An Integrated Strategy Not Matched By The U.S.
Strategy Central
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth, November 2024
Introduction
China's approach to Irregular Warfare (IW) is integral to its broader military and geopolitical strategy, designed to complement conventional forces and expand influence through non-kinetic means. China is weaving an irregular strategy that extends beyond traditional battlegrounds into the social, economic, and informational realms by leveraging information, influence, and non-state actors. China calls IW “Hybrid Warfare,” but we will use IW interchangeably in this discussion.
To confuse matters even more, the U.S. refers to the realm between peace and war as the gray zone. In contrast to China’s ambiguous and integrated approach to competition short of conflict, the U.S. approach to IW and gray zone activities has often been compartmentalized, focusing heavily on Special Operations Forces (SOF) and a mixed bag of diplomatic, economic, and informational conventional tools. U.S. intelligence services likely have the most success exploiting the gray zone, but they must be better coordinated and revelatory about the effects. A U.S. and China comparison of gray zone approaches shows significant differences in the scope, patience, and flexibility between the two nations, with China embracing a more diverse and integrated approach.
The United States should revise its gray zone strategy to counter China and effectively advance and protect its national security interests within the context of Great Power Competition. This article aims to enhance understanding of Beijing's perspective on Irregular Warfare (IW), including its historical context and the application of IW operations in the gray zone. A comparison between the two approaches will demonstrate the need for strategic adaptation in the U.S. approach.
The U.S. History and Approach to Irregular Warfare and the Gray Zone
Irregular Warfare (IW) is a violent struggle between state and non-state actors to gain influence and legitimacy over a population. They are operations aimed at achieving political objectives through unconventional means, often below the threshold of traditional warfare. It includes unconventional warfare, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense. Gray zone activities, on the other hand, occupy a space between peace and open conflict, characterized by actions like cyber intrusions, disinformation campaigns, economic coercion, espionage, and challenging other governments levers of control through harassment, intimidation, and strong arms tactics that push legal, policing, or military boundaries (lawfare). These operations seek to achieve strategic gains while avoiding the direct triggers of a strictly military response of consequence.
Gray zone security challenges are competitive actions between states or states and non-state actors that fall between peace and war. The lack of distinction between belligerence at the threshold of war and a regular occurrence creates complications for foreign policymakers. Unlike conventional categories of war or peace, these challenges are marked by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, the actors involved, and applicable legal frameworks. While gray zone activities share specific characteristics, each challenge is unique, requiring tailored approaches. These challenges are more intense than typical peacetime competition, inherently aggressive, ambiguous on a scale between peace and war, and dependent on perspective. The gray zone is not merely physical space as a “zone” implies; it is also an approach that confuses others about intentions and employs methods that always carry an air of deniability.
In its early history, the United States often employed gray zone tactics against established powers, but this approach shifted as it became a global leader. The current national security architecture, primarily shaped by the National Security Act of 1947, is focused on maintaining the world order, making the U.S. ill-suited for gray zone challenges despite decades of attempts to address them. Since World War II, the U.S. has struggled to respond effectively to these challenges due to gaps in laws, policies, and strategies. America's responses are frequently either overly militarized or overly constrained, failing to navigate the ambiguous middle ground between peace and warfare, where clear concepts for law enforcement and military action do not neatly apply. The chart above illustrates that the U.S. has traditionally focused on a Clausewitzian approach, emphasizing the trinity and often adopting a predominantly tactical mindset. In contrast, China has successfully blended tactical and strategic practices, utilizing Sun Tzu’s theories to establish hybrid warfare as a core strategy.
For the U.S., the convergence between IW and the gray zone involves using aggressive methods that stop short of war, focusing on influencing and leveraging specific populations. IW is a limited approach to influencing populations, and the gray zone goes beyond a specific Indigenous group to the perception of these operations in the geopolitical landscape. Additionally, the gray zone encompasses more than just population dynamics. It represents an approach to degrade, deter, and out-compete other nations without engaging in direct conflict. It also goes beyond simply seeking friendly resolutions to access and control resources, communication lines, or markets.
The U.S. approach to IW and gray zone activities has evolved and has been shaped by various conflicts and global challenges. Below is an overview of critical elements of the U.S. history and approach to IW and the gray zone:
Unconventional Warfare (UW): During the Cold War, the U.S. engaged in unconventional warfare to support anti-communist insurgencies worldwide, often utilizing CIA operations and Special Forces to conduct covert activities to weaken Soviet influence.
Counterinsurgency (COIN): In conflicts such as Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the U.S. adopted COIN strategies that combined military operations with efforts to win the "hearts and minds" of local populations.
Foreign Internal Defense (FID): U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) have long trained and assisted allied nations' militaries in countering internal threats, thereby preventing adversaries from gaining influence.
Information Operations (IO): The U.S. has increasingly focused on information operations to counter adversarial propaganda, particularly during the Gulf War and recent engagements against extremist groups.
Cyber Warfare: The U.S. has developed cyber capabilities as part of its IW strategy, focusing on defensive measures and offensive operations to counter threats from state and non-state actors.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) remain at the core of U.S. military IW efforts. They engage in various missions, from direct action to counterterrorism and unconventional warfare to countering a limited range of gray zone threats posed by adversaries. The U.S. approach also involves collaboration with allies, interagency coordination, and using diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to complement military efforts or in some combination. However, adapting these capabilities to counter China's sophisticated gray zone tactics remains a significant challenge.
SOF enhances U.S. influence without direct confrontation by training allies and partners, supporting insurgents, countering insurgents, psychological operations, and conducting information operations. Despite their effectiveness, traditional SOF tactics have limited reach in the information-heavy environment that characterizes gray zone warfare. The U.S. struggles to match China’s capability in deploying state-controlled media, legal frameworks, and digital subversion to achieve strategic gains. The State Department, which has legal authority over these operations, heavily restricts military use of IO, further limiting its effectiveness.
Historical Roots & Modern China’s Irregular Warfare Approach
The foundation of China’s current approach to IW can be traced back to its history of asymmetric resistance and revolution. The People's Republic of China (PRC) was born out of Mao Zedong's guerilla strategies during the Chinese Civil War, where irregular tactics were employed to counter the technologically superior Kuomintang forces. Mao’s philosophy centered on influencing the population and transitioning from irregular to conventional tactics when advantageous. This historical narrative shapes the Chinese mindset, where IW is not an afterthought but an essential part of national defense and expansion strategies.
Chinese leaders understand that irregular approaches are a powerful tool in an era when outright military conflict could have catastrophic consequences. Therefore, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) incorporates them into its broader strategic approach, focusing on disrupting adversaries and projecting power in subtle, often deniable ways. This methodology, rooted in historical necessity, persists in modern Chinese strategy, as evidenced by its activities in the South China Sea and beyond.
China’s modern concept of IW is often called hybrid warfare and integrates political, military, and informational efforts to influence populations and diminish adversarial legitimacy. Unlike Western powers, which often compartmentalize IW into counterterrorism or counterinsurgency, China sees hybrid warfare as central to its great power competition strategy. Beijing merges hybrid with conventional operations, using them in tandem to shape the battlespace and ensure favorable outcomes without direct confrontation. Blending conventional and irregular tactics is seen as a natural approach in any potential great power conflict, especially with the United States, as demonstrated in the South China Sea, where maritime militias act as vanguards of Chinese sovereignty claims without engaging conventional military assets.
A central approach to China’s hybrid strategy emphasizes the “Three Warfares”—public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare. These elements aim to manipulate the information environment to undermine adversaries to ensure strategic gains without firing a shot. For example, public opinion warfare utilizes state-controlled media and social platforms to influence domestic and international audiences. Psychological warfare is intended to demoralize opponents, while legal warfare seeks to exploit international law ambiguities, particularly in disputes over the South China Sea. These efforts, all conducted in the gray zone below the threshold of open conflict, are essential to Beijing's aim of reshaping the global order in its favor.
PLA Methodology & Capabilities
China’s approach to gray zone operations is broad, diverse, and well-developed. Critical components of China’s strategy include:
The Three Warfares: Public opinion warfare, psychological warfare, and legal warfare are central to China’s strategy of shaping the information environment, influencing populations, and manipulating legal norms to support its strategic objectives.
Maritime Militias: China employs maritime militias—non-military fishing vessels equipped for reconnaissance and harassment missions—to assert control over disputed waters without engaging conventional military forces.
People's Armed Police (PAP): The PAP is utilized for domestic security but also plays roles in international operations, particularly in border areas and maritime security.
Cyber and Information Warfare: China’s Ministry of State Security (MSS) engages in cyber espionage and disinformation campaigns to weaken adversaries and achieve strategic gains without direct confrontation.
United Front Work: This political strategy involves cultivating relationships with influential individuals and groups in other countries to increase Chinese influence abroad.
Economic Coercion: China uses economic measures, such as trade restrictions and infrastructure investment through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), to create dependencies and exert political leverage over other nations.
China does not routinely focus on IW approaches similar to U.S. SOF. While China attempts to create instability and apply pressure on unfavorable governments or sway specific populations, unconventional warfare (UW) or foreign internal defense (FID) are not their preferred methods. Instead, they rely primarily on information operations (IO), lawfare, and psychological operations. China’s most aggressive military tactics include using maritime fishing militias, Coast Guard harassment in international waters, building islands in international waters, claiming land and waters that are not China, and conducting military exercises around Taiwan. PLA Air Force fly-bys and violations of other nations' airspace are also common. The People's Liberation Army (PLA) and People's Armed Police (PAP) SOF are mainly limited to supporting conventional operations.
In late 2015, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) initiated sweeping reforms to transition from land-based territorial defense to broader power projection across space, cyberspace, and the far seas, aligning with its strategy to protect Chinese interests in these “strategic frontiers.” A central aspect of this reform was the creation of the Strategic Support Force (SSF) (not a SOF unit), which consolidates the PLA’s space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities into a single unit, aiming to enhance the PLA’s capacity to engage in "informationized" wars. The SSF plays two critical roles: strategic information support and strategic information operations. In its support role, the SSF centralizes intelligence collection, enables joint operations, and strengthens PLA power projection, particularly in space and nuclear domains. In its operational role, the SSF coordinates cyber, electronic, and space warfare to target enemy command systems, aiming to “paralyze” and “sabotage” these systems in the early stages of conflict.
The SSF enhances the PLA’s effectiveness in conducting complex information operations by unifying previously disparate capabilities. This integration allows the PLA to streamline cyber espionage, offensive cyber actions, and information warfare campaigns, creating new synergies to conduct decisive information operations. The SSF's unified command structure supports the coordination and deployment of information warfare assets, positioning the PLA to execute sophisticated, multi-domain strategies in competition and future conflicts.
In short, China has built a homologized PLA that blends military and civilian structures suited for gray zone activities from the tactical to the strategic levels. They can influence populations, degrade rival capabilities, create confusion about what and how they conduct themselves, build access to markets and lines of communication, and manipulate states to go along with their strategic designs. U.S. SOF are not built or trained for this pseudo-war capability that spans domains, confounds legal definitions, and retains plausible deniability to obviously problematic activities.
Chinese DIME Approaches to Irregular Warfare
The Chinese approach to IW draws from multiple elements of national power. Politically, China employs “United Front” operations, using diplomatic engagements, economic influence, and even cultural exchanges to expand its influence abroad and secure compliance among its neighbors. Politically motivated IW activities include efforts to sway opinions in target countries by cultivating political elites through economic incentives or coercion, thereby enhancing Chinese influence without direct intervention.
Militarily, the PLA employs its regular forces in roles traditionally associated with special operations, such as direct action and reconnaissance, but tightly integrates these actions with conventional capabilities. The People’s Armed Police (PAP) and maritime militias are also instrumental in China’s hybrid efforts. The maritime militia, for instance, has been pivotal in asserting control over contested waters in the South China Sea, allowing Beijing to advance territorial claims through persistent presence and intimidation, all while maintaining plausible deniability.
China also uses its intelligence services as an integral component in gray zone approaches. The Ministry of State Security (MSS) engages in cyber espionage, disinformation campaigns, and economic warfare to weaken adversaries and steal valuable data. These activities are coordinated with other national power elements, blurring the line between traditional military operations and covert actions typical of IW.
China’s primary global security approach is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which strategically employs gray zone tactics to expand its influence, subtly bypassing direct military engagement. By offering infrastructure loans to developing countries, China enables economic dependency and political sway, often binding countries with debt through terms favorable to Chinese interests. Infrastructure projects, such as ports, roads, and railways, facilitate economic interconnectivity while enabling dual-use logistics that support China's military and commercial interests. Additionally, China's involvement in these regions allows it to shape local politics and align the strategic goals of partner nations with its own, securing vital resources and expanding its sphere of influence without resorting to armed conflict. Through these methods, the BRI operates in the geopolitical gray zone, advancing Chinese interests under the guise of development and cooperation.
Comparing the U.S. and Chinese Approaches to Irregular Warfare
The Chinese approach to irregular activities and gray zone challenges are more comprehensive, diverse, and developed than the United States. China’s flexibility and patience, coupled with its use of non-military tools to achieve its objectives, give it an advantage in gray zone operations. Beijing leverages various legal, economic, cyber, and informational instruments, integrating them with military capabilities. This contrasts with the U.S. approach, which remains primarily compartmentalized. SOF and intelligence agencies often conduct IW activities in isolation from broader political and economic efforts.
China’s patience in achieving long-term strategic goals also contrasts with the often reactive nature of U.S. policy. While the U.S. has demonstrated tactical proficiency in IW through its SOF, the broader integration of IW into national strategy lags behind China’s cohesive, multi-domain approach. The Chinese ability to operate effectively within the gray zone, using a mix of coercion, disinformation, and legal manipulation, highlights the need for the U.S. to adapt its strategy to compete effectively.
Improving the U.S. Approach to Compete in the Gray Zone
To better compete with China in the gray zone, the U.S. must broaden its IW doctrine to address the diverse and evolving challenges posed by Chinese gray zone operations. This involves developing IW capabilities beyond the traditional focus on SOF and incorporating an interagency approach that includes diplomatic, economic, and informational tools. Enhanced interagency collaboration, particularly in cybersecurity and intelligence sharing, is essential to creating a comprehensive IW platform capable of countering China's tactics.
The U.S. could also establish dedicated cyber and information warfare units within SOF or build new partnerships with technology industries to innovate in the IW domain, especially as AI and other computing systems dramatically alter the competitive playing field. Joint operations with regional allies, such as multinational maritime security missions, could effectively deter Chinese aggression in contested areas like the South China Sea.
Moreover, expanding strategic messaging and influence operations will help counter China's extensive use of state-controlled media and disinformation campaigns. By fully embracing a broader IW approach that leverages military, economic, informational, and diplomatic capabilities, the U.S. can position itself to better compete in the gray zone and preserve stability in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
To bridge the capability gap with the Chinese, the U.S. needs to enhance its IW framework to align more closely with China's capabilities to counter Chinese strategies in the gray zone. This involves expanding SOF capabilities, including cyber defenses, strategic messaging, counter-lawfare operations, military deception, strategic sabotage, psychological operations outside combat zones, reconnaissance, and enhanced collaboration with allies (Advise, Assist, Accompany). Additionally, the U.S. must be willing to adjust its formations, such as incorporating dedicated IW units focused on cyber and information warfare (digital media) rather than relying solely on traditional SOF missions.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) doctrine, forged in the crucible of Cold War proxy conflicts, now faces a critical test as it confronts the unique challenges posed by China’s strategic maneuvers in the gray zone. While the Cold War-era doctrine suited past great power competition, today’s security environment demands a fresh assessment of SOF’s methods, capabilities, and techniques to effectively wield irregular warfare (IW) in defense of U.S. national interests. China's sophisticated gray zone tactics—combining economic coercion, cyber threats, and influence operations—reveal gaps in current SOF doctrine that require urgent adaptation. The question is whether SOF will evolve to meet the unconventional threats posed by China or continue to rely on a doctrine designed for a world that no longer exists.
Great Power Competition - Irregular Warfare – Gray Zone
Throughout recorded history, Irregular Warfare and gray zone strategies have long been principal approaches to competing with other powerful nations. Great power competition (called strategic competition by the Joint Staff) inherently involves a struggle for influence and power projection without escalating to full-scale war, and IW has provided an effective way to achieve this balance. During the Cold War, for example, the United States and the Soviet Union extensively used IW methods, such as supporting proxy wars, insurgencies, and covert operations, to expand their influence and counter each other's geopolitical moves. This was done to avoid the catastrophic consequences of direct conflict between two nuclear powers.
Today, a similar dynamic is evident in the competition between China and the United States. Both nations seek to assert influence and undermine each other’s positions through non-conventional means, recognizing the risk of direct military engagement. China’s use of the gray zone allows it to make incremental gains that contribute to its strategic objectives without crossing the threshold of conventional warfare. This calculated approach reflects an understanding of the historical effectiveness of gray zone and irregular/hybrid approaches in great power competition—where indirect methods, influence operations, and strategic patience can yield significant outcomes while mitigating the risk of broader conflict.
China’s gray zone strategy reflects a clear understanding of global power dynamics and seeks to maximize Beijing’s influence while mitigating risks. A prime example is the South China Sea. Chinese IW operations, including maritime militia deployments and artificial island construction, have effectively expanded Chinese influence without provoking large-scale military conflict. China has gained strategic advantages by employing non-conventional forces in maritime disputes while minimizing international backlash.
Moreover, China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a strategy enabled by gray zone/irregular approaches, creating economic dependencies in countries across Africa, Latin America, and Europe. These dependencies can be leveraged politically, ensuring that nations benefiting from Chinese investments remain favorable to Beijing’s interests. In Africa, for example, Chinese private security companies are increasingly used to protect Chinese investments, reflecting a hybrid model that combines economic engagement with a subtle military footprint.
For the United States, acknowledging the role of IW in great power competition and maximizing gray zone approaches means investing in capabilities that extend beyond traditional military power while better integrating all elements of power. Competing effectively in the gray zone requires embracing a range of activities under a central strategy that ranges from economic measures and strategic messaging to cyber and covert operations. As history demonstrates, IW and gray zone activities are critical to gaining a strategic advantage against powerful adversaries, making it essential for the U.S. to refine and expand its IW strategies to keep pace with the evolving nature of great power competition.
Conclusion – Competing In This Era, Not The Last One
China’s IW strategy represents a comprehensive effort to shape the global environment to its advantage, using every tool available short of open warfare. Using maritime militias, PAP units, cyber capabilities, and political manipulation illustrates how Beijing merges IW and conventional capabilities to pursue its goals. As the world enters an era of renewed great power competition, China’s commitment to IW means that future conflicts involving China are unlikely to be purely conventional. Instead, IW will likely serve as the primary method through which China exerts influence and undermines adversaries without escalating to open hostilities.
For policymakers and military planners, understanding the intricacies of China’s IW is crucial. Beijing’s approach demands that rival strategies be developed that address the entirety of China’s IW toolkit—military, political, legal, and informational. By recognizing that China’s use of IW and gray zone approaches are part of a long-term strategy to reshape the international order, the United States and its allies can better prepare to dilute these efforts both in the Indo-Pacific and globally.
To dilute China’s efforts to degrade the U.S. while advancing its interests in great power competition, the U.S. must undergo significant organizational, doctrinal, and methodological changes. These changes must effectively counter irregular approaches in the gray zone while protecting and advancing U.S. national security interests. Simply countering the Chinese is a great way for the U.S. to chase its tail and not create the world the U.S. can thrive in. To compete with China’s integrated gray zone/irregular strategies, the U.S. must broaden its approach beyond conventional and special operations frameworks, developing a comprehensive interagency system with robust cyber, intelligence, and informational warfare capabilities. Organizationally, a unified structure that enhances interagency collaboration, especially between SOF, cyber units, and civilian agencies, will be essential to effectively coordinate military and civilian functions and implement gray zone activities that can counter, degrade, deter, and advance.
Doctrinally, U.S. forces must shift to a holistic, improved and expanded IW doctrine that incorporates aspects of the gray zone approach and embraces military, diplomatic, economic, and informational tools to address complex threats and opportunities. This shift requires an adaptive strategy that combines offensive and defensive cyber operations, strategic messaging, and influence operations to challenge adversaries in the informational domain. Furthermore, counter-lawfare tactics and psychological operations must be prioritized outside traditional combat zones to address China’s nuanced and pervasive gray zone methods.
Methodologically, the U.S. must build resilient IW units capable of rapid response, digital warfare, and intelligence operations aligned with advanced technological innovations in AI and cybersecurity. By restructuring SOF capabilities to include IW-specific units and enhancing coordination with allied forces for regional security missions, the U.S. can assert its influence and deter adversarial encroachment in contested regions. Only through a multi-domain, multi-faceted approach can the U.S. effectively navigate the gray zone, protect its interests, and maintain stability amid great power competition. SOF should lead the way, not by being a slightly better version of its current self, but by becoming something different.
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