The Surge & The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Iraq
Athena, the Ancient Greek Goddess of Strategy, Floats Blindly over the U.S. COIN Operations in Iraq in 2007.
Introduction
The situation in Iraq was dire at the end of 2006 when President George W. Bush implemented the surge of an additional 30,000 U.S. forces and selected General David Petraeus to command it. Returning to Baghdad in early February 2007, Petraeus found conditions worse than expected. The deterioration since his departure in September 2005 was sobering. Violence, which had escalated dramatically in 2006 after the bombing of the Shiite al-Askari shrine in Samarra, was out of control. With over 50 attacks and three car bombs daily in Baghdad alone, the plan to hand off security to Iraqi forces was failing. Sectarian battles and infighting in the Iraqi government and the Council of Representatives created a dysfunctional political environment. Many oil pipelines were damaged, electrical towers toppled, roads in disrepair, markets shuttered, and citizens feared for their lives. Government revenue was down, and basic services were inadequate. Life in many areas of the capital and country was about survival.
The surge was deemed necessary to rescue a floundering strategic mission with many points of failure. The most critical problem to solve was the unchecked violence, which the addition of nearly 30,000 troops to Iraq by 2007 was meant to cure. While the surge of forces was crucial, the most significant change was the shift in strategy and operational plans. Instead of handing off security tasks to Iraqi forces, the U.S. shifted to focusing on the security of the Iraqi people using largely U.S. forces. The core idea guiding this strategy was recognizing that the most critical terrain in the campaign was the human terrain—the people. This made the primary mission to improve their security. This improvement would allow Iraq’s political leaders time to forge agreements, reduce ethno-sectarian disputes, and establish a foundation for further efforts to improve the lives of average Iraqis. The hope was that the Iraqi people would invest in the new state's success and choose peace and support for the new nation. To do this, General Petraeus ordered the U.S. troops to live amongst the people. The message was clear: get out of the bases and seek the most violent areas and make them secure. The idea was “big” then and seemed to work as violence did drop. On the surface, things appeared to improve, especially regarding the violence.
A common misconception about the surge is that it was the singular reason for the decline in violence. A simple cause-and-effect assessment was applied and not questioned. It was very unpopular to disagree with this notion for years afterward, especially in the military. After all, the rampant violence in 2006 significantly decreased by 2008, and some economic and political signs of life were starting to take hold. Despite its comprehensive approach, the counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine that drove the primary mission of the military may have been too focused on tactics to achieve long-lasting strategic results and too complex to succeed consistently. If the Americans left, someone had to keep policing streets, neighborhoods, and cities. Assuming that Iraqi forces would get good enough, fast enough, to be ready at the end of the surge was a significant gamble. The even bigger gamble was assuming the ad hoc, uncoordinated attempt to develop governance would mature in 12-15 months. This proved to be beyond rationale.
The “new” approach was based on COIN operations, which would address the conflict's military and non-military aspects by winning the local population's support and isolating and neutralizing insurgents while building governance and security capability. This involves a combination of direct military actions and indirect efforts to address the root causes of the insurgency, such as political, economic, and social grievances. However, the effectiveness of COIN in achieving broader strategic goals has been debated, especially in light of the outcomes of various operations over the past two decades.
This article will examine the U.S. COIN efforts in Iraq from late 2006 to 2011. The article will assess the successes and limitations of these efforts, highlighting how COIN operations have often achieved short-term tactical successes but struggled to deliver long-term strategic outcomes, chief among them being stability. Additionally, we will consider the regional impacts of these counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts, particularly on Middle Eastern geopolitics and internal dynamics.
The Surge in Iraq 2006-2008
The Bush Administration's strategic goals for the 2006-2008 military surge in Iraq were to create a secure environment, reduce violence, develop Iraqi security forces, promote reconciliation among ethnic and sectarian groups, and foster economic development for a stable, self-governing Iraq.[1] Doctrinally it was a COIN strategy, but politically it was a hail Mary. The U.S. had lost control of the situation and desperately needed a course correction to save domestic and international condemnation. The U.S. believed that it could enhance Iraqi security forces' capabilities, foster political compromise among Iraqi factions, and boost economic reconstruction efforts. The surge's primary objective was to reduce violence to a level that would enable a sustainable political process and a more stable and secure Iraq that could be left to its own devices to manage.[2]
By 2007, an additional five Army brigades commanded by General David Petraeus got to work dismantling insurgent networks and restoring order. Operation Fardh al-Qanoon focused predominantly on Baghdad and its surrounding areas, known as the "Baghdad belts." The strategy also emphasized counterinsurgency tactics that involved embedding U.S. forces within Iraqi communities to build trust and gather crucial intelligence.[3]Petraeus was in constant coordination with his diplomatic counterpart, Ambassador Ray Crocker who did his best to advance the governmental capabilities of the Iraqi’s and steer the fractious and deeply divided Iraqi politicians.
Simultaneously, the surge strategy included efforts to stabilize the volatile Al Anbar province, where Sunni tribes, initially aligned with insurgent forces, began to oppose al-Qaeda in Iraq due to the latter's brutal tactics and imposition of radical Islamist rule. The cooperation between U.S. forces and Sunni tribal militias, known as the "Anbar Awakening," significantly weakened al-Qaeda's influence in the region and provided a model for similar initiatives in other parts of Iraq. The surge's combined military and diplomatic efforts were accompanied by a marked decrease in violence and set the stage for subsequent stabilization and withdrawal efforts.[4]
The U.S. military surge aimed to stabilize Iraqi populations and seemed to be working. However, the concurrent sectarian purges underscored the complexity of the conflict. Shia, Sunni, and Kurdish groups violently pursued their agendas to control tribally dominant areas. Much of the reduction in violence came as Shia, Sunni, and Kurds purged their areas of unwanted sects. As more homogeneous populations dominated an area, the violence dropped. This “self-segregation” in Baghdad and the subsequent decline in violence should not be attributed to the surge as the primary cause of reduced violence. Once segregated, the U.S. forces could prevent further violence by keeping the balkanized groups apart. Additionally, the surge did not adequately address the deep-seated sectarian and ethnic divisions, which continued to fuel conflict and displacement across the country. The purges during this period were a stark reminder of the enduring and violent struggle for power among Iraq's diverse communities. While the U.S. government denied there was a civil war underway among the Iraqi civilians, it would be hard to find a better definition.[5]
While this occurred, the U.S. military was also hastening the development of Iraqi security forces. Advancements were made, yet these forces remained plagued by sectarianism, corruption, and dependency on U.S. support. Although there was an improvement in their operational capabilities, the long-term sustainability and effectiveness of these forces without extensive foreign assistance were questionable.[6] Economic reconstruction efforts successfully rebuilt infrastructure and revitalized specific sectors, but widespread corruption and bureaucratic inefficiencies limited the overall impact on the Iraqi economy.[7]
The strategic objectives of the 2007-2008 military surge in Iraq were only partially and often only temporarily achieved. The surge aided in reducing sectarian violence as the U.S. took to enforcing the dividing lines between sectarian communities. General McCrystal's successful counterterrorism efforts were enormously helpful in weakening insurgent groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). They created a virtuous reinforcing cycle as increased U.S. military presence improved security measures among the people, and JSOC took AQI combatants off the battlefield.[8] This reduction in violence created a window of opportunity for political reconciliation and economic recovery. However, the progress in political reconciliation was limited and inconsistent. While some strides were made, such as governmental reform and provincial elections, deep-seated sectarian tensions, political fragmentation, and the effects of de-Ba'athification continued to hinder comprehensive national unity.
Ultimately, while the surge achieved tactical successes and temporary stabilization, it failed to fully realize the strategic objectives of establishing a self-sustaining, unified, and democratic Iraq. The enduring challenges in governance, security, and economic development highlighted the complexities of nation-building and the limitations of military intervention as a tool for achieving long-term political solutions.[9]
Did U.S. COIN Achieve Strategic Success?
The U.S. COIN and CT efforts in Iraq from 2003 to 2024 had profound and wide-ranging effects on the Middle East, influencing regional dynamics, security, and political landscapes. Initially, the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq in 2003 and subsequent efforts to combat insurgencies and terrorism destabilized the region, exacerbating sectarian tensions and contributing to widespread violence. The removal of Saddam Hussein's regime created a power vacuum that various insurgent groups, including Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) and later ISIS, exploited, leading to significant instability both within Iraq and in neighboring countries.[10]
The rise and fall of ISIS had a particularly notable impact. ISIS's rapid territorial gains in 2014 and its declaration of a caliphate drew international attention and intervention, leading to the formation of a global coalition to combat the group. The extensive military campaign against ISIS, which included significant contributions from regional actors like Iran and Kurdish forces, reshaped alliances and enmities in the Middle East. The conflict also prompted significant humanitarian crises, with millions displaced and widespread destruction, particularly in Syria and Iraq.[11]
Furthermore, the prolonged military engagements and the focus on counterterrorism efforts led to shifting power dynamics in the region. Iran's influence in Iraq grew substantially as it supported Shia militias and political factions, altering the balance of power and increasing sectarian tensions. Meanwhile, U.S. efforts to stabilize Iraq and combat terrorism drew resources and attention, impacting broader U.S. foreign policy in the region. The enduring presence of insurgent and terrorist threats, despite significant military successes, underscored the complexity of achieving long-term stability and highlighted the need for comprehensive political and socio-economic solutions to address the root causes of extremism and conflict.[12]
Taking a more extensive regional perspective, COIN and CT operations in the Middle East from 2003 to the present have significantly influenced the United States' strategic position in geopolitics and its competition with great powers like China and Russia. These operations, primarily in Iraq and Afghanistan, have consumed substantial military and economic resources, diverting attention from other strategic priorities. The prolonged engagements and poorly managed exfiltration from Afghanistan have led to a perception of overextension and incompetence and have strained U.S. military capabilities and readiness.
Strategically, the focus on counterinsurgency has allowed China and Russia to expand their influence in various regions. China has capitalized on this by advancing its Belt and Road Initiative, enhancing its economic and strategic foothold across Asia, Africa, and Europe. Concurrently, Russia has reasserted its influence in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, notably through its intervention in Syria and its actions in Ukraine. These developments have challenged U.S. dominance and necessitated a strategic pivot to address the resurgence of great power competition.
Moreover, the emphasis on counterinsurgency has arguably stultified broader strategic thinking, as noted by historical precedents where military focus on specific doctrines limited adaptability. The U.S. has had to recalibrate its strategies to address the multifaceted threats posed by state actors like China and Russia, as highlighted in the 2018 National Defense Strategy and the 2022 National Security Strategy, prioritizing strategic competition. The extensive COIN efforts have impacted the U.S. strategic position by diverting resources and focus, allowing China and Russia to gain ground in the global power landscape.
COIN Is a General Theory – It Must Be Applied Specifically (Often With CT)
Iraq is a conflict that the U.S. must study and learn from. The chain of U.S. decisions that led to adopting a COIN strategy is riddled with unforced errors. The U.S. accused Saddam of building weapons of mass destruction and harboring terrorists. He was not. The U.S. invaded, removed Saddam, and then removed all Baath Party members from the security forces and government. De-Baathification was the perfect choice to create an army of insurgents. The Baathists, minority Sunnis, wanted to return to power, which made them a textbook insurgency.
Meanwhile, the majority Shia, who were long repressed, clambered to take control of the government. Al Qaeda took advantage of the chaos and established Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). The mere U.S. presence and the Abu Grab incident provided fuel for recruiting jihadists. As the violence exploded, the U.S. recognized that COIN would be the best long-term approach to creating an Iraq capable of maintaining stability. However, there was also a growing terrorist threat inside Iraq to contend with. COIN had to be paired with a simultaneous counterterror (CT) campaign to suppress AQI’s violence for the surge strategy to work.
COIN was not the wrong choice in Iraq by 2006, and it led to some success by 2008. However, three critical errors in strategic judgment forced the U.S. to make this choice. The invasion was based on misguided notions and “cherry-picked” intelligence that did not account for post invasion destabilization. De-Baathafication was a mistake by a bureaucrat with too much power and insufficient oversight. Lastly, the choice of imposing democracy was doomed to fail. Removing Saddam and firing anyone good at governance created a massive power vacuum. Governance lies at the heart of COIN and the U.S. had to save its effort in Iraq by building an organic capability to replace the one it had destroyed. The Bush Administration did not conduct the invasion with COIN or CT in mind for the post-invasion Iraq. The Administration assumed that a quick strike and a beheading would lead to freed people taking responsibility for the birth of their new nation. This deeply unrealistic assumption created conditions that required COIN and CT on a massive scale. Both efforts required building an organic capability to retain control once the U.S. military achieved stability. The U.S. was forced to choose these options to resolve the monster earlier U.S. mistakes had created: an ineffective Iraqi government and AQI’s “safe haven” in Iraq.
A general but weak stability was returned by 2009, and marginal progress had been made to create an effective Iraqi security force and functioning government. AQI was defeated on the battlefield. But like a cancer cell left after surgery that survives chemo and radiation, it metastasized into a ravaging, deadly cancer worse than its original form. Invasion, a massive COIN operation, and a brilliant but brief CT campaign defeated AQI and set conditions for the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq with some pride intact. Ultimately, the seeds were planted for the rise of ISIS. The Iraqi security forces that the U.S. spent hundreds of billions of dollars to build crumbled and ran from ISIS. The government cowered at the might and brutality of ISIS. With its army in full retreat and no political will to mount a counterattack, much of Iraq became part of the ISIS Caliphate. This marked the complete failure of the U.S. COIN strategy.
COIN is difficult in any circumstance, but one key to its success is to determine the primary cause for insurgents and resolve it correctly. Once forced to apply a COIN strategy in Iraq, the U.S. failed to adequately address the root causes of the country's civil and political divisions. The Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish divide was the core issue. This problem likely has no complete remedy, but it was the critical element that drove violence and division. Sectarianism in Iraq is not an anomaly but a fundamental aspect of its culture, history, and identity. Most U.S. planners in 2002 and 2006 barely understood that.
While the U.S. implemented COIN seeking stability, it also unilaterally selected the U.S. democratic system as a model for the Iraqi government. Democracy failed to address the underlying causes of the country's civil and political divisions, particularly the sectarian divide. Sectarianism is deeply ingrained in Iraq and historically required a heavy hand to control. However, for the Americans working to restore governance pretentiously believed establishing a democratic state was the best way for the U.S. to maintain a relationship with Iraq. They also assumed it was the best means for long-term stability for Iraqis.
There were other reasons to choose a democracy. Many of our laws for the support of a foreign nation are geared towards supporting a technically capable, democratic, and bureaucratically oriented nation-state. This was not Iraq. However, an Iraqi version of America would solve the problem. The U.S. could also justify the nation-building effort if that nation were a democracy. The American people and the predominantly European coalition would be reluctant to support any other system of governance. The rapid descent into chaos and widespread sectarian violence demonstrated that the remedy did nothing to cure the disease of mass Iraqi violence. Iraq lacked the history, tradition, or commitment to democracy. While democracy has endured regarding voting, the Economist Intelligence Unit rates Iraq as authoritarian state (2023).[13] It remains weak, flawed, and inadequate to retain its sovereignty without external aid.
Conclusion
The U.S. COIN and CT operations in Iraq were, at times, tactically brilliant and bravely conducted by U.S. forces but were ultimately strategically flawed. Initially, the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the subsequent removal of Saddam Hussein created a power vacuum, which various insurgent groups, including Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), exploited. The U.S.'s early decisions, such as de-Baathification, exacerbated the situation by alienating critical segments of the population, fostering insurgency rather than quelling it. This forced the U.S. to adopt a COIN strategy, which, while contributing to reducing violence, did not remedy the deeper political, social, and economic grievances fueling the conflict.
The 2007 surge focused on securing the population and building local governance structures. This tactical shift temporarily reduced violence and created a window for political reconciliation. However, the underlying sectarian tensions and political fragmentation persisted, undermining long-term stability. The rise of ISIS following the U.S. withdrawal in 2011 highlighted the fragility of the gains made during the surge and underscored the limitations of COIN in achieving sustainable strategic outcomes.
The failure to establish an autonomous, unified Iraqi state was partly due to the U.S. imposing a democratic model unsuited to Iraq's sectarian landscape. The U.S.'s inability to foster genuine political inclusivity and address deep-rooted societal divisions meant that COIN operations could only provide a temporary respite from violence. The emergence of ISIS not only destabilized Iraq further but also had significant geopolitical repercussions, drawing regional and global powers into a prolonged conflict.
Wishful thinking and flawed assumptions will yield failure in almost any strategy; COIN is no exception. While reducing violence is crucial, it alone will not stabilize a nation. A governmental system favored by the people and wed to realizable organic capabilities is a mandate, not an option. If, in some future scenario, the U.S. believes it must invade a country to deny a “safe haven” to a terrorist organization, then it must know what kind of government is possible, at what cost, and how effective it can be. This is not a military problem; it is a governance problem. If grievance creates instability, the best hope for resolution is the political process, not violence. Violence can only be a temporary solution and can quickly move in unexpected and uncontrollable directions once unleashed. Because violence has the allure of a quick solution, COIN is often seen as a tactical remedy to a political problem. This, of course, makes it a poor choice as a strategy.
[1] The White House. "The New Way Forward in Iraq." 2007. https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/01/20070110-3.html
[2] Petraeus, David H. "Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq." Testimony, 8-9 April 2008.
[3] Schlosser, Nicholas J. The Surge, 2007-2008. Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States Army, 2017.
[4] Ibid.
[5] 2008 US Government Denies a Civil War Was Occurring Among Iraqi Civilians During the US Military Surge." Analysis by ChatGPT, OpenAI, July 11, 2024.
[6] Robinson, "Tell Me How This Ends," PublicAffairs, 2008
[7] Packer, "The Assassins' Gate," Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2005
[8] Biddle, "Assessing the Surge," Foreign Affairs, 2008
[9] "Iraq: U.S. Policy and Diplomacy," Council on Foreign Relations, 2012
[10] Ricks, "Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq," Penguin Press, 2006
[11] "The Syrian Jihad," Lister, Oxford University Press, 2016
[12] "The Long Haul to Defeat ISIS," Knights, CTC Sentinel, 2021
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