How the U.S. Can Address the Information Challenge of Our Time
Strategy Central
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth - December 4, 2024
Introduction
In the realm of national power, the United States has traditionally excelled in diplomacy, military strength, and economic influence, as encapsulated in the DIME (Diplomacy, Information, Military, Economy) framework. However, the often undervalued and underutilized "I" or informational element now represents a critical vulnerability. The digital age has amplified the potency of information as a tool for shaping perceptions, influencing public opinion, and advancing strategic goals. Yet, this democratization of information has also exposed new weaknesses, with adversaries exploiting open societies through disinformation and propaganda. Perhaps even more importantly, the totality of information in all its various forms is even more important to see as a diverse whole found in academia, science, military, industry, government, and personal spheres. This article examines the United States' neglect of its informational power and argues for a revitalized approach that prioritizes education, strategic coordination, and the creation of an empowered institution capable of addressing the multifaceted challenges of the information age.
The Underrated Weapon & Weakness
Throughout history, governments have used information as a powerful tool to shape public perception, control populations, and undermine rivals. For example, information control is a pillar of regime security in totalitarian regimes, with North Korea as an oft-cited example of a successful totalitarian regime. However, by its sheer scale and technological skill, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is the modern-day master of this strategy. Its propaganda machine and internal security systems maintain an iron grip on what its 1.4 billion citizens know and think. By carefully curating what information is disseminated—whether through state-run media or its sophisticated internet censorship network known as the Great Firewall—the CCP effectively inoculates its population against dissent. The informational instrument in China is not about public enlightenment but about ensuring the population is fed what the regime deems acceptable to prevent rebellion.
The use of information to defeat a rival is a well-documented strategy. During World War II, the Allied forces successfully used deception operations—such as Operation Bodyguard—to mislead Nazi Germany about the location of the D-Day invasion. This informational tactic sowed confusion among the German leadership and ultimately contributed to the success of Operation Overlord. This form of information advantage is an archetype of how information can be wielded to misdirect and defeat an adversary. The Allies understood that controlling what their enemy thought and believed was as important as winning on the battlefield.
Conversely, the free flow of information has sometimes led to instability in democratic societies. Consider Hungary under Viktor Orbán transitioned from a robust democracy to an essentially authoritarian regime. Initially benefiting from the free flow of information, Orbán and his Fidesz Party systematically co-opted independent media while spreading populist and nationalist messages through state-aligned outlets. Disinformation and fear-based narratives regarding immigration and "foreign influence" undermined trust in democratic institutions. Despite there being almost no immigration into the country. Once in power, Orbán consolidated executive power and curtailed press freedoms. With the media under state control, effectively curtailing the free flow of information and using the bully pulpit as a tool for entrenching authoritarian rule. A trend toward this kind of authoritarianism in other Western countries, such as Germany, France, Sweden, Canada, and the United States, demonstrates the dangerous nature of information and its control in a democratic context.
Types of Information
In the modern “information age” it is thought of in a media and medium context. However, Information is a vital and complex element of national power, extending beyond mere messages, facts, and figures. Benign American information stored online is available on just about every subject imaginable. It is transmitted through various channels, including books, academic journals, the internet, media, and art. When studied carefully by an adversary, information like classified materials, scientific discoveries, infrastructure operations, personnel files, billing information, polling information, or anything one can imagine can be aggregated and used against the United States. With the new power of AI to synthesize large amounts of data, almost any form of information can be used to attack or manipulate our foundations of power.
Dividing information into categories that impact national security versus those that do not can be complex, and seemingly mundane information can be used for nefarious purposes in much the same ways as classified material. Probably the best way to think of national security information is in forms of information like intelligence, secrets, controlled technical data, infrastructure systems, sensitive technologies, corporate information, sensitive government data, personal information on individuals, and any forms of information on theories, markets, infrastructure, personnel, economics, technology, military, health, that the U.S. government or corporate entities must deny access to safeguard operations, techniques, and procedures. Classified material has elevated levels of harm to national security if accessed by rivals. Again, that does not mean unclassified material is harmless. It should be separated when working through what may or may not be information requiring some level of protection from prying eyes.
Messaging and information operations would be a separate category. Governmental messaging, information operations, and public diplomacy are interconnected yet distinct tools used to influence audiences and shape perceptions to advance national interests. Governmental messaging refers to official communications from a government aimed at conveying policies, values, or positions to domestic or international audiences, often through statements, press releases, or digital platforms. Information operations (IO) encompass a broader spectrum of activities, including strategically using information to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp adversarial decision-making while safeguarding one’s own information systems. IO is frequently employed in military and intelligence contexts to gain a strategic advantage. Public diplomacy, on the other hand, focuses on building relationships and understanding between governments and foreign publics through cultural exchanges, international broadcasting, and educational initiatives. These practices form a comprehensive approach to shaping the global information environment and advancing a nation’s strategic objectives. The domain where this information is passed should not be confused with the
The government’s relationship to information is fundamentally related to controlling what people know. Creating an open enough information flow enables a productive, enterprising society capable of supporting a sufficiently dynamic economy. A democracy views less intrusive information suppression as the best path, with authoritarians controlling as much as possible.
U.S. Stability and the Informational Element of Power
Information operations, public diplomacy, messaging, and enabling open source flows of information are often the focus for the “I” in DIME, with good reason. The government, universities, companies, and people routinely provide information to the public. Transparency in communication and clarity on topics is often (not always) the goal of the Western tendency to push information out publicly. It is seen as a common good.
The U.S. values democracy and believes that easily accessible information benefits the public. However, the digital age has made America vulnerable, as the information overflow can be manipulated, undermining democratic stability. Historical examples like the Weimar Republic, 1970s Chile, and Austria under Orban illustrate how information can be weaponized to support authoritarian regimes. The digital age acts like an accelerant for dis and misinformation campaigns. Recent disinformation campaigns by countries such as China, Russia, and Iran during U.S. presidential elections exploited American information openness, fostering division and mistrust among citizens.
The attacks are not restricted to elections. The following is a small sample of disinformation operations by U.S. rivals:
Russian Propaganda Exploits Black Lives Matter Protests (2020): Russian-backed operatives used social media platforms to stoke division during the Black Lives Matter protests, creating fake accounts to amplify both pro- and anti-BLM narratives. By exploiting racial tensions, these efforts sought to deepen polarization and undermine public trust in U.S. institutions.
Chinese Disinformation Targets COVID-19 Origins (2020-2021): Chinese state-affiliated media disseminated unfounded claims that COVID-19 originated in U.S. military labs. This disinformation campaign aimed to deflect blame for the pandemic spread confusion, and diminish confidence in American public health responses.
Iranian Influence Campaign Exploits U.S. Social Divides (2020): Iranian cyber actors launched operations to exploit contentious issues like immigration and policing, spreading divisive content via fake accounts on platforms like Facebook and Instagram. The goal was to deepen societal fractures and portray the United States as a nation in disarray.
Russian Energy Misinformation Undermines U.S. Policy (2016-Present): Russian media outlets, including RT and Sputnik, pushed misleading narratives about U.S. energy practices, such as fracking causing severe environmental harm. These campaigns aimed to weaken U.S. energy independence and bolster European reliance on Russian natural gas.
North Korean Disinformation Targets U.S. Military in South Korea (Ongoing): North Korean propagandists circulated conspiracy theories about U.S. military bases in South Korea, accusing them of human rights abuses and environmental damage. The disinformation sought to erode support for the U.S.-South Korea alliance and fuel anti-American sentiment in the region.
While democratic ideals emphasize transparency and access, these principles can be weaponized by actors who understand the weaknesses inherent in an open information environment. The mass availability of information and a lack of media literacy among the populace creates fertile ground for disinformation. When a democracy’s social norms reject the truth or become unable to discern and accept factual information, it is in danger. As Malcolm Gladwell argues in his book Revenge of the Tipping Point, once around 25% of a population adopts a countervailing view of democratic norms, the rest of society becomes susceptible to rapid change—potentially towards authoritarianism.
The Challenge of Democracy in the Information Age
Unlike authoritarian regimes, where information flow is tightly controlled to maintain regime stability, democracies face the challenge of balancing openness with resilience. In autocratic systems, leaders like those in China or North Korea tightly control information because they understand that uncontrolled information can spark rebellion. Monarchs and autocrats have feared the power of an informed populace—and rightly so. Information, when wielded by those who understand its value, is a potent weapon against tyranny. Yet, in a democracy, the approach to information is fundamentally different. Rather than restrict access, the emphasis is on maximizing availability. This is where the United States finds itself in a precarious position.
The U.S. has embraced the idea that more information is always better without adequately preparing its citizens to navigate the complexities of the information age. In a world where anyone can publish anything anytime, distinguishing fact from fiction has become increasingly difficult. Without proper education and media literacy, citizens are left vulnerable to manipulation by foreign and domestic actors. This internal vulnerability represents a significant national security risk. An educated and analytical citizenry is necessary to sustain democracy in the information age. Yet, the U.S. has lagged in ensuring its citizens are equipped with the tools needed to critically evaluate the information they consume, particularly about democracy, the role of institutions, and how the economy and justice system work. The U.S. government as a whole has seen a decline in informing the public and controlling the international narrative in ways beneficial to the U.S. Society and the government need a better toolkit to maintain democracy and the things that have made this a successful and prosperous nation.
Reimagining the Role of Information in National Security
The United States allocates only five cents of every dollar to civics education in K-12 schools, a figure that has seen slight increases but remains inadequate for preparing future voters. Additionally, many high schools fail to teach essential subjects like how capitalism works, basic business skills, and entrepreneurship. This lack of education leaves graduates unprepared to engage in the economy and civic life. By integrating these skills with lessons on identifying and combating misinformation, schools can better equip young Americans to navigate today’s complex information landscape. While not a complete solution, it is a basic requirement. Adults will also require some form of remedial information on these subjects, but this is easier said than done in the land of the free.
To address this challenge, the United States must rethink its approach to the informational element of national power. First, the U.S. government should invest in education initiatives to improve media literacy among the public. The U.S. government can help teach adult Americans civics, capitalism, and media literacy through a combination of accessible community education programs, public broadcasting, and digital tools like interactive apps and online courses. Nationwide awareness campaigns and workplace initiatives could further integrate these lessons into daily life, while partnerships with libraries, civic groups, and cultural hubs can bring resources directly to communities.
By promoting fact-checking platforms and offering reliable information through public channels, the government can empower adults to combat misinformation, understand economic systems, and take on their responsibilities as informed citizens. Teaching citizens how to evaluate sources, identify biases, and differentiate facts from misinformation will help the nation build resilience against information manipulation. This approach is not just an educational imperative but a necessity for national security.
Second, the U.S. must take steps to regulate the spread of disinformation and misinformation. While this is a contentious issue, particularly given the constitutional protections on free speech, there are ways to approach regulation without infringing individual rights. Encouraging transparency in social media algorithms, holding platforms accountable for spreading false information using algorithms designed to spread it, and promoting responsible journalism are all measures that can help mitigate the impact of disinformation. Trust between the government and the American people has been a casualty of spreading true, dis, and misinformation.
Third, the next administration should consider reestablishing the United States Information Agency (USIA). In this iteration, it should be more than just a messaging hub. Not familiar with the USIA? There is a reason for that. The USIA was created in 1953 and was tasked with "telling America’s story to the world" by coordinating public diplomacy efforts during the Cold War. It used mediums such as Voice of America, educational exchanges, and cultural programming to counter Soviet propaganda and promote U.S. values. However, by the late 20th century, the collapse of the USSR and shifts in global power dynamics eroded USIA’s perceived relevance. In 1999, it was dissolved, with many of its functions absorbed by the State Department under a new Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs.
Opponents of reviving the USIA argue that the agency’s design was flawed, its ability to influence policy was limited, and it could not adapt to post-Cold War challenges. Critics suggest that nostalgia for the agency overlooks its inefficiencies, such as its isolation from broader U.S. foreign policy and struggles to secure domestic support. They also highlight the effectiveness of decentralized approaches, which allow multiple agencies to adapt independently to diverse global information challenges.
Proponents, however, emphasize the need for a centralized body to combat modern disinformation threats and coordinate whole-of-government efforts. They argue that global messaging today requires more than sporadic public diplomacy efforts. Reviving the USIA with expanded capabilities could address academic, scientific, cultural, and infrastructure-related aspects of information that shape international perceptions of the U.S. and how the U.S. protects these valuable assets. A reimagined USIA could enhance America’s credibility by integrating diverse tools and addressing the complex information environment of the digital age.
Conclusion: The Lonely I In DIME
The informational element of national power has long been the "lonely I" of the DIME construct—undervalued, underutilized, and often misunderstood. Yet, in an age where information shapes perceptions, drives decision-making, and influences the course of nations, the ability to create, exploit, and disrupt knowledge is more important than ever. Democracies are uniquely vulnerable to information exploitation because of their openness. Still, this vulnerability can be mitigated through education, regulation, and a strategic approach to the use of information as a tool of national power.
The United States faces an urgent need to bolster its informational defenses. National security improvements must include robust civics and media literacy education to prepare citizens for the complexities of the digital age, targeted regulations to combat disinformation while respecting constitutional freedoms, and the revival of a modernized United States Information Agency (USIA). This agency should not merely manage public diplomacy but act as a comprehensive information steward, guarding academic, industrial, and cultural dimensions to protect and promote the nation's interests. The U.S. must recognize that information is not a passive asset but an active tool of power that requires strategic oversight and investment. By addressing these challenges head-on, the United States can ensure that its democratic ideals and global leadership remain resilient in the face of evolving threats.
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