STRATEGY CENTRAL
For Practitioners, By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth – November 16, 2024
Introduction
The People's Republic of China, a powerful nation whose rise to global prominence commands significant international attention, was not forged through conventional means. Instead, its foundation was built through a series of calculated, asymmetric maneuvers, a style of warfare that Mao Zedong perfected in his struggle against the Kuomintang (KMT) during the Chinese Civil War. The roots of China's current embrace of irregular warfare (IW) as a critical part of its national defense strategy can be traced back to Mao’s revolutionary tactics. Mao's emphasis on the combination of irregular and conventional warfare and his belief in winning over the population provides a framework that helps to explain how and why the modern People's Liberation Army (PLA) is so adept at irregular strategies today.
The Foundations of Mao's Irregular Warfare
Mao Zedong’s approach to irregular warfare was deeply rooted in his understanding of China’s socio-political landscape and the realities of its military capabilities. From 1927 to 1949, China was engulfed in an intense civil conflict that saw Mao’s Communist Party of China (CPC) pitted against the numerically and technologically superior forces of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang. Recognizing the disparity between the CPC and the KMT, Mao embraced irregular warfare, shifting away from large, direct engagements and instead prioritizing guerilla tactics.
The early development of Mao’s IW philosophy began with the Autumn Harvest Uprising in 1927. Despite initial failures, Mao realized that the strength of the Communist movement lay not in direct confrontation but in embedding the fighters among China’s vast rural population. Mao utilized tactics of harassment, sabotage, and ambush—targeting KMT supply lines, disrupting communication networks, and striking swiftly before retreating into the safety of the countryside. His success rested on several core principles: flexibility, mobility, and the ability to blend into the broader population—traits that have been the cornerstone of guerilla warfare throughout history but perfected by Mao.
A central element of Mao’s IW strategy was his belief that irregular warfare could weaken an enemy through attrition and transform a weaker force into one capable of undertaking decisive conventional operations when conditions became favorable. For Mao, irregular warfare was not merely a strategy of necessity but one of opportunity, providing a means to erode the enemy’s morale and logistical capabilities while simultaneously rallying popular support for the Communist cause.
The Yan'an Era and Consolidation of IW Tactics
Perhaps the most significant period for developing Mao’s irregular warfare doctrine came during the Yan'an era (1935-1945). After the Long March, a grueling retreat that covered over 9,000 kilometers and decimated Communist forces, Mao established a stronghold in the remote region of Yan'an. Here, he laid the ideological and practical foundation for Communist guerilla operations. Mao combined political indoctrination with military training, ensuring that both fighters and civilians understood their role in the larger struggle against the KMT and the Japanese forces occupying parts of China at the time.
In Yan'an, Mao stressed the importance of understanding the dynamics of the conflict. His famous dictum, "The enemy advances, we retreat; the enemy camps, we harass; the enemy tires, we attack; the enemy retreats, we pursue," highlighted the fluid nature of guerilla warfare. Mao saw irregular warfare as an art of patience and persistence—never directly challenging the KMT on their terms but always maneuvering to control the tempo of engagement. This principle became one of the most notable examples of asymmetry in modern conflict, where time, terrain, and people's will were as valuable as guns and ammunition.
Case Studies of Mao's Irregular Warfare Success
Two key examples of Mao's use of irregular warfare during his struggle against the Kuomintang highlight the effectiveness of his approach.
The first example was the Battle of Pingxingguan in September 1937, fought in collaboration with Chinese nationalist forces against Japan. Though nominally aligned with Chiang Kai-shek, Mao’s forces utilized classic guerilla tactics—attacking an unsuspecting Japanese supply convoy in a narrow mountain pass, inflicting heavy casualties, and seizing valuable supplies. This operation was notable not just for its immediate military success but for its symbolic value in bolstering morale among Communist fighters and the local population, proving they could fight back against the mighty Japanese army. Mao’s strategy showcased the strength of the Communists’ ability to select favorable ground, strike at the opportune moment, and disappear before an organized counterattack could be mounted. For Mao, the Pingxingguan victory demonstrated how smaller, agile forces could outmaneuver technologically superior adversaries using unconventional means.
A second and perhaps more consequential example was the Hundred Regiments Offensive (1940), which involved the cooperation of multiple Communist guerilla units. This campaign aimed to disrupt Japanese control by targeting northern China's key railways, bridges, and supply depots. Mao’s forces successfully sabotaged over 600 miles of railway, demonstrating the potency of guerilla tactics in cutting enemy supply lines and reducing their ability to project power over extended areas. Though the Japanese responded with brutal countermeasures, the offensive helped solidify popular support for the Communist forces by showing that they were actively fighting against foreign occupation, thereby building Mao's political capital as the true defender of Chinese sovereignty.
Why Mao Believed He Achieved Victory
Mao’s ultimate victory over the Kuomintang in 1949 stemmed from his unwavering commitment to his guerilla warfare doctrine, a deep understanding of the socio-political environment, and the careful fostering of civilian support. One of Mao’s most significant realizations was that to defeat a more powerful enemy; a movement had to become part of the people themselves. Mao's "mass line" approach, which emphasized maintaining close contact with the peasantry, converting their needs and demands into policy, and involving them in the revolutionary cause, proved essential in sustaining Communist forces.
Chiang Kai-shek's Kuomintang, despite its military superiority and backing from the United States, struggled to maintain popular support, particularly in rural areas. KMT forces were viewed as corrupt, disconnected, and often brutal in their treatment of the local population. Mao capitalized on these failings by ensuring that his fighters operated amongst the people and gained their trust and loyalty by offering security, land reforms, and protection against landlords and foreign invaders. This ideological and practical alignment with the populace effectively turned China’s vast rural regions into an invaluable support base that fed and protected the Communist forces. Mao’s ability to transform irregular warfare from a tactic into a comprehensive, people-driven movement is perhaps the greatest testament to his success.
Lessons From Mao's Approach
Mao Zedong’s irregular warfare doctrine offers several enduring lessons about asymmetric conflict—lessons that continue to be relevant today. Mao demonstrated that irregular warfare could be a viable strategy not only for survival but also for strategic success against a more powerful opponent. His approach emphasized understanding the adversary's strengths and weaknesses and tailoring tactics to exploit those vulnerabilities. By operating in a manner that did not require direct confrontation, Mao created space for the Communist forces to grow stronger while simultaneously weakening the enemy’s resolve and reach.
A key insight into the effectiveness of Mao's IW approach is the critical role of popular support. Mao viewed the population as a "sea" in which guerilla fighters could swim—a powerful metaphor that underscores the inseparability of IW success from the people who surround it. In Mao’s estimation, the ability to win—or even to sustain a movement—depended not on the size of the military force but on the depth of political and social integration with the population. Mao believed that any attempt at guerilla warfare would be destined for failure without the people.
Mao’s tactics of mobility, attrition, and psychological warfare can be effective under particular conditions: where a weaker force is willing to be patient, avoid direct engagements, and exploit the political weaknesses of an opponent. The rise of guerilla movements throughout the 20th and 21st centuries—from Fidel Castro’s revolution in Cuba to the Viet Cong’s struggle against the United States in Vietnam—bears witness to Mao’s enduring influence. His approach demonstrated that conventional superiority can be countered by understanding local conditions, carefully managing public perception, and exploiting every opportunity to strike at an adversary’s most vulnerable points.
Today, China’s strategic thinking still incorporates elements of Mao’s IW doctrine, albeit in a more complex and modernized form. The ongoing emphasis on political warfare, information operations, strategic patience, and a robust civil-military relationship echoes Mao's conviction that victory does not necessarily require conventional dominance. Instead, asymmetry and adaptation—whether in the form of guerilla tactics or through information warfare—remain at the core of effective resistance and resilience strategies.
Mao Zedong's irregular warfare strategy was not only a blueprint for military operations but a social and political movement that embodied the aspirations of a marginalized population. Through an astute combination of guerilla warfare, socio-political integration, and psychological resilience, Mao achieved what many thought impossible—the defeat of a vastly superior adversary. His insights on warfare still resonate, reminding us that the strength of a force lies not merely in its size but in its relationship with the people it represents and the clarity of purpose that drives it.
Bibliography
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4. Van Slyke, Lyman P. Enemies and Friends: The United Front in Chinese Communist History. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967.
