In Honor of The Fallen of 9/11 And The Aftermath
By Practitioners, For Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth, September 11, 2024
Editorial Note
We published an article last week reviewing the “Pentagon Papers.” This week, we are following up with the “Afghanistan Papers.” Conducting research and writing these articles left our staff pretty disgusted with the incredible similarity between the wars in Vietnam and Afghanistan. Each war demonstrated a remarkable degree of government deception and chronically bad strategic directives. It is generally public knowledge, but being reminded of the details was unpleasant. Our staff either served a tour or had some military service-connected experience with Afghanistan (and Iraq). Friends died there or came back wounded. We knew this would not be a “feel-good” piece; it is a journalistic take on Craig Whitlock’s book, plus some related facts.
However honest and accurate the article is, it was hard not to feel “snarky” about depicting what happened. The AI-generated poster above is a somewhat satiric approach to explaining these wars’ similarities. No offense is intended towards the men and women who served bravely in either mission. However, some less-than-warm feelings are directed at our political and military leadership, many of which actively misled and allowed poor strategic decisions to pass to cover their posterior. Unlike Vietnam, our nation had been attacked, and a decisive strategy was called for. With the civilized world in support, our leadership, spanning four presidents, led us on an odyssey that ended almost as tragically as it had begun and, in many ways, left us worse off. There is much we should not forget about Afghanistan, especially those who gave their all to a doomed cause. In honor of those who fell on 9/11 and after, we offer this look into our war in Afghanistan.
Introduction
In the wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the United States launched Operation Enduring Freedom, targeting the Taliban regime in Afghanistan for harboring al-Qaeda, the group responsible for the attacks. What began as a swift mission to dismantle al-Qaeda and oust the Taliban spiraled into a prolonged and costly twenty-year effort to reshape Afghanistan’s political and social landscape. Drawing from "The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War" (2021) by Craig Whitlock, along with additional analyses and firsthand accounts, this article examines the rationale behind U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan, the evolution of its mission, and the factors that led to the ultimate failure of U.S. efforts there. It also explores the consequences of the American withdrawal in 2021 and reflects on the broader strategic implications of two decades of flawed policies, lack of strategy, and poor management.
The Initial Rationale for U.S. Military Intervention
The initial objective of the U.S. intervention in Afghanistan was clear: to destroy al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power for providing a safe haven to the terrorist group. In the immediate aftermath of 9/11, there was widespread international support for U.S. actions, and the mission seemed straightforward. However, as outlined in "The Afghanistan Papers," internal government documents obtained through freedom of information requests reveal a different narrative. From the outset, the U.S. mission had significant ambiguities and contradictions. President George W. Bush’s administration did not clarify whether the goal was solely to punish the Taliban or to eliminate them, nor was there a cohesive strategy for what would follow once these initial objectives were achieved.
The confusion about the Taliban was due to the US failure to capture Osama Bin Laden during the Battle of Tora Bora in 2001. This failure resulted from tactical missteps, reliance on unreliable local forces, and inadequate resources. US military leaders prioritized a light-footprint approach, relying on Special Forces and airpower and delegating ground fighting to Afghan militia leaders, who were often corrupt or lacked commitment. Despite credible intelligence pinpointing Bin Laden's location, US forces did not deploy sufficient troops to capture him in the mountainous terrain along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, allowing him to slip away into Pakistan.
The strategic consequences of this failure were profound. Bin Laden's escape prolonged the war on terror, allowing Al-Qaeda to regroup and spread its influence across the region. His continued evasion symbolized a missed opportunity to deal a decisive blow to global terrorism. The failure also strained U.S.-Pakistan relations, as American officials suspected that elements within Pakistan provided safe harbor for Bin Laden and, later, Taliban fighters. With Bin Laden out of Afghanistan, the United States would focus much of the military effort on removing the Taliban, and when that failed, countering their growing resurgence that led to the fall of the U.S.-backed government.
Mission Creep: From Counterterrorism to Nation-Building
As early as 2002, the mission expanded from counterterrorism to nation-building utilizing Counterinsurgency doctrine. This transition marked the beginning of a series of strategic errors. Instead of focusing narrowly on counterterrorism objectives, the U.S. embarked on an ambitious project to establish a democratic government, build infrastructure, and create security forces capable of defending the new Afghan state. "The Afghanistan Papers" highlights how this shift occurred without a clear understanding of Afghan society or the necessary commitment of resources to achieve such transformative goals.
The complexity of Afghan society, especially its tribal dynamics and resistance to centralized authority, was ignored by U.S. leadership as it essentially imposed democracy on the fledgling nation. This led to flawed policies that didn't gain local support. Implementing Western-style democracy in a country with deep tribal and ethnic divisions was unrealistic and ultimately unworkable. National security policy and strategy experts should have recognized this flaw. Confusing a counterterror strategy (mow the grass) with a counterinsurgency strategy (hearts & minds) was a direct result of wanting to purge Al Qaeda and prevent the return of Taliban rule. You can do both simultaneously, but each must be applied within the limit of resources. COIN at scale with a population that entirely rejects central authority is foolish.
Chronic Deception and Fabrications
One of the most troubling revelations from "The Afghanistan Papers" is how U.S. officials misled the public about the war’s progress and prospects. Successive administrations, from George W. Bush to Barack Obama to Donald Trump, maintained a facade of inevitable victory and downplayed the challenges facing U.S. efforts in Afghanistan. Internally, however, these same officials expressed doubts about their strategies and recognized the dysfunctionality of the mission. This consistent pattern of deception recalls the misinformation spread during the Vietnam War and underscores a recurring theme in U.S. military engagements: the gap between public optimism and private pessimism.
According to Whitlock, internal assessments frequently contradicted the upbeat narratives given to the public. For instance, U.S. military leaders regularly inflated metrics of success, such as the number of Taliban fighters killed, the number of Afghan security forces trained, and the extent of territory controlled by the Afghan government. These fabrications were designed to create an illusion of progress, suggesting that victory was achievable and within reach.
The U.S. government fabricated information to boost morale among troops and support among allies and to prevent the Taliban from gaining psychological and political victories. Maintaining a positive public narrative was crucial for sustaining domestic support and preventing the erosion of public backing. Thus, successive administrations prioritized crafting a narrative that minimized the complexities and challenges faced in Afghanistan, emphasizing instead the potential for success through continued commitment.
Economically, the U.S. involvement in Afghanistan was also justified by misleading claims about reconstruction efforts and economic development. Whitlock’s investigation highlights how U.S. officials often portrayed Afghanistan as a success story of nation-building, with new schools, hospitals, and infrastructure projects. However, behind the scenes, there were admissions that these projects were frequently ineffective, plagued by corruption, or incomplete. The flow of billions of dollars into Afghanistan led to widespread graft and fraud, with much of the aid money ending up in the hands of warlords and corrupt officials or wasted on poorly planned projects. Yet, the public narrative emphasized development successes as a justification for sustained economic investment and military presence.
The deception extended to strategic goals and objectives as well. Whitlock’s investigation uncovers that from the very beginning of the war, there was confusion and ambiguity over the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. Initially, the primary objective was to dismantle al-Qaeda and remove the Taliban from power for harboring terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks. However, as the mission evolved, it expanded into an ambitious and poorly defined project of nation-building and establishing a stable democracy. This shift in objectives was never clearly communicated to the American public, who were instead led to believe that the mission’s focus remained on counterterrorism. The lack of clarity and shifting goals contributed to the protracted nature of the conflict. Still, officials were reluctant to admit these strategic missteps, fearing a loss of public and international support.
Another critical element of Whitlock’s findings is using manipulated data to support the government's narrative. The so-called "Lessons Learned" documents from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) included candid interviews with hundreds of military and civilian officials who admitted that the U.S. war strategy was failing. Yet, these honest assessments were rarely, if ever, shared with the public. Instead, U.S. leaders cherry-picked data to present a more favorable picture. For example, metrics that showed increased trained Afghan security forces were often cited. Still, the equally important information about their high desertion rates and lack of combat readiness was omitted. This selective presentation of data helped maintain a false narrative of steady progress and justifiable commitment.
Whitlock’s investigation also reveals that U.S. officials were aware early on that the Afghan government, propped up by the U.S., was seen as illegitimate by much of the Afghan population. Corruption was rampant, and the government failed to gain the trust of its people. Despite this, the U.S. continued to publicly express confidence in the Afghan government’s ability to lead and unify the country, ignoring warnings from diplomats, intelligence officials, and military commanders that the strategy was doomed to fail. This sustained support, based on false premises, only prolonged the conflict and deepened the U.S. entanglement in Afghanistan.
"The Afghanistan Papers" exposes a disturbing narrative of deception and fabrication by the U.S. government in its military, political, and economic efforts in Afghanistan. Whitlock’s findings highlight the lengths to which officials went to maintain public support and avoid accountability, often at the expense of a coherent and effective strategy. The revelations from these papers serve as a cautionary tale, emphasizing the importance of honesty, transparency, and clear objectives in military engagements. As the U.S. reflects on its two-decade involvement in Afghanistan, these lessons are crucial for future foreign policy and military decision-making, especially since they are a near mirror image of what occurred in Vietnam. Vietnam and Afghanistan have deeply eroded the trust and confidence in the American government, which acts as fuel for the partisan divide infecting our country.
A Deeper Look at COIN and CT Efforts
The U.S. military initially focused on counterterrorism but later shifted to a counterinsurgency strategy as the main effort during the Obama administration. This strategy aimed to protect the population and strengthen Afghan security forces, but it had limited success. The strategy overlooked the resilience of the Taliban and the lack of support for the U.S.-backed Afghan government, which faced corruption and legitimacy issues.
The U.S. CT efforts in Afghanistan focused on dismantling al-Qaeda and preventing the country from becoming a safe haven for terrorist groups. Despite some successes in eliminating key al-Qaeda leaders, the overall goals set by the US government were not fully achieved due to flawed strategies, misaligned objectives, and the resilient nature of the insurgency movements in Afghanistan.
The United States' counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan was primarily focused on addressing the threat posed by al-Qaeda, associated groups, and ISIS-K. The strategic aim was to "disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future." Special operations forces conducted these operations and relied on advanced technology, such as drones, to conduct surveillance and execute precision strikes. While these efforts successfully eliminated several senior al-Qaeda leaders, including Osama bin Laden, in 2011, they did not significantly degrade the group’s operational capabilities in the region. Al-Qaeda’s decentralized structure allowed it to adapt and survive despite losing key leaders. Moreover, the focus on high-value targets often overlooked the broader network of fighters, facilitators, and support structures that sustained al-Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The impact of the U.S. counterterrorism effort in Afghanistan was complicated by al-Qaeda’s evolving strategy. Al-Qaeda shifted from a direct operational role in Afghanistan to a more advisory and supportive role, fostering relationships with local insurgent groups like the Taliban. This allowed al-Qaeda to maintain a low profile and avoid direct confrontation with U.S. forces while continuing to exert influence in the region. Additionally, the porous border between Afghanistan and Pakistan provided a sanctuary for al-Qaeda and the Taliban, allowing them to regroup and plan attacks with relative impunity. Despite years of efforts and billions of dollars spent, the U.S. failed to sever these cross-border insurgent networks, which continued to threaten Afghan stability.
One of the primary reasons U.S. counterterrorism efforts were not as effective as desired was the shifting nature of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan. What began as a focused counterterrorism campaign evolved into a broader counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that aimed to defeat the Taliban, stabilize the country, and build a democratic Afghan state. This shift diluted the focus on al-Qaeda and diverted resources to a mission that required a fundamentally different approach. Counterinsurgency efforts involved large-scale military operations, civilian protection initiatives, and efforts to win “hearts and minds,” but they often lacked coherence and failed to achieve their intended outcomes.
The U.S. counterinsurgency campaign in Afghanistan did not weaken the Taliban, who re-emerged as a formidable insurgent force after being ousted from power in 2001. The Taliban’s resilience was fueled by a combination of factors, including their deep-rooted connections with local communities, support from regional actors such as Pakistan, and the Afghan government’s inability to establish legitimacy and effective governance. The U.S. COIN strategy, which sought to establish a strong central government and build an effective Afghan security force, was undermined by widespread corruption, poor planning, and a lack of understanding of the local political and cultural dynamics. Consequently, the Taliban capitalized on these weaknesses, gradually regaining control over large swathes of the country.
The U.S. faced challenges in Afghanistan due to shifting objectives, strategic miscalculations, and an underestimation of al-Qaeda and the Taliban's resilience. While some progress was made in eliminating terrorist leaders, it was insufficient to dismantle the broader insurgent and terrorist networks. The prolonged conflict, coupled with evolving enemy strategies, ultimately limited U.S. effectiveness and led to the collapse of the U.S.-backed Afghan government in 2021.
The experience underscores the difficulties of conducting operations in complex and hostile environments, where local dynamics and regional geopolitics play a critical role. Furthermore, the U.S. fell short in combating terrorism in Afghanistan, as al-Qaeda and other militant groups remained active. The conflation of the Taliban with al-Qaeda was a strategic error that hindered negotiation and de-escalation. Ambiguous objectives for counterterrorism operations exacerbated the mission's protracted nature.
The Collapse of Afghan Security Forces
One of the most significant failures of the U.S. mission in Afghanistan was the collapse of Afghan security forces. Despite over 90 billion dollars invested in training and equipping the Afghan military, these forces were unable to withstand the Taliban’s advance following the U.S. withdrawal in 2021. Several factors contributed to this failure, including inadequate training, corruption, and poor leadership. Afghan soldiers often lacked motivation and were more loyal to local warlords than the central government, undermining their effectiveness.
The withdrawal of U.S. military forces significantly impacted the morale and effectiveness of the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces (ANDSF), which had long relied on U.S. support. The U.S. military had built the ANDSF to resemble its structure. Still, developing enlisted leadership, a professional officer corps, technical skills, and advanced tactics was unfamiliar and challenging for the Afghans. The addition of the Afghan Air Force (AAF) further exacerbated their struggles. The AAF, not expected to be self-sufficient until 2030, faced critical setbacks when U.S. maintenance support was withdrawn in 2021, leading to operational inefficiencies and supply shortages that left ANDSF units ill-equipped to combat the Taliban. The U.S. logistics system was often used to supply the ANDSF, and like their ground combat and air force counterparts, ANDSF logisticians could not replace their exiting American counterparts. The 2020 U.S.-Taliban agreement, signed under the Trump administration, marked a turning point by reducing U.S. military involvement, including crucial airstrikes, leaving the ANDSF vulnerable against the Taliban.
The rapid collapse of the Afghan military in the face of the Taliban’s offensive highlighted the weaknesses in U.S. strategy and the lack of sustainable progress over two decades. This collapse also exposed the extent to which the U.S. had overestimated the capabilities of the forces it had built, leading to a disastrous withdrawal that further damaged U.S. credibility.
The Botched Withdrawal and Negotiations with the Taliban
The American withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021 was marked by chaos and disarray, drawing stark comparisons to the fall of Saigon in 1975. Scenes of desperate Afghans clinging to aircraft at Kabul’s Hamid Karzai International Airport as they attempted to flee the Taliban’s rapid advance shocked the world. They highlighted the chaotic nature of the U.S. exit. This disorderly withdrawal was the culmination of a series of missteps, strategic miscalculations, and an underestimation of the Taliban's strength. The root causes of this debacle can be traced back to the agreement negotiated between the Trump administration and the Taliban, which set the stage for the U.S. departure but failed to account for the fragile state of the Afghan government and its security forces.
The agreement, signed in February 2020, committed the U.S. to a full military withdrawal from Afghanistan by May 2021 in exchange for a Taliban pledge to prevent terrorist groups from using Afghan soil to threaten the United States and its allies. However, this deal was made without the participation of the Afghan government, which weakened its legitimacy and emboldened the Taliban. The agreement effectively gave the Taliban a clear timetable for when U.S. forces would leave, allowing them to strategically prepare for a swift offensive to reclaim power as soon as American troops exited. It also led to a significant reduction in U.S. military presence, which weakened the support available to Afghan forces in their fight against the Taliban.
When President Joe Biden took office in January 2021, he faced a difficult decision: honor the agreement or extend the U.S. presence in Afghanistan, risking further conflict with the Taliban. Biden ultimately decided to proceed with the withdrawal, albeit with a slight extension to August 31, 2021, to allow for a more orderly exit. However, the rapid collapse of the Afghan government and security forces took U.S. officials by surprise. Despite intelligence warnings that the Afghan military might struggle to hold ground against the Taliban, the speed of the Taliban's advance—capturing key cities and Kabul in a matter of days—was unexpected, leading to a rushed and chaotic evacuation process.
Several factors, including poor planning, insufficient coordination with Afghan forces, and a lack of contingency measures, exacerbated the withdrawal’s disarray. The U.S. had overestimated the capabilities and resolve of the Afghan security forces, who, despite years of training and billions of dollars in support, crumbled rapidly in the face of the Taliban offensive. The U.S. military was caught off guard by the speed of the Taliban’s advance, forcing a hasty evacuation that left thousands of Afghan allies, including interpreters, embassy staff, and their families, stranded. The images of chaos at Kabul airport, with people desperate to escape, evoked memories of the fall of Saigon, where similar scenes of desperation played out as North Vietnamese forces closed in on the city in 1975.
Compounding the situation, the U.S. withdrawal plan did not adequately account for the need to secure Kabul until all American citizens and vulnerable Afghans had been evacuated. The lack of a secure perimeter around the airport and the decision to abandon Bagram Air Base—considered a more defensible location—contributed to the chaotic scenes. The U.S. military had to rely on ad hoc arrangements with the Taliban to facilitate safe passage to the airport, further complicating the situation. The suddenness of the evacuation also meant that much of the U.S. military equipment and classified materials could not be adequately secured or destroyed, raising concerns about them falling into Taliban hands. The former USCENTCOM Commander, Gen. Frank McKenzie, recently published an excellent account of the government’s withdrawal decisions called “The Melting Point.” An upcoming review of this book will go into this topic further.
No matter how much planning went into the U.S. withdrawal, the chaos surrounding the exit from Afghanistan has had significant implications for U.S. foreign policy and its standing on the global stage. It has sparked a debate about the execution of the exit strategy, the intelligence failures leading up to the withdrawal, and the broader strategic rationale for the U.S. presence in Afghanistan. The hasty exit also raised questions about America’s commitment to its allies and partners, especially those left behind. For many, the disorderly departure from Kabul marked a painful end to a 20-year engagement and a sobering reflection on the limits of American military power in achieving long-term political objectives in complex environments.
Strategic Implications and Lessons Learned
The United States' lessons from the Afghanistan war, spanning two decades, reflect critical insights into military strategy, counterinsurgency, nation-building, and diplomatic engagement. Here are some of the key lessons:
1. Limitations of Military Power
The U.S. learned that military superiority alone could not guarantee success in a conflict involving a complex mix of insurgency, tribal politics, and external influences. Despite technological and firepower advantages, the insurgency persisted, highlighting the limits of military power in achieving political objectives.
2. Nation-Building Challenges
Efforts to establish a functioning government and institutions in Afghanistan faced deep-rooted challenges, such as corruption, ethnic divisions, and lack of infrastructure. The failure of nation-building initiatives demonstrated that external forces cannot impose governance structures without local buy-in and cultural sensitivity.
3. Counterinsurgency Complexities
The Afghanistan war emphasized the difficulty of counterinsurgency operations. Winning the “hearts and minds” of the local population proved elusive, and civilian casualties and mistrust of foreign troops often undermined efforts. The U.S. also underestimated the Taliban’s resilience and ability to regroup.
4. Overextension and Mission Creep
The U.S. initially entered Afghanistan with the clear goal of dismantling Al-Qaeda. However, over time, the counterterror mission expanded to broader objectives like nation-building and creating a stable democracy, which diluted focus and led to overextension. This "mission creep" was seen as a contributing factor to the protracted nature of the war.
5. Dependency on External Support
Afghan security forces became overly dependent on U.S. support, which weakened their ability to stand independently. When the U.S. withdrew, the collapse of the Afghan government and military revealed that long-term dependency was unsustainable.
6. Diplomacy and Political Solutions
The U.S. experience in Afghanistan underscored the necessity of political and diplomatic solutions in conflict zones. Military efforts were not matched by sufficient diplomatic engagement, particularly with regional actors like Pakistan, Iran, and Russia. The eventual negotiations with the Taliban reflected a recognition that the war could not be won militarily.
7. Cost of War
The financial and human costs of the war were staggering. Trillions of dollars were spent, with significant loss of life, both military and civilian. This raised questions about the long-term value of such extended military engagements and their impact on U.S. foreign policy.
8. Importance of Exit Strategies
One of the critical lessons from Afghanistan was the need for a well-defined exit strategy from the outset. The chaotic U.S. withdrawal in 2021 highlighted the consequences of not planning an orderly transition, leading to humanitarian crises and loss of credibility among allies and adversaries alike.
9. Civil-Military Relations
The war exposed tensions between civilian leadership and military commanders over the war's strategy and objectives. This highlighted the importance of clear communication and alignment between political goals and military tactics.
10. Long-Term Impact on U.S. Policy
The Afghanistan war has made the U.S. more cautious about engaging in similar interventions. The focus has shifted towards avoiding large-scale ground wars and emphasizing diplomacy, alliances, and counterterrorism from a distance, such as through drone warfare and special operations.
The Afghanistan war reminds us of the complexities of modern conflicts and the limits of military solutions, reinforcing the need for achievable integrated strategies that combine military, diplomatic, economic, and cultural tools. The Afghanistan experience also demonstrates the risks associated with deceptive narratives and the manipulation of information. The consistent dishonesty and lack of transparency eroded public trust and prevented necessary strategic adjustments. Effective military engagements require honest communication, accountability, and a willingness to adapt strategies based on ground realities.
Conclusion
The United States’ involvement in Afghanistan represents a tragic chapter in American foreign policy, marked by strategic missteps, overconfidence, and a profound disconnect between public narratives and ground realities. Using thousands of pages of internal government documents, Craig Whitlock's "The Afghanistan Papers" critically examines the many layers of deception and mismanagement that characterized the conflict. As the U.S. reflects on its longest war, it must confront the uncomfortable truths revealed by this experience and learn from its mistakes to avoid repeating them in future conflicts.
Applying Clausewitz's "remarkable trinity" provides a focused lens to analyze the United States’ counterterrorism and counterinsurgency strategies in Afghanistan. The trinity consists of three interrelated elements: the government, the military, and the people, each playing a crucial role in the conduct of war.
Government: The U.S. government's strategic objectives in Afghanistan were multifaceted, aiming to dismantle terrorist networks while fostering a stable political environment. However, as Clausewitz would argue, the lack of a clear, unified political aim led to strategic ambiguity. This is reminiscent of the Vietnam War, where conflicting objectives diluted the strategic focus.
Military: The military's role in executing these strategies often emphasized operational success without a coherent strategic framework. Clausewitz might critique this as a failure to align military operations with political objectives, leading to what he would describe as "grand tactics" rather than actual strategy.
People: The support of the populace, domestically and in Afghanistan, was crucial. Clausewitz would likely point out that the erosion of public support over time due to prolonged conflict and unclear outcomes undermined the war effort. This reflects his notion that the will of the people is a critical component of war's success.
Clausewitz would likely view the U.S. efforts in Afghanistan as a misalignment of the trinity. Strategic objectives were not clearly defined or communicated, the local populace did not support the central government backed by the United States, and the military effort was diluted by pursuing CT and COIN simultaneously without applying the necessary resources for each strategy to achieve the specified military objectives. Given his emphasis on the importance of generalship, Clausewitz would not likely recommend rotating military commanders every year. This led to a disjointed approach that unsurprisingly failed to achieve its long-term goals.
The lessons from Afghanistan are clear: military interventions must have clear and achievable goals, respect local contexts, and prioritize transparency and honesty. Only by embracing these principles can the United States hope to achieve more successful outcomes in future engagements and rebuild its credibility on the international stage.
Epilogue
There are many parallels between Vietnam and Afghanistan (and Iraq), but there was a chance for the U.S. to get it right in Afghanistan. The 2001 mission was justified, and Al Qaeda an enemy to be vanquished. In Vietnam, President Johnson fabricated the Gulf of Tonkin incident (the second one) and then prosecuted a campaign against communist North Vietnam while propping up a succession of corrupt leaders in the South that the public did not support. By 1972, Vietnamization meant the transfer of combat responsibilities to the Army of South Vietnam. They at least lasted until May of 1975 before collapsing against the more capable North Vietnamese Army.
In both wars, the government consistently and methodically lied and obfuscated the truth about how badly these wars were going. In both cases, a lack of clear and achievable objectives created strategic drift and the need to conceal this truth. In both wars, well-intentioned Americans committed years of their life to make the best of these bad situations. They deserved better from our government and did not get it. One man who wanted to avoid another Vietnam was Colin Powell. Late in his career, he worked with the Secretary of Defense to develop a set of questions to answer truthfully when contemplating the use of force against another nation. Derived from Powell’s study of Clausewitz, the questions remain valid.
Future leaders should consider these words before considering a third Vietnam-styled foreign adventure:
References:
Whitlock, Craig. The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War. Simon & Schuster, 2021.
Brister, Thomas. "The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War." Lessons Learned. 2024.
Nicole, Jean-Thomas. "What The Afghanistan Papers Tell Us About War and Truth." Foreign Affairs, 2024.
Borger, Julian. "The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War." The Guardian, 2024.
Gary Berntsen, “Jawbreaker: The Attack on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda” (New York: Crown, 2005), 123-130.
Steve Coll, “Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden” (New York: Penguin, 2004), 423-435.
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Report. February 2023.
Why the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed.
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