not just a “military problem,” but a web of interconnected social, political, economic, and cultural issues that demanded innovative solutions.
Early Military Design Models
The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) became a pioneer of military design thinking, especially after their experiences in the first intifada in the 1990s. The IDF recognized that traditional operational art had failed to address the complexities of non-state actors like Hamas and Hezbollah and later, ISIS. The IDF embraced design thinking under the leadership of officers such as Brigadier General Shimon Naveh, who introduced Systemic Operational Design (SOD). SOD offered a way to manage complexity by understanding the entire system in which military forces operated, including the cognitive and cultural dimensions of both friend and foe.
One of the early models to emerge within the U.S. military was the Army Design Methodology (ADM), introduced around 2010. The ADM sought to integrate design thinking into the planning process by focusing on understanding the “operational environment” before developing courses of action. The ADM encouraged planners to consider not only the immediate military problem but also the wider context in which it existed. This broader perspective allowed for the identification of opportunities and risks that might otherwise be overlooked in traditional, linear planning models.
Successful Applications of Military Design
One of the most notable examples of the successful application of military design thinking was during the U.S. Army’s operations in Iraq, particularly during the surge in 2007-2008. As the situation deteriorated into a sectarian civil war, traditional military tactics were proving ineffective. The U.S. military needed a new approach to stabilize the country.
Military design thinking, through the lens of the ADM, played a crucial role in reshaping the U.S. strategy. General David Petraeus and his team, influenced by design thinking principles as found in chapter 4 of the counterinsurgency doctrine at the time (FM 3.24), re-examined the operational environment in Iraq. They realized that the traditional approach of eliminating insurgents was only part of the problem. The broader challenge involved restoring legitimacy to the Iraqi government, protecting the population, and promoting political reconciliation. By framing the problem in a more holistic manner, the U.S. military was able to devise a strategy that integrated both military and non-military elements, including political engagement and infrastructure development. The success of the surge was not solely due to design thinking, but the incorporation of its principles into operational planning allowed for a more nuanced approach to the conflict, which ultimately contributed to a temporary stabilization of Iraq.
Another example of successful military design application was during the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield, conducted by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) during the Second Intifada. This large-scale operation targeted Palestinian militant infrastructure and was instrumental in toppling Yasser Arafat’s regime in the Palestinian Authority, which had been implicated in the orchestration of numerous attacks against Israel. The IDF employed design thinking principles to understand and dismantle the complex system of militant networks and governance structures that had taken root under Arafat’s regime.
By applying Systemic Operational Design (SOD), the IDF analyzed the intricate web of militant groups, their social support networks, and their connections to the Palestinian Authority. The approach went beyond the conventional tactics of engaging in direct combat; it sought to reshape the environment by targeting key nodes of power and influence within the Palestinian territories. This holistic understanding enabled the IDF to conduct a coordinated and effective military campaign that not only neutralized militant capabilities but also fundamentally disrupted the governance framework that had provided support to these groups. The use of military design thinking allowed the IDF to effectively alter the operational environment, reducing the wave of terror attacks and dismantling the organizational structure of Arafat’s regime, making it a successful application of design principles in a highly complex and volatile situation.
The Decline of Military Design Thinking
Unfortunately, military design thinking in the United States has lost momentum in recent years. After the Iraq surge, U.S. military strategy reverted to more linear, force-on-force tactics, especially as the focus shifted toward troop withdrawal and the transfer of security responsibilities to Iraqi forces. This more traditional approach underestimated the fragility of the Iraqi political system and the evolving nature of insurgent groups. The U.S. withdrawal in 2011 created a power vacuum that was filled by extremist factions, culminating in the rise of ISIS by 2014. ISIS exploited the weaknesses of both the Iraqi government and its security forces, which had not been adequately addressed through a broader design-thinking approach. A more sustained application of design methodologies, with an emphasis on political reconciliation, economic rebuilding, and regional power dynamics, might have helped mitigate these vulnerabilities.
Similarly, in the years following the 2014 conflict, Israel shifted back to more conventional military tactics aimed at containing Hamas, primarily through airstrikes and border security measures. This linear approach, focused on reactive defense rather than systemic engagement with the underlying political and social drivers of the conflict, left many root causes of unrest unaddressed. Over time, this allowed Hamas to rebuild its capabilities and maintain its political influence, ultimately leading to the surprise attack on October 7, 2023. Hamas exploited gaps in Israeli security planning and intelligence, which had become more focused on conventional deterrence and less on addressing the deeper structural issues that empowered groups like Hamas in Gaza.
The decline of military design in the U.S. military can be attributed to several factors, including institutional inertia, a preference for conventional warfighting paradigms, and the growing complexity of integrating design methodologies into military cultures that value hierarchy and certainty.
The re-emergence of great power competition, particularly with the rise of China and the resurgence of a militaristic Russia, has caused many military organizations to refocus on conventional warfighting models – the comfortable hypothetical paradigm that provides justification for both the military resource planning process and the defense industrial complex. As militaries prepare for high-intensity conflicts with peer or near-peer adversaries, they are largely failing to develop forces and approaches that are flexible and agile enough to compete for national interests while avoiding the need to fight wars. Unfortunately, the allure of traditional force-on-force engagements has overshadowed the broader, more nuanced approaches championed by military design thinking à la Sun Tzu.
In many U.S. military circles, there remains a preference for linear, kinetic solutions to problems. This is particularly evident in military exercises and war games, which often prioritize conventional scenarios such as amphibious assaults, tank battles, and air superiority campaigns, yet do not evaluate the effectiveness of deterrent posture, non-military approaches, or unconventional strategies. Modern wargames also often fail to account for the complexity of modern warfare, which includes cyber threats, economic measures, logistic constraints, information warfare, hybrid actors, and political instability. Military design thinking, with its emphasis on system-wide analysis and problem reframing, could offer significant value in these areas, but its application has been limited as its products tend to be heretical to the predisposition to warfighting.
Missed Strategic Opportunities
The sidelining of military design thinking is resulting in countless missed strategic opportunities. As military organizations focus on preparing for traditional, high-intensity warfare, they often overlook the subtler, non-kinetic challenges that can shape the strategic landscape. This is particularly evident in areas such as information operations, political warfare, and gray zone conflicts, where adversaries are increasingly using non-military means to achieve strategic objectives.
For example, in the South China Sea, China has employed a range of non-military tactics—such as island building, economic coercion, and diplomatic manipulation—to assert its territorial claims. These actions occur in a space that falls below the threshold of conventional warfare, making it difficult for traditional military planning models to respond effectively. Military design thinking, with its ability to integrate diverse factors into a comprehensive operational picture, could provide a more adaptive and creative approach to addressing these challenges. However, because the focus remains on preparing for potential large-scale conflict with China, opportunities to counter China’s gray zone tactics have been underexploited.
Similarly, in the cyber domain, military design thinking could offer a way to better understand the complex and evolving nature of digital warfare. Cyber threats often exist in a space where military, civilian, and private-sector interests overlap, creating a complex system that traditional military planning struggles to navigate. Design thinking, with its emphasis on understanding systems and relationships, could help military planners develop more effective strategies for both defense and deterrence. Yet, the emphasis on kinetic, conventional warfare has limited the extent to which these ideas have been integrated into military cyber strategies.
The Archipelago of Design: Expanding Design Across NATO
The good news is military design thinking isn’t dead yet. Nor has the complexity of the environment lessened, despite the blinders donned by most Western militaries. Private organizations are carrying the torch of the military design movement, and are working to spread and institutionalize military design thinking on a broader scale. Strategy Central is proud to count itself among these organizations. Another is the Archipelago of Design (AoD), a non-profit network of security practitioners, educators, and researchers seeking to empower leaders to change mindsets with design methodologies across NATO members and partner nations.
Founded to support the spread of military design thinking and promote its integration into broader security frameworks, the AoD has sought to elevate design from a niche set of practices to a central component of military and security planning. Through workshops, training programs including serious games, and research, the Archipelago of Design has been instrumental in helping NATO members and partners explore the potential of design methodologies. The organization works to ensure that military planners and security professionals are equipped not just to respond to conventional military threats, but also to navigate the complex, multifaceted challenges that characterize modern security environments (see for example, AoD’s latest manual on Foresight: https://aodnetwork.ca/safeguarding-the-future/)
The AoD represents a key node in the global effort to integrate military design into the mainstream of defense and security thinking. Despite this, design thinking has struggled to fully embed itself within the day-to-day practices of many military organizations, as conventional warfare paradigms often remain the preferred approach. The tension between these paradigms—conventional warfighting on one hand and design thinking on the other—continues to shape the evolution of military planning in the 21st century.
CONCLUSION
The evolution of military design thinking from a promising alternative to traditional military planning into a marginalized methodology highlights the ongoing tension between conventional warfighting paradigms and the need for adaptive, strategic solutions in a complex world. Yet, despite early successes, such as the U.S. military’s adaptation in Iraq and the Israeli Defense Forces’ use of Systemic Operational Design, the broader military community has struggled to fully embrace design thinking.
The resurgence of conventional warfighting paradigms, driven by great power competition and a renewed focus on state-on-state conflict, has caused the U.S. military to deprioritize the innovative potential of design. This shift has resulted in missed strategic opportunities, particularly in non-traditional domains like cyber warfare, information operations, and gray zone conflicts, where adversaries leverage complexity and ambiguity to achieve their goals.
For militaries to remain effective in the face of modern challenges, there must be a re-integration of military design thinking into their planning processes. By fostering a broader, more adaptive approach that incorporates the lessons of design, military organizations can better navigate the multifaceted, interconnected threats of the 21st century. Through organizations like the Archipelago of Design, the potential remains for military design to regain its momentum and reshape the way militaries think about strategy, operations, and long-term success in an increasingly uncertain world.
Overall a very good article that I enjoyed. FWIW, I'm a proud proponent of DT, so mostly I’m a member of the “amen chorus” here! First, I think the main reason design did not catch on is because it’s hard, and military thinking always confused and conflated strategy "formulation" with planning when they are fundamentally different (synthesis vs analysis respectively). Joint doctrine watered down the concept and undercut it's utility as it overlooked that fundamental distinction.
Your two examples of DT success are good ones. I do think the OIF example and the post-withdrawal implosion also needs to include the mis-application of COIN concepts in AFG as well. In the US, COIN and Design sank together. As for Israel, I…