STRATEGY CENTRAL
For and By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth – March 18, 2025
Introduction
The Pentagon’s recent decision to shut down the Office of Net Assessment (ONA) is a devastating blow to America’s long-term military strategy. For over fifty years, this relatively small and cost-effective office—established under the legendary Andrew Marshall—provided invaluable foresight into future conflicts, shaping strategic thinking and guiding defense planning. Its abrupt closure signals a dangerous shift away from forward-looking military preparedness and leaves a glaring void that will not be easily filled.
A Legacy of Strategic Foresight
The Office of Net Assessment was founded in 1973 under the guidance of Andrew Marshall, a towering intellectual figure in the realm of defense strategy. His role was not to provide immediate battlefield solutions but to assess long-term trends, adversary capabilities, and emerging technologies that would shape future conflicts. His influence was felt at the highest levels of the Department of Defense (DoD), shaping strategies that ultimately led to critical advancements in military doctrine.
One of ONA’s most impactful contributions was its role in the development of the AirLand Battle doctrine, which defined U.S. military operations against the Soviet Union during the Cold War. More recently, ONA spearheaded studies on China’s military rise, championing the Air-Sea Battle concept that sought to counter Beijing’s anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) strategy. The office’s ability to think ahead—sometimes decades ahead—allowed the U.S. military to preemptively address challenges before they fully materialized.
Why Would Anyone Shut This Down?
The decision to close ONA, reportedly under the direction of Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth, is perplexing. According to the Pentagon’s statement, the office will be "restructured and reopened with a new focus on pressing national security challenges." But this vague rationale raises more questions than it answers. ONA’s very mission was to anticipate those challenges. By shutting it down, the DoD is severing a crucial intellectual arm that has historically helped it outmaneuver adversaries in strategic competition.
Critics of ONA, such as Senator Charles Grassley, have labeled it as “wasteful and ineffective,” arguing that its work has been too detached from immediate military needs. Some claim that the office spent too much time theorizing about distant threats while ignoring ongoing conflicts like Iraq and Afghanistan. But this criticism misunderstands ONA’s purpose: it was never meant to provide real-time tactical guidance—it existed to prepare for the wars of tomorrow. This is the unglamorous work of joint and service commands attempting to envision the future and the force required to operate in that environment. This is how you build the future force, not fight today's battles. The DoD must do both.
The Cost of Losing ONA
The financial burden of ONA was negligible compared to its strategic value. The office operated on an annual budget of roughly $10–20 million—a minuscule fraction of the Pentagon’s $850 billion budget. In return, it delivered assessments that often shaped how military resources were allocated and how strategies were developed to counter peer competitors like China and Russia.
With ONA gone, who will now provide the same level of independent, long-term strategic assessment? Bureaucratic entities within the Pentagon? Think tanks with political agendas? The Joint Chiefs? None of these institutions have the same mandate, intellectual freedom, or longevity that ONA possessed. Without an organization explicitly dedicated to long-term assessments, the Pentagon will increasingly be caught in the cycle of fighting the last war rather than preparing for the next one.
A Shortsighted Move at the Worst Possible Time
The decision to shut down ONA comes as the United States faces intensifying strategic competition with China, renewed threats from Russia, and the proliferation of emerging technologies that could radically alter the nature of warfare. The Pentagon’s need for high-level, independent strategic thinking has never been greater.
As Thomas Mahnken, a former Pentagon strategist, pointed out, “We’re in a period that looks a lot like the Cold War, and we’re doing away with an office that for decades helped senior leaders navigate that conflict.” This sentiment echoes across the national security community, where the closure of ONA is widely seen as a major step backward in the ability to conceptualize future military requirements.
What Could Replace ONA? Likely, Nothing as Effective
Some have suggested that ONA’s functions could be absorbed by other DoD entities, such as the Defense Innovation Board or various research arms of the military services. However, these organizations do not possess the same institutional mandate for long-range strategic assessment. Unlike ONA, which operated independently and reported directly to the Secretary of Defense, most alternative bodies are subject to layers of bureaucracy that stifle creative thinking.
Moreover, ONA had the unique ability to commission research from a wide network of academics, defense analysts, and military thinkers without being constrained by the bureaucratic inertia that often plagues large defense institutions. This intellectual flexibility will not be easily replicated.
Final Thoughts: A Decision That Must Be Reversed
The closure of ONA is a deeply flawed decision that reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of how strategic foresight contributes to national defense. While the Pentagon may claim that it is restructuring the office for a new mission, history suggests that such restructuring efforts often lead to dilution, not enhancement, of capability.
If the U.S. is serious about maintaining its competitive edge in an era of renewed great-power competition, it must recognize the irreplaceable value that ONA provided. The closure of this office is not just a bad idea—it is a self-inflicted wound that weakens America’s ability to anticipate, adapt, and prevail in the conflicts of the future.
Bibliography
Cohen, Eliot A. “The Brain of the Pentagon.” The Atlantic, 2019. https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2019/05/andrew-marshall-brain-pentagon-passed-away/588952/
Jaffe, Greg. “Hegseth Closes Pentagon Office Focused on Future Wars.” The New York Times, March 14, 2025.
Mahnken, Thomas G. The Gathering Storm: China’s Challenge to US Security and Strategy. Washington, DC: CSBA, 2021.
Marshall, Andrew W. Long-Term Strategic Competition with China: Implications for America’s National Security. Washington, DC: Office of Net Assessment, 2014.
Rumsfeld, Donald. Known and Unknown: A Memoir. New York: Sentinel, 2011.
Tolkowsky, Jeffrey. “Net Assessment and the Future of Warfare.” Defense One, October 17, 2022. https://www.defenseone.com/ideas/2022/10/net-assessment-and-future-warfare/375928/
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