Power Politics - United States vs. China

A Great Power Competition Report 

By Monte Erfourth – August 11, 2024

THE COMPETITION REPORT SERIES

The Strategy Central Great Power Competition report details the United States and China’s great power competition in the first half of 2024. It offers an analysis to help strategists grasp the current rivalry between these two superpowers regarding power, economics, military power, and diplomacy.  This is the first of five segments covering each aspect of great power competition.  

The first topic for this report on great power competition is titled Power Politics. It will be an effort to explain what great power competition functions and its relationship to national power. It will then focus on the Indo-Pacific region, which stands at the epicenter of great power competition. While Europe remains a significant competitive landscape, the Indo-Pacific is where the strategic aspirations of China and the United States’ deeply intertwined power dynamics are most evident. This report leverages the Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index 2023 to reveal the power levels between nations in this pivotal region. For roughly the last decade, China's quest for regional hegemony has challenged the established order backed by the United States. The analysis extends beyond the dominant players to encompass the roles of lesser regional powers and small island states, whose geopolitical significance, though often underestimated, can significantly influence regional stability. By examining the nations ranked on the Total Power Index, this report aims to elucidate the strategic calculations and perceptions of power that shape the Indo-Pacific's complex and evolving security landscape.

UNDERSTANDING COMPETITION

The 2023 Joint Concept for Competition (JCC) has defined great power (strategic) competition as “a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other.” The JCC further explains that the normal and peaceful competition among allies, strategic partners, and other international actors who are not potentially hostile is outside the scope of this concept. This is a good description of how countries with hostility towards each other pursue interests, but missing pieces remain to fill the puzzle.

Cooperation, competition, and conflict reflect the degree of friction between national efforts as countries pursue influence and leverage for an advantage.  The objective is to use advantages to advance and protect their interests.[i]   Where interests mutually converge, actors can cooperate; where interests collide, actors compete—sometimes to the point of conflict. Countries with different interests can both cooperate and compete in different areas at the same time. Additionally, countries view and rank interests differently; what may not be very important to one country could be very important to another, and the importance of an interest can change over time.  The ability of actors to build influence and action leverage through the various tools of national power (Diplomatic, Information, Military, Economic) that establish and maintain advantage relative to others with divergent interests shape their behavior and determine their freedom of action in competition.

The name “great power competition” (from international relations theory) fits because a core feature of the international environment is the requirement for countries to apply the complete and comprehensive application of power necessary to advance and protect interests. Thucydides said it best: "The strong do what they can, and the weak suffer what they must.”[ii] For both the weak and the strong, competing in the international arena requires gaining and maintaining enough power to influence other countries, which can create leverage.  This leverage can, in turn, create an advantage in pursuing interests at the times and places that matter.  This is a dynamic challenge that constantly evolves with geopolitical and technological developments.  Today's competition can set the conditions for better peace, attain objectives short of war, and possibly set favorable conditions in the event of future conflict. This is the “great game,” as some 20th-century European powers dubbed it. Without power, a country is subject to the whims of those who have it.

Competition and conflict cannot be understood without power being the central topic.  It is a failing of the NDS and the JCC that they do not make this clear.  DIME gives us a quick way to say “elements of power,” but these are not static notions.  They are in motion and contact with rivals at all times.  Understanding the interplay and use of national power is vital to understanding what the U.S. can and should be doing to protect and advance interests.  Prosperity, which includes lines of communication, markets, extractive goods, foodstuff, and other valuables, is a requirement to maintain and expand power. These resources are and have always been pursued by communities with some amount of power to survive and thrive.  The international order is highly Darwinian but does show signs of Kantian civility in the international institutions established mainly after WWII.

American power is well understood in the international environment.  Both state and non-state actors have adopted asymmetric approaches to compete effectively against the U.S.  Some compete through spectacular acts of terrorism. Others work to dismantle international institutions and alliances.  Others compete to advance influence campaigns through economic, diplomatic, and information channels and leveraging asymmetries of interest.  Still, others compete by leveraging ambiguities in the security environment, using military means that elude existing deterrence models. These strategies of applied power to blunt U.S. power will create an advantage for the group or country in pursuit of their interests. 

This explanation of the dynamics of national power in the international environment allows for better insight into what happens when the United States uses DIME powers to pursue and protect interests.  National security interests define strategic ends. All national elements of power must be applied to defend the homeland, expand prosperity, protect national values, and project national values. Power applied to these ends must be translated into clear and coherent political aims and specific objectives.  A strategy so conceived must be achievable, acceptable, and effective to ensure the nation's well-being. In the upcoming section of Power Politics, we will delve into the dynamics of countries' relationships with each other and how they pursue their interests using their power.

POWER POLITICS

This report will use the Lowey Institute Total Power Index in the Asian Pacific for 2023 to show how developing power measures for nations can help understand the political strategies at play as each uses power to protect and pursue its interests. Lowey’s Institute’s Asia Power Index 2023 edition (https://power.lowyinstitute.org/report/) is an excellent tool to aid strategists in better understanding Asia's regional power distribution. The following discussion will repeatedly refer to the Total Power Index to frame the current state of competition play.

Great power strategies in the Indo-Pacific orient around the axis of tension between an ascendant China and the post-World War II regional order backed by the United States. China strives for regional hegemony, seeking privilege commensurate with its power to protect its interests and impose its will along its periphery. India and Japan balance the multipolar system; when aligned, they nearly match China in power. The Indo-Pacific members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad)” formation—India, Japan, and Australia—surpass China’s Power score. Lesser regional powers—South Korea, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, and Malaysia—face pressure between China and the U.S.-led effort to balance. It should not be assumed that a greater collective score translates into an absolute power advantage.  Types, abilities, coordination, and a host of other factors determine the actual power advantage.  Yet, real power has been achieved if the perception of collective or individual power is realized.  If not, influence and leverage are diminished.  Perception is central to deterrence theory.  If a country does not fear another rival’s power, the likelihood of deterring the unafraid country is mostly nil.

Less powerful Indo-Pacific states also factor into the geopolitical design of the region, albeit in context-specific situations. For example, countries in the South China Sea—Vietnam, the Philippines, and Brunei—have modest comprehensive power relative to global and regional powers but influence negotiations surrounding the nascent South China Sea Code of Conduct agreement between China and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). North Korea, nuclear-armed and volatile, occasionally generates uniquely destabilizing effects in Northeast Asia. Mongolia, Nepal, and Bhutan are wedged between great powers with potential for competition and cooperation. Sri Lanka and the Maldives spread across the Indian Ocean, offering access along seaways vital to global trade. Bangladesh, Cambodia, Myanmar, and Laos in Southeast Asia straddle the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean, providing land and maritime throughways around the Strait of Malacca. These nations overlook the most crucial sea passage for China in the world.  Approximately 90% of imports flow through the strait, and its vulnerability is behind the need for the Belt and Road Initiative.  New Zealand’s position at the region’s southern edge limits its strategic impact, yet its Commonwealth ties and economic linkages provide it with limited relevance. Depending on context, these less powerful states can have an outsized effect on regional outcomes through trade and diplomacy.

The South China Sea is likely the most disputed within the Indo-Pacific region.  It is a vital and resource-rich region and has been a longstanding flashpoint for territorial disputes, with China, the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan asserting overlapping claims. This area is strategically significant, as it serves as a critical maritime corridor for global trade, with an estimated $3.37 trillion worth of goods passing through its waters annually. Additionally, the sea is believed to hold vast oil and natural gas reserves, further intensifying the stakes for the involved nations.

China has been the most assertive in its claims, invoking the "Nine-Dash Line" to assert sovereignty over nearly 90% of the South China Sea. This claim is based on historical maps and documents, though it lacks international legal standing and has been challenged by other nations. China has bolstered its position through extensive land reclamation projects, constructing artificial islands equipped with military facilities, which has drawn international criticism and heightened tensions.

The Philippines, whose claims are based on proximity and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has been at the forefront of challenging China's expansive claims. In 2016, the Philippines won a landmark case at The Hague, where an international tribunal ruled that China's claims had no legal basis. Despite the ruling, China has refused to recognize the decision, and the situation remains unresolved. The Philippines has alternated between challenging and seeking accommodation with China, reflecting its complex geopolitical calculations. China has pressured them by crowding Philippine waters with fishing militias and attacks by Chinese Coast Guard vessels, coupled with diplomatic pressure to capitulate to Chinese demands.

Vietnam, which has historical claims similar to China's, has also been vocal in its opposition to Beijing's actions. The country has engaged in military modernization and sought to strengthen its alliances, particularly with the United States and India, to counter China's growing influence. Vietnam's approach is marked by assertiveness and diplomatic engagement, aiming to protect its interests without provoking outright conflict. Inexplicably, China does not pressure Vietnam in a similar way to the Philippines.

Malaysia and Brunei have also staked claims in the South China Sea, though their approaches have been more subdued than the Philippines and Vietnam. Malaysia has opted for a quieter diplomatic strategy, maintaining good relations with China while still asserting its rights under international law. Brunei, the smallest claimant, has largely stayed out of the spotlight, quietly maintaining its claims without escalating tensions.

Taiwan, which controls the largest island in the South China Sea, Itu Aba, also claims most of the area, mirroring China's "Nine-Dash Line." However, Taiwan's involvement is complicated by its unique international status and focus on its security concerns in the Taiwan Strait. Consequently, Taiwan's approach has been more restrained, emphasizing the peaceful resolution of disputes.

The United States plays a significant role in the South China Sea disputes despite not being a claimant. Washington has repeatedly affirmed its interest in ensuring freedom of navigation in the region, a principle crucial to global trade. The U.S. conducts regular "freedom of navigation operations" (FONOPs) to challenge China's maritime claims and demonstrate its commitment to international law. Additionally, the U.S. has deepened its security partnerships with nations like the Philippines and Vietnam, providing military aid and conducting joint exercises to bolster their capabilities.

The South China Sea remains a highly contested and strategically crucial region, with overlapping claims creating complex geopolitical tensions. While each claimant pursues its interests through diplomacy, legal avenues, and military modernization, the United States plays a pivotal role in maintaining stability and countering China's assertiveness in the region. The situation remains fluid, with the potential for diplomatic breakthroughs and further escalation.

Expanding to the “Second Island Chain,” the Indo-Pacific is home to many geographically small island states with varying degrees of economic development, independence, and strategic relevance. Many states experience relations with great powers based on colonial associations or imperial reach, such as the United States with the Marshall Islands. Yet the resurgence of other regional powers—most notably, China—has provided alternatives for investment and support. Perhaps better than any other country, China has capitalized on the fact that every United Nations (UN) member state—no matter its power in the geopolitical system—has a vote in the UN General Assembly (UNGA) and a voice on the international stage. In this context, even states with low power take on additional importance.

Great power competition in the Indo-Pacific is shaped by the United States' long standing as the regional hegemon and China’s insecurities that have not waned despite its historical growth in power and influence. Historical threats of invasion from without and instability from within, demographic and environmental pressures, challenging economic transformation, and the shadow of the “Century of Humiliation” provide a greater purpose for acting on those insecurities. China strives for regional hegemony, which manifests in a perceived need to project security across borders, dominate its near maritime environment within the first island chain, and secure its aortic sea lanes linking to the Middle East and Europe and those connecting the Americas. China’s approach generates friction with India and Japan, with which it shares land and maritime boundaries. Russia has limited reach in the Indo-Pacific but remains engaged in Northeast Asia and often supports Chinese initiatives, including the expansive Belt and Road Initiative. Germany and France also have limited leverage within the region but advance multilateral agendas to address shared challenges like climate change and reinforce architecture, such as ASEAN, to shape China’s rise. The U.S. seeks to contain China within the first island chain, which will prevent China from pushing its newly formed blue water navy into the Pacific, which would significantly pressure the U.S. domination of critical sea lanes of communication in the Pacific and possibly beyond. The United States seeks to balance Indo-Pacific power through its allies and partners and multilateral processes alongside its European peers.

CONCLUSION

At the heart of competition lies the concept of national power, a multifaceted tool wielded by nations to protect and advance their interests on the international stage. In the current global power competition, the Indo-Pacific is a critical arena where the competition between the United States and China plays out, each vying for regional hegemony and the ability to shape the geopolitical landscape according to their strategic objectives.

The United States, with its long-standing post-World War II regional order, seeks to maintain its dominance in the Indo-Pacific through a network of alliances and partnerships, such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) and its strategic positioning within the first island chain. By leveraging its military, economic, and diplomatic power, the U.S. aims to contain China’s growing influence and prevent it from projecting power beyond its immediate maritime boundaries. The U.S.'s efforts to balance power in the region are about maintaining its strategic advantage, sustaining access to the vast regional resources, and ensuring the stability of the global order it has helped to shape.

China, on the other hand, is determined to assert its influence and achieve regional hegemony. Driven by a mix of historical insecurities, demographic challenges, and economic ambitions, China’s approach to the Indo-Pacific is aggressive and expansive. The Belt and Road Initiative and its military modernization efforts underscore China’s commitment to securing vital sea lanes and extending its regional reach. This expansionist strategy generates friction with neighboring powers like India, Japan, and the United States.

The competition between these great powers in the Indo-Pacific is not merely about accumulating military might but about the broader application of national power. Economic influence, diplomatic engagement, and the ability to shape international norms are all critical components of this struggle. The Lowy Institute's Asia Power Index 2023 provides a detailed snapshot of how power is distributed across the region, highlighting the dynamic interplay between the various elements of national power. It shows that while China and the U.S. are the primary competitors, other regional actors, including India, Japan, and smaller Southeast Asian nations, play significant roles in shaping the outcomes of this competition.

The Indo-Pacific is a microcosm of the broader great power competition unfolding on the global stage. In all its forms, national power is the central axis around which this competition revolves. As China and the United States continue to vie for regional supremacy, the strategies they employ and the power they project will not only determine the future of the Indo-Pacific but also have far-reaching implications for global stability and order. The ongoing struggle between these two superpowers underscores the importance of understanding and measuring national power, as it is the key to navigating the complex and often volatile landscape of international relations in the 21st century.

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[i] This is described in The Competition Continuum, Joint Doctrine Note 19-1, June 2019 (https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/jdn_jg/jdn1_19.pdf).

[ii] https://www.oxfordreference.com/display/10.1093/acref/9780191866692.001.0001/q-oro-ed6-00010932#:~:text=Thucydides%20c.&text=The%20strong%20do%20what%20they,weak%20suffer%20what%20they%20must.&text=Of%20the%20gods%20we%20believe,they%20rule%20wherever%20they%20can.