The Pentagon Papers: Deception And Bad Strategy in Vietnam

Strategy Central

By Monte Erfourth – August 31, 2024

Introduction

The "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," commonly known as the Pentagon Papers, offers a candid look at how the United States government escalated its efforts in Vietnam. The report, commissioned in 1967 by then-Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, was intended as a comprehensive and secret study of U.S. political and military involvement in Vietnam from 1945 to 1967. However, it became a historical document of government deception when it was leaked to the press in 1971, revealing that the U.S. government had used questionable justifications for its involvement in Vietnam, intentionally misled the public about the progress of the war, and lacked clear objectives for its military engagement. This essay explores how the Pentagon Papers exposed these troubling aspects, implicating key figures such as McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson. It discusses the broader implications for American foreign policy and public trust.

A Pattern Of Misleading

The Pentagon Papers detail how the United States gradually escalated its involvement in Vietnam, starting with financial and military support for the French colonial government during the First Indochina War. After France's defeat in 1954, the U.S. stepped in to support the newly established government of South Vietnam against the communist North Vietnamese regime led by Ho Chi Minh. Initially, American involvement was limited to providing military advisors and financial aid. However, as the communist insurgency in the South, known as the Viet Cong, gained momentum, the U.S. began to increase its military presence. The report reveals that the U.S. continued to escalate its military efforts despite early assessments indicating the conflict was unwinnable under existing conditions. By 1965, President Johnson had authorized the deployment of combat troops, marking a significant escalation from a supporting role to direct military involvement.

A central theme of the Pentagon Papers is the use of questionable justifications by the U.S. government to escalate its involvement in Vietnam. The most infamous example is the Gulf of Tonkin incident in August 1964, where North Vietnamese patrol boats allegedly attacked U.S. Navy destroyers. The Johnson administration presented this incident as unprovoked aggression, leading Congress to pass the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution. This resolution gave the President broad authority to use military force in Vietnam without a formal declaration of war. However, the Pentagon Papers reveal that the administration had already planned to escalate U.S. involvement and that the evidence of the attacks was questionable at best. Subsequent investigations showed that the second reported attack likely never occurred. This manipulation of events demonstrates how the U.S. government used misleading information to justify military action and deceive Congress and the American public about the nature and scope of U.S. involvement.

The Pentagon Papers also expose how the Johnson administration, notably President Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, actively misled the public about the war's progress. Publicly, officials were optimistic, claiming victory was within reach and that U.S. efforts succeeded in containing communism in Southeast Asia. However, internal documents revealed a starkly different picture. The U.S. military and intelligence reports painted a grim picture of the war's prospects, citing mounting casualties, ineffective South Vietnamese forces, and an unrelenting enemy. McNamara, who had privately expressed doubts about the war's feasibility, continued publicly endorsing escalation and presenting a false narrative of progress. This dissonance between public statements and private assessments reflects a deliberate strategy to maintain public support for the war effort, even as reality deteriorated.

No Strategic Objectives – Bogus Escalation

One of the most shocking revelations of the Pentagon Papers is the lack of clear objectives guiding U.S. involvement in Vietnam. The documents reveal that successive administrations, from Harry Truman to Lyndon Johnson, had little consensus on what a successful outcome in Vietnam would look like. The primary justification was the containment of communism, embodied in the domino theory—the belief that if one country in Southeast Asia fell to communism, others would follow. However, the Pentagon Papers show that U.S. policymakers were divided on the feasibility of this strategy and the costs associated with achieving it. The lack of clear, attainable objectives led to an inconsistent and often contradictory policy approach, further undermining the U.S. effort and leading to a prolonged conflict with no clear end.

Robert McNamara, who served as Secretary of Defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, played a central role in escalating U.S. involvement in Vietnam and the subsequent cover-up of the war's failures. The Pentagon Papers highlight McNamara's pivotal role in shaping U.S. policy in Vietnam. He often advocated for increased military involvement despite his growing private doubts about the war's chances of success.

McNamara commissioned the Pentagon Papers study in part because he feared that future generations would not understand the rationale behind the U.S. government's decisions. However, he was also complicit in withholding information from the public and presenting an overly optimistic picture of the war. President Johnson was also deeply involved in the deception, repeatedly telling the American people that the U.S. was winning the war and that there was a light at the end of the tunnel, even when his advisors warned of a potential quagmire. The actions of McNamara and Johnson reflect a broader pattern of deception and manipulation that defined U.S. policy in Vietnam.

Bad Strategic Theory

The release of the Pentagon Papers had profound implications for U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia and the broader Cold War context. The exposure of the government's deception and lack of a coherent strategy in Vietnam severely undermined the credibility of the domino theory, which had been a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy from the mid-1950s to the early 1970s.   The theory posited that if Vietnam fell to communist control, it would trigger a chain reaction across Southeast Asia, leading neighboring countries to also succumb, much like a row of falling dominos. This idea was rooted in the fear of the spread of communism, which was perceived as a monolithic threat orchestrated by the Soviet Union and China.

After the fall of Saigon in 1975, while Laos and Cambodia did experience communist takeovers, the anticipated widespread domino effect did not materialize across Southeast Asia. Countries such as Thailand, Malaysia, and Indonesia did not fall to communism, suggesting that the theory's predictive power was limited. Critics argue that the theory oversimplified the region's complex political and cultural dynamics, failing to account for the unique circumstances of each country. The lack of a widespread communist takeover after the Vietnam War suggests that the theory was more of a strategic rationale than a reliable predictor of geopolitical outcomes.

If the war in Vietnam was not winnable and the cost was too high, it called into question the entire premise of containing communism through military intervention. The Pentagon Papers also prompted a reevaluation of U.S. strategy in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world, leading to a more cautious approach in future conflicts and a shift towards détente with the Soviet Union and China. The revelations further fueled the anti-war movement in the United States and intensified public and congressional scrutiny of U.S. foreign policy decisions.

The Erosion of Trust

The long-term impact of the Pentagon Papers on American society and government cannot be overstated. The revelations of deception and manipulation eroded public trust in the government, contributing to a broader crisis of confidence that would manifest in various ways throughout the 1970s. The Watergate scandal, which unfolded shortly after the release of the Pentagon Papers, further compounded this distrust as Americans became increasingly skeptical of their leaders and institutions. The legacy of the Pentagon Papers also profoundly impacted the relationship between the government and the media. The Nixon administration's attempts to suppress the publication of the Pentagon Papers led to a landmark Supreme Court case, New York Times Co. v. United States, reaffirming the importance of a free press in holding the government accountable. This case set a precedent for greater transparency and strengthened the role of investigative journalism in American democracy.

Conclusion

The "Report of the Office of the Secretary of Defense Vietnam Task Force," or the Pentagon Papers, is a sobering reminder of how government deception and lack of clear objectives can lead to disastrous consequences. The documents reveal a pattern of escalation, manipulation, and obfuscation that characterized U.S. involvement in Vietnam and exposed the flawed rationale behind the war. The actions of key figures such as Robert McNamara and President Lyndon B. Johnson, who were deeply involved in the escalation and subsequent cover-up, reflect the broader challenges of maintaining public support for a war that lacked a clear path to victory.

Key Revelations:

• Escalation of Conflict: The papers disclosed that the U.S. government had systematically escalated its involvement in Vietnam, often without the full knowledge or consent of Congress. This included covert operations and bombing campaigns in neighboring countries like Laos and Cambodia, which were not publicly acknowledged at the time.

• Misleading the Public: The documents revealed that successive administrations, from Truman to Johnson, had misled the American public about the scale and nature of U.S. involvement. Public statements often contradicted the internal assessments, which were far more pessimistic about the war's progress and prospects for success.

• Questionable Justifications: The Pentagon Papers showed that the rationale for U.S. involvement was often based on flawed assumptions and that the government was aware of the improbability of achieving a decisive military victory.

• Lack of Clear Objectives: The documents highlighted a lack of clear strategic objectives, with policymakers often divided on the ultimate goals of U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

The Pentagon Papers' revelations had far-reaching implications for U.S. foreign policy and public trust in government. They led to a more cautious approach in future conflicts and a reassessment of the strategies used to combat communism during the Cold War. Ultimately, the legacy of the Pentagon Papers underscores the importance of transparency, accountability, and a clear strategy in any military engagement, lessons that remain relevant today.

Bottom Line – Bad strategy and lies are a deadly mix. The results of pursuing a large-scale fight in Vietnam were catastrophic for America, the Allies, and Vietnam in loss of life:

---

End Notes

·      "Pentagon Papers: The Defense Department History of United States Decisionmaking on Vietnam." New York Times, 1971.

·      McNamara, Robert S., and Brian VanDeMark. "In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam." New York: Times Books, 1995.

·      Karnow, Stanley. "Vietnam: A History." New York: Viking Press, 1983.

·      Sheehan, Neil. "A Bright Shining Lie: John Paul Vann and America in Vietnam." New York: Random House, 1988.

·      New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971).

·      Herring, George C. "America's Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950-1975." New York: McGraw-Hill, 2002.

·      Ellsberg, Daniel. "Secrets: A Memoir of Vietnam and the Pentagon Papers." New York: Viking Press, 2002.