Examining the Parallels Between the US Withdrawals from Afghanistan & Vietnam
Strategy Central
By & For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth – January 8, 2025
Introduction
The United States' withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was marked by chaos, tragedy, and widespread criticism, both domestically and internationally. The 20-year war ended with harrowing scenes at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport: desperate Afghans clinging to departing planes, the deadly bombing that killed 13 U.S. service members, and the abrupt Taliban takeover of the capital. Analyzing the factors leading to the disastrous withdrawal reveals a confluence of strategic missteps, intelligence failures, and political decisions. These decisions tragically often mirrored the strategic failure of Vietnam.
A Compressed Timeline
The 2021 withdrawal’s chaos stems from decisions made years earlier. In February 2020, the Trump administration signed the Doha Agreement with the Taliban, committing to a full U.S. troop withdrawal by May 2021 in exchange for Taliban promises to sever ties with al-Qaeda and negotiate with the Afghan government. Critics argued that the deal gave the Taliban significant leverage without ensuring enforceable guarantees. Despite these warnings, the agreement accelerated the momentum for withdrawal.
Following the November 2020 presidential election, President Donald Trump ordered a rapid troop drawdown, bypassing standard military and diplomatic protocols. The sudden directive, signed just days after the election, shocked senior officials, with then-Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Mark Milley describing it as “potentially catastrophic” and “militarily unfeasible.” Ultimately, the order was not fully implemented, but it set the stage for instability by reducing U.S. forces to a skeleton presence.
When President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he faced a dilemma: honor the Doha Agreement’s withdrawal deadline or risk renewed conflict with the Taliban. Biden extended the deadline to August 31, 2021, asserting that prolonging the war would not yield meaningful change. However, the administration’s timeline provided little room to adapt to the rapidly deteriorating situation on the ground.
The Final Days of Withdrawal
The withdrawal’s final phase was marked by chaos, violence, and tragedy. As the Taliban encircled Kabul in mid-August, thousands of Afghans rushed to Hamid Karzai International Airport, desperate to escape the impending regime. Images of people clinging to departing aircraft became a searing symbol of the withdrawal’s dysfunction.
In the chaos, U.S. forces scrambled to evacuate American citizens, Afghan allies, and other vulnerable groups. Operation Allies Refuge, one of the largest airlift operations in history, evacuated over 120,000 people. Yet, the operation was marred by tragic incidents, including the August 26 suicide bombing at Abbey Gate that killed 13 U.S. service members and over 170 Afghan civilians.
The evacuation’s disarray highlighted serious lapses in planning and execution. Military commanders were forced to negotiate directly with Taliban leaders to secure the airport perimeter, a stark illustration of the diminished U.S. leverage. Meanwhile, thousands of Afghan allies, including interpreters and their families, were left behind, sparking outrage and calls for accountability.
The Miscalculations
A significant miscalculation stemmed from overestimating the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF). Over two decades, the U.S. invested billions into training and equipping the Afghan military. Yet, the ANDSF suffered from systemic corruption, poor leadership, and reliance on U.S. support. When the U.S. withdrew its air support and contractors who maintained critical equipment, the ANDSF collapsed in a matter of weeks. General Mark Milley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, later described the speed of the collapse as unforeseen and a failure of intelligence assessments (The Washington Post).
The Trump administration's February 2020 agreement with the Taliban in Doha set the stage for the U.S. exit. The deal, which included a commitment to withdraw all U.S. troops, excluded the Afghan government from negotiations and emboldened the Taliban. Critics argue that this agreement undermined the Afghan government’s legitimacy and morale while signaling to the Taliban that they could wait out U.S. forces (Sandler, Foreign Affairs). The Biden administration inherited this framework and followed through, citing the risks of extending the war.
Despite U.S. intelligence warnings of a possible Taliban takeover, the speed at which the group captured provincial capitals and Kabul caught both the U.S. and Afghan governments off guard. A classified July 2021 U.S. intelligence report, later leaked, predicted that Kabul could fall within months after the U.S. withdrawal. Instead, it fell in mid-August, as President Ashraf Ghani fled the country (Rosenberg and Schmitt, The New York Times).
The evacuation effort was hindered by disorganized planning and reliance on an aging State Department bureaucracy. Tens of thousands of Afghans who had worked with U.S. forces, along with their families, were left behind, despite earlier promises of safe relocation. By the time the evacuation began in earnest, the Taliban controlled Kabul, complicating access to the airport. The attack by ISIS-K, which killed 170 Afghan civilians in addition to the U.S. troops, underscored the fragility of the situation (BBC News).
Lessons From Afghanistan
The chaotic withdrawal offers profound lessons for U.S. policymakers, military planners, and the broader international community. These lessons span strategy, execution, and the human cost of war.
Strategic Clarity and Realism
The withdrawal underscored the importance of aligning strategic objectives with on-the-ground realities. The U.S. entered Afghanistan in 2001 with the clear goal of dismantling al-Qaeda and ousting the Taliban. Over time, the mission expanded to include nation-building and democratization, ambitions that proved unsustainable. Future interventions must prioritize achievable objectives and maintain a clear exit strategy.
The Perils of Overreliance on Local Partners
The collapse of the ANDSF revealed the dangers of overdependence on fragile local institutions. While U.S. training programs focused on replicating Western military structures, they failed to account for Afghanistan’s unique social and political dynamics. Ensuring the long-term viability of local forces requires a tailored approach that addresses cultural, logistical, and operational challenges.
The Humanitarian Dimension
The withdrawal highlighted the moral imperative to protect civilians and allies in conflict zones. The failure to evacuate thousands of Afghan allies before the Taliban takeover damaged U.S. credibility and left vulnerable populations at risk. Moving forward, evacuation plans must be prioritized and implemented proactively, rather than as last-minute crises.
The Role of Intelligence
Intelligence failures contributed to the withdrawal’s chaos. Despite warnings about the Taliban’s capabilities, U.S. officials underestimated the speed of the ANDSF’s collapse. Enhancing intelligence coordination and integrating diverse perspectives can improve decision-making in complex environments.
Accountability and Oversight
The withdrawal exposed gaps in accountability at multiple levels, from senior policymakers to operational commanders. Transparent reviews and robust oversight mechanisms are essential to learning from past mistakes and preventing similar outcomes in future conflicts.
The Lessons Not Learned
The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 shares striking parallels with the botched withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975, underscoring recurring lessons in strategic planning, operational execution, and accountability. These lessons reflect critical areas where both operations faltered, with implications for future military and foreign policy engagements.
Strategic Clarity and Realism
Afghanistan and Vietnam reveal the dangers of mission creep and the failure to align strategic objectives with on-the-ground realities. In Vietnam, the initial goal of containing communism expanded into an unwinnable nation-building effort, just as in Afghanistan, the mission shifted from counterterrorism to ambitious democratization. In both cases, the U.S. failed to adapt its strategy to the shifting terrain of local politics and military feasibility. The lesson here is clear: future interventions must establish achievable objectives grounded in a realistic understanding of local contexts and maintain a clear exit strategy to prevent overextension.
The Perils of Overreliance on Local Partners
The collapse of U.S.-supported forces—South Vietnam’s ARVN in 1975 and Afghanistan’s ANDSF in 2021—underscores the risks of overdependence on fragile local institutions. Both instances reflect failures to build sustainable and resilient local forces, with U.S. training efforts overly focused on replicating Western military models rather than adapting to local conditions. Future training programs must prioritize cultural, logistical, and operational considerations to ensure the longevity and effectiveness of local partners, mitigating the risks of sudden collapse when external support wanes.
The Humanitarian Dimension
Humanitarian crises marred both withdrawals, with the abandonment of allies and vulnerable populations casting long shadows over U.S. credibility. In Vietnam, thousands of South Vietnamese who had supported U.S. operations were left behind as Saigon fell. Similarly, in Afghanistan, the failure to evacuate Afghan allies before the Taliban’s rapid advance left countless individuals at risk. Proactive evacuation planning must become a central component of future withdrawal operations, ensuring the timely protection of those who risk their lives in support of U.S. efforts.
The Role of Intelligence
Intelligence failures played a pivotal role in both chaotic withdrawals. In Vietnam, the collapse of ARVN forces caught many U.S. policymakers off guard despite clear indicators of their fragility. In Afghanistan, U.S. intelligence underestimated the Taliban’s capabilities and the ANDSF’s vulnerability. These missteps highlight the need for improved intelligence coordination, diverse analytic perspectives, and scenario planning to anticipate and mitigate worst-case outcomes in future operations.
Accountability and Oversight
Both withdrawals exposed significant gaps in accountability from senior policymakers to operational commanders. In Vietnam, debates over the conduct of the war lingered for decades, with no comprehensive review to assign responsibility for its failures. Similar calls for transparent reviews and oversight mechanisms have arisen in Afghanistan to prevent such outcomes in the future. Institutionalizing accountability through robust oversight and after-action assessments is essential to learning from past mistakes and fostering trust in U.S. military and foreign policy decision-making.
The withdrawals from Vietnam in 1975 and Afghanistan in 2021 underscore the need for strategic discipline, realistic objectives, sustainable partnerships, proactive humanitarian planning, and institutional accountability. As the U.S. prepares for future conflicts in an increasingly complex global environment, these lessons must inform a more adaptable, ethical, and effective approach to military engagement and withdrawal. Failing to heed them risks repeating the same mistakes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, allies, and broader strategic goals.
A Troubling Pattern of Strategic Disaster
The flawed U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in 2021 serves as a stark reminder of the perils of strategic missteps, misaligned objectives, and inadequate preparation. These failures mirror the lessons that should have been learned from the disastrous U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975. Both conflicts exposed the dangers of mission creep, overreliance on fragile local forces, and insufficient planning for disengagement's humanitarian and operational complexities.
In Afghanistan, the failure to adapt to the realities of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF) and the speed of the Taliban's resurgence revealed a profound disconnect between strategic objectives and on-the-ground realities. This mirrors Vietnam, where the collapse of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) similarly highlighted the limitations of U.S. support for corrupt and unsustainable local regimes. Both cases reflect strategic ineptitude in crafting realistic, achievable objectives and a failure to develop resilient local partners.
The humanitarian crises that followed both withdrawals—abandoned allies in Vietnam and the chaos at Kabul airport in Afghanistan—underscore a recurring failure to protect those who supported U.S. efforts. The tragic scenes of desperation and loss of life tarnished America's global reputation and demonstrated a lack of proactive evacuation planning despite prior warnings in both conflicts.
Intelligence failures also played a critical role. In Vietnam, policymakers underestimated the ARVN's vulnerabilities, just as intelligence assessments in Afghanistan failed to predict the rapid collapse of the ANDSF. These repeated failures highlight systemic issues in intelligence coordination and the inability to anticipate adversaries' strategies.
Accountability remains elusive in both cases. Although Vietnam's lessons were thoroughly documented and widely studied, they were ignored in Afghanistan. This repeated disregard raises serious questions about whether the U.S. can learn from its mistakes or whether institutional inertia ensures these errors will persist in future engagements.
The chaotic withdrawals from both Afghanistan and Vietnam expose a troubling pattern of strategic ineptitude. As the U.S. considers future interventions, the lessons of these twin failures must be internalized. For the sake of military personnel, American taxpayers, and the citizens of nations where the U.S. intervenes, it is imperative to break this cycle of flawed decision-making—failing to do so risks repeating the same catastrophic outcomes, with dire consequences for U.S. credibility, global stability, and the moral responsibility owed to those who serve and depend on America’s leadership.
Sources
Malkasian, Carter. "What Went Wrong in Afghanistan?" The Atlantic, September 2021.
Sandler, Ethan. "The Taliban’s Victory and America’s Defeat." Foreign Affairs, October 2021.
Rosenberg, Matthew, and Eric Schmitt. "The Afghanistan Papers: What Went Wrong?" The New York Times, September 2021.
"Afghanistan: Timeline of the U.S. Withdrawal." BBC News, August 2021.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR). Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed: SIGAR-23-16-IP. 2023.
Shane, Leo III. "Trump Ordered Rapid Withdrawal from Afghanistan after Election Loss." Military Times, October 13, 2022.
Associated Press. "New GOP Report Blames Biden for Disastrous End to U.S. War in Afghanistan." AP News, 2023.
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