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    • Aug 25
    • 11 min read

Military Might - United States vs. China

A Great Power Competition Report

Strategy Central

By Monte Erfourth – August 25, 2024

THE COMPETITION REPORT SERIES

The Strategy Central Great Power Competition report series details the United States and China’s great power competition in the first half 2024. It offers an analysis to help strategists grasp the current rivalry between these two superpowers regarding national power, economics, military power, and diplomacy.  This is the third of five segments covering each aspect of great power competition and will focus on military competition.  


This article focuses on the military dynamics that have shaped U.S.-China relations throughout the first half of 2024. The article examines the strategic maneuvers by both nations in key areas across the Asian-Pacific such as the South China Sea, Taiwan Strait, and East China Sea, highlighting their efforts to assert dominance and deter each other's influence. It explores how the U.S. has intensified its military presence and alliances to counter China's growing capabilities. It details China's aggressive posturing and strategic partnerships with Russia, Iran, and North Korea. Through a nuanced exploration of military engagements, defense strategies, and geopolitical implications, the report underscores the deep rivalry and persistent mistrust that define U.S.-China relations.

 

Situation

Military tensions have been pronounced between China and the United States, particularly in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. The U.S. continued its freedom of navigation operations, which China views as provocations. In response, China increased its military activities, including building infrastructure on man-made islands and expanding its naval presence. The strained military relationship was further complicated by disagreements over the AUKUS pact, which involves the U.S., U.K., and Australia cooperating on nuclear-propelled submarines—a move Beijing sees as a containment strategy. Despite some high-level talks aimed at maintaining open lines of communication and managing the competition, deep mistrust persists, with both sides accusing each other of aggressive posturing.

 

U.S. Strategy

DoD employs the 2022 National Security Strategy's concept of integrated deterrence to blend military capabilities across all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—to prevent adversaries from engaging in predatory activities. This approach aims to create a seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their aggressive actions will outweigh the benefits. The strategy includes cooperation across different branches of the U.S. military, integration with other government agencies, and collaboration with international allies to ensure a comprehensive deterrent posture.

 

However, the application of integrated deterrence is, at best, aspirational and faces significant challenges. Integrating all forces and capabilities across various domains and agencies (plus allies) into a cohesive deterrent strategy is daunting and unachievable. The U.S. military, traditionally specialized in warfighting, struggles to adapt to a role primarily focused on deterrence, which is inherently a political function. Effective deterrence requires clear communication of intentions and capabilities to adversaries, which can conflict with the secrecy and specialized nature of many military operations, particularly in cyber and space domains. 

 

In April of 2024, the Commission on the National Defense Strategy assessed the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) in a nearly 100-page report criticizing the Pentagon for not implementing its strategy effectively. 


The Commission found:

  • DoD.  The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot and should not solely be responsible for national defense. The National Defense Strategy (NDS) emphasizes the need for an "integrated deterrence," which is not currently being implemented effectively. A comprehensive approach that involves all elements of national power is necessary to coordinate and utilize resources across the Department of Defense, the executive branch, the private sector, civil society, and U.S. allies and partners.

o   Technology. Fundamental shifts in threats and technology require fundamental changes in how the DoD functions. When the danger approaches wartime urgency, the DoD operates at the speed of bureaucracy. 

o   Force Size. The NDS force-sizing construct is inadequate for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges. We propose a Multiple Theater Force Construct—with the Joint Force, in conjunction with U.S. allies and partners—sized to defend the homeland and tackle simultaneous threats in the Indo-Pacific, Europe, and the Middle East. 

o   Production. U.S. industrial production is currently insufficient to meet equipment, technology, and munitions needs, especially in a major conflict between world powers.

o   Readiness. The Joint Force is currently struggling to maintain readiness. Adding more responsibilities without providing the necessary resources will only lead to further breakdown.

o   Interagency. DoD should seek to align its concepts with other parts of the interagency to better coordinate military tools and other instruments of national power in pursuit of integrated deterrence.

 

 

U.S. Military Deterrence Efforts Against China in the Indo-Pacific

From January to July 2024, the U.S. military undertook several strategic initiatives to deter China's assertive actions in the Indo-Pacific region. These efforts were concentrated around Taiwan, the Philippines, the Spratly Islands, the Senkaku Islands, and the East China Sea. The U.S. aimed to reinforce its commitment to regional allies, uphold international laws, and maintain a balance of power to prevent any unilateral changes to the status quo by China.


  • Taiwan

In response to increasing Chinese military pressure around Taiwan, the U.S. escalated its military presence and engagement with Taiwan. The U.S. conducted several freedom of navigation operations (FONOPs) through the Taiwan Strait, underscoring the international waters' status and the U.S. commitment to free passage. Additionally, there were joint military exercises between U.S. and Taiwanese forces, focusing on enhancing Taiwan's defensive capabilities against potential amphibious assaults and missile attacks from China. These exercises included simulated air defense, anti-submarine warfare, and cyber defense operations, demonstrating a comprehensive approach to deterrence.


  • The Philippines

The U.S. fortified its alliance with the Philippines through increased military aid, joint exercises, and the rotational presence of U.S. troops under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Notably, the annual Balikatan exercises were expanded in 2024, involving more complex scenarios and advanced weaponry. These drills included amphibious assaults, live-fire exercises, and air-to-ground operations to improve interoperability and readiness against regional threats, including Chinese maritime assertiveness in the South China Sea. The U.S. also worked on upgrading military facilities in the Philippines to ensure rapid deployment capabilities if necessary.


  • The Spratly Islands

    In the contested Spratly Islands, the U.S. conducted multiple FONOPs to challenge China's extensive territorial claims and militarization of artificial islands. These operations were complemented by aerial reconnaissance missions to monitor Chinese activities and assert the right to freedom of overflight. The U.S. Navy's presence in the region was bolstered by carrier strike groups and amphibious ready groups conducting patrols and exercises, demonstrating the capability to respond to any provocations swiftly. The U.S. also engaged with regional partners such as Vietnam and Malaysia, providing maritime security assistance and enhancing collaborative surveillance efforts.


  • The Senkaku Islands and the East China Sea

    To support Japan in its territorial dispute with China over the Senkaku Islands, the U.S. reaffirmed its defense commitments under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. This included increased joint patrols and surveillance missions in the East China Sea, where Chinese incursions into Japanese-claimed waters had escalated. The U.S. and Japan conducted joint air and naval exercises to deter Chinese aggression and demonstrate their alliance's robustness. These drills involved anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and missile defense operations, showcasing a comprehensive deterrence strategy.

 

China’s Strategy In The Asian Pacific

As initially described by former US diplomat and current military professor Patrick Mendis, China's' Blue Dragon' Strategy seeks to expand its influence and strategic reach across major water and land areas, countering US efforts and increasing PRC control. China’s strategy is broken into three regions: the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Indian Ocean. It involves establishing claims on manmade islands and the surrounding maritime exclusion zones.

 

In the South China Sea, China has constructed and armed several artificial islands, outfitting them with military facilities like airstrips, radar systems, and missile installations. A key part of China's strategy, known as the Blue Dragon, involves making strong territorial claims, backed by the "nine-dash line," a boundary China uses to assert its control over about 90% of the South China Sea. This area includes important maritime zones and various islands and reefs also claimed by countries including Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. In 2023, China released a new map to further assert its claims over these disputed territories.

 

China’s Blue Dragon strategy is anchored on Taiwan and Sri Lanka. Taiwan is crucial to Xi Jinping’s goals of revitalizing China by reclaiming all the territory that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) believes rightfully belongs to the PRC. Strategically, controlling Taiwan would give the PRC dominion over the Taiwan Strait. This is a strategically critical maritime route through which 80% of the world’s largest container ships pass, accounting for 40% of the global shipping fleet.

 

China's strategy of winning a war without fighting is evident in its tactical maneuvers from Taiwan to Sri Lanka, challenging the United States' traditional Cold War-era containment methods. The modern global landscape, marked by intertwined political, corporate, technological, and trade connections, makes it difficult to divide the world into clear pro-American or pro-China camps. To counter China's growing influence, the United States must stay ahead in scientific and technological innovation while maintaining robust security guarantees for its allies in the Indo-Pacific. However, military cooperation alone, such as through the Quad, AUKUS, or bilateral treaties with nations like the Philippines and Vietnam, isn't sufficient. Washington must also engage its smaller allies as partners in both military and economic matters, as seen in its recent diplomatic efforts to engage the Pacific Islands Forum to counter China's influence in the South Pacific.

 

Beijing's centralized power and autocratic mindset could lead to strategic miscalculations, driven by overconfidence in its military strength and economic capabilities. Unlike democratic systems with self-correcting mechanisms like regular elections and freedom of expression, China's autocratic governance may become its downfall, similar to the Soviet Union's collapse under its own miscalculations and systemic weaknesses. The United States should adopt a flexible containment policy, leveraging partnerships with allies while allowing China to falter through its own strategic errors. This approach could potentially turn China's internal challenges into strategic advantages for the U.S. in the geopolitical contest.

 

China Undeterred

Beijing's expansion of its global influence posture is a strategic maneuver aimed at bolstering the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) objectives. This strategy seeks to undermine U.S. leadership, destabilize democratic institutions, and extend Beijing's influence globally. Key elements of this approach include:

  • Promoting Pro-China Narratives: Beijing focuses on disseminating favorable narratives about China while countering U.S.-promoted narratives that threaten its interests. This includes leveraging generative AI to enhance the sophistication of its influence operations.

  • Exploiting U.S. Societal Divisions: Beijing mirrors Moscow's influence tactics by exploiting perceived divisions within U.S. society. This was evident during the 2022 U.S. midterm elections when PRC propaganda arms targeted candidates from both political parties via platforms like TikTok.

  • Molding Public Discourse: Beijing intensifies efforts to shape U.S. public opinion on sensitive sovereignty issues such as Hong Kong, Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang. This includes monitoring Chinese students abroad for dissident views and mobilizing student associations to act on Beijing's behalf.

  • Influencing Research and Academia: The PRC influences research by U.S. academics and think tank experts, aiming to control the narrative and policy choices regarding China.

  • Maritime Power Projection.  From intimidating Taiwan with live fire exercises all around the island to the militia fishing fleets violating other nations’ territorial waters and harassing their coast guard and naval forces with their own, China conducts maritime operations just under U.S. redlines with great regularity.

  • UN Power Moves. In 1971, the PRC replaced the ROC as the recognized government of the Chinese people in the UN. Under PRC pressure, the number of nations that recognize Taiwan today has dwindled to twelve.


Given these activities, it is plausible that Beijing may attempt to influence the U.S. elections in 2024. The PRC's enhanced capabilities in covert operations and disinformation dissemination, coupled with the actions of individuals not directly supervised by Beijing but aligned with its goals, pose a significant risk to the integrity of the electoral process. 

If the list does not look like traditional military activities, then you may not be aware of China’s competitive military organization. In late 2015, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) launched significant reforms that reshaped its structure, warfighting model, and organizational culture, notably by creating the Strategic Support Force (SSF). The SSF centralizes the PLA's space, cyber, electronic, and psychological warfare capabilities, shifting from land-based territorial defense to extended power projection in strategic frontiers like space, cyberspace, and the far seas. This reorganization aims to enhance efficiency and synergy among disparate capabilities, enabling decisive strategic information operations (IO). The SSF's two main branches, the Space Systems Department and the Network Systems Department oversee space and cyber operations, consolidating previous departmental responsibilities to streamline command and control. Despite the ongoing transition, the SSF is poised to play a critical role in the PLA's strategy for fighting and winning information-centric wars.

The SSF's formation is part of broader PLA reforms, including the dissolution of four general departments and the Central Military Commission (CMC) expansion. This new structure supports the dual command system where services focus on force construction, and theater commands handle joint operations. The SSF and the Rocket Force remain outside this bifurcated arrangement, responsible for force construction and strategic operations. The SSF centralizes technical reconnaissance and information support, which is essential for joint operations and strategic defense. Modeled partly on the U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), the SSF integrates various operations, including cyber espionage, cyber-attacks, and psychological warfare, addressing historical coordination challenges within the PLA. However, the SSF's effectiveness will depend on overcoming organizational culture issues and ensuring seamless integration across its various missions and with other military entities.

 

The Axis

China is central in fostering cooperation, coordination, and mutual support among China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. This alliance significantly impacts global dynamics, notably by supporting Russia's military operations in Ukraine. China has contributed critical technology and economic backing, while Iran has provided advanced drone technology. North Korea, though not a formal member of this axis, has reinforced these efforts by supplying ammunition and missile systems to Russia. These contributions enhance Russia's military capabilities and undermine Western efforts to diplomatically and economically isolate Moscow.  This supports President Xi Jinping’s vision of China as the preeminent East Asian power and a leading power on the world stage. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) will attempt to preempt its reputation and legitimacy challenges, undercutting U.S. influence, driving wedges between Washington and its partners, and fostering global norms favoring its authoritarian system with the support of Russia and Iran.



Military Collaboration

Military collaboration between the U.S. and China saw a cautious but positive development with the resumption of high-level military-to-military communications. This includes reinstating the U.S.-China Defense Policy Coordination Talks and the U.S.-China Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. These dialogues are crucial for managing potential crises and ensuring open lines of communication, especially in hotspots like the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait. Both sides also agreed to resume telephone conversations between theater commanders, marking a significant step in mitigating risks of unintended military escalations.

 

Summary

The U.S. military's efforts from January to July 2024 to deter China in the Indo-Pacific region were multifaceted. They involved a combination of increased military presence, joint exercises, and reaffirmation of defense commitments to allies. These measures were designed to maintain stability, uphold international norms, and prevent any unilateral changes to the regional status quo by China.  They have also been largely ineffective at deterring Chinese cyber-attacks, influence operations, lawfare, East China Sea aggression,  expanding military capabilities, supporting Russia and Iran, or harassing partners and allies internationally.  The Joint Force has no equivalent to the PLA’s Strategic Support Force and only a desperate and uncoordinated interagency response to defeat the threat it poses. This must be rectified, or China’s advantage in psychological, informational, and cyber capabilities will continue to outclass those of the United States.  Despite the Lowey Institutes’ dominant military capability score for the U.S. (see below), it does not reflect China's dominance in key strategic capabilities. The U.S. military cannot be overconfident despite legitimate power projection.  It urgently needs to set the theater for conflict to deter war while shoring up the manifold areas it is either not competing, not deterring, or deterring with little effect.



 

BIBLIOGRAPHY

 

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