Shadows of Irregular Warfare in Modern Competition
Strategy Central
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth - December 12, 2024
Introduction
Throughout the Cold War, the Soviet Union relied on a complex blend of irregular warfare techniques to spread communist influence, subvert Western-aligned governments, and counter the influence of the United States. This strategy was a cornerstone of the Soviet doctrine, built on ideological fervor and a careful understanding of global geopolitics. Unlike the United States, which often employed direct intervention and overt counterinsurgency, the Soviet approach sought to capitalize on asymmetric opportunities and exploit the political fault lines of vulnerable regions. While this method yielded notable successes, it also led to remarkable failures, ultimately shaping the dynamics of modern irregular warfare.
The Foundations of Soviet Doctrine
The Soviet irregular warfare strategy emerged from a doctrinal emphasis on subversion, proxy conflicts, and support for revolutionary movements. Inspired by Marxist-Leninist ideology, the Soviets believed that global revolution was inevitable and sought to hasten its arrival indirectly. Unlike conventional warfare, which required a heavy commitment of resources and risks, irregular methods provided the Soviet Union with an efficient means to project power in an era of nuclear brinkmanship. Soviet intelligence services, primarily the KGB and GRU, played a vital role in this doctrine, utilizing covert operations to support communist insurgencies, infiltrate enemy states, and undermine political institutions from within.
Moscow's approach involved working through local communist parties and developing clandestine networks to wage psychological, political, and guerrilla warfare against Western powers. Support for revolutionary movements was often concealed, allowing the Soviets plausible deniability. Rather than invading or deploying vast numbers of troops, the Soviet Union offered training, equipment, and economic assistance to sympathetic governments and insurgencies. The support for Fidel Castro's revolution in Cuba, the assistance provided to North Vietnamese forces, and involvement in African liberation movements exemplify the widespread, sometimes subtle and sometimes not, nature of Soviet intervention.
Soviet advisors emphasized political education, guerrilla tactics, and organizational training for their client movements. This differed significantly from the American approach, which frequently prioritized technological superiority and firepower. The Soviet model, grounded in communist-leaning ideological alignment, built strong partnerships based on shared revolutionary aspirations, fostering long-term loyalty among client states and groups.
A Regional and Global Approach
Geopolitically, Soviet irregular warfare took place on two fronts: regional and global. In regions like Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa, the Soviets sought to disrupt Western influence by supporting national liberation movements and anti-colonial insurgencies. In Africa, Soviet backing of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) during the Angolan Civil War symbolized Moscow's broader regional objectives. By leveraging Cuban military support and Soviet weapons, the MPLA prevailed, establishing a socialist-oriented government. This success cemented the Soviet foothold in Southern Africa and demonstrated their ability to expand influence through irregular warfare, diplomacy, and proxy alliances. The Soviets tried this approach in Angola and Mozambique, Ethiopia, South Africa, Namibia, Congo, Guinea-Bissau, Somalia, and Zimbabwe.
Zimbabwe is a prime example of a major irregular effort during the Cold War that failed. The Soviet Union actively supported the Marxist-leaning Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU), led by Joshua Nkomo, as part of its broader strategy to expand socialist influence in Africa and counter Western and Chinese involvement in liberation movements. The Soviets provided ZAPU with military training, arms, and financial aid, including sophisticated weaponry for its armed wing, the Zimbabwe People's Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA), to fight against Rhodesia’s white-minority regime. Soviet efforts were driven by the desire to establish a Marxist-aligned government in Zimbabwe and promote anti-colonial resistance across the continent. However, the Soviet Union faced competition from China, which backed the rival Zimbabwe African National Union (ZANU) and its leader, Robert Mugabe. This rivalry weakened the overall liberation effort and limited Soviet influence after Zimbabwe’s independence in 1980 when ZANU emerged victorious and pursued non-aligned policies rather than aligning strictly with Moscow.
In Latin America, Cuba served as an intermediary for Soviet ambitions. The Cuban Revolution transformed Havana into a hub of revolutionary export, with Fidel Castro's regime actively spreading Marxist doctrine. The Soviets saw Cuba as a forward operating base for communist expansion across Latin America, with Che Guevara becoming a symbol of regional insurgencies. The United States responded aggressively, using its proximity to assert dominance. The Bay of Pigs invasion of 1961, an attempt by U.S.-backed exiles to overthrow Castro, highlighted Washington's willingness to counter Soviet-backed revolutions through direct, albeit sometimes poorly executed, intervention. Despite the invasion's failure, the event underlined the limits of U.S. counterinsurgency efforts when faced with determined local and Soviet-backed resistance.
The global nature of Soviet irregular warfare is most vividly seen in Southeast Asia, where the conflict in Vietnam exemplified a prolonged irregular battle that had implications far beyond the region. Soviet support for North Vietnam—through financial aid, military advisors, and weaponry—enabled the communist insurgency to survive a sustained American assault. Though China was also a key benefactor, the Soviet contribution played a pivotal role in ensuring that North Vietnamese forces were well-armed and capable of continuing the struggle. The eventual American withdrawal from Vietnam in 1975 marked one of the most significant successes for Soviet irregular efforts during the Cold War, striking a severe blow to U.S. global prestige.
Successes and Failures in Soviet Irregular Warfare
While Soviet support for North Vietnam and the MPLA is emblematic of Moscow's successes, the Cold War also highlighted the limitations and failures of their irregular warfare doctrine. In Afghanistan, the Soviet Union found itself embroiled in a quagmire that mirrored the American experience in Vietnam and, later, Afghanistan as well. Initially intending to prop up a faltering communist government, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 escalated into a drawn-out conflict against the mujahideen, who the United States, Pakistan, and Saudi Arabia supported.
The Soviet effort to pacify Afghanistan relied heavily on brute force and mass repression, an approach that backfired as the mujahideen—fueled by covert American assistance under Operation Cyclone—became increasingly effective. Stinger missiles supplied by the CIA enabled the mujahideen to neutralize Soviet air superiority, and the conflict dragged on until the Soviets withdrew in 1989. Afghanistan thus marked a significant failure for Soviet irregular warfare, demonstrating the limits of relying on conventional tactics to combat a determined irregular enemy with foreign backing.
In Latin America, Soviet efforts were also met with mixed results. Soviet efforts focused on Cuba, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Grenada, Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, and Venezuela. While Cuba remained a loyal ally and Nicaragua's Sandinista government emerged as a regional partner, efforts to instigate successful revolutions elsewhere often fell short. In Chile, Soviet backing for leftist groups failed to prevent the CIA-supported military coup that ousted President Salvador Allende in 1973, ushering in the authoritarian regime of Augusto Pinochet. This represented a broader challenge for the Soviets. Despite the ideological commitment and significant investment, they frequently struggled to overcome the entrenched political and economic influence of the United States in Latin America.
Irregular Competition: The Soviet Union vs. The United States
The Cold War irregular competition between the United States and the Soviet Union was characterized by stark contrasts in methods and outcomes. Soviet irregular warfare doctrine emphasized ideological indoctrination and the empowerment of local communist movements, leveraging local discontent against colonial or capitalist powers. In contrast, the American approach centered on containment, using counterinsurgency, economic assistance, and direct military intervention to prevent the spread of communism.
One of the most vivid examples of this competition was the struggle for influence in Angola during the 1970s. The Angolan Civil War pitted the Soviet-supported MPLA against U.S.-backed factions such as the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). The conflict became a proxy battlefield, with Cuban troops and Soviet advisors fighting against South African forces and CIA-sponsored insurgents. Ultimately, the MPLA emerged victorious, and Angola became a Soviet-aligned state—a significant geopolitical win for Moscow. The U.S. failure to prevent the spread of communism in Angola underscored the limitations of relying on disparate and often fragmented proxy forces without cohesive support.
The irregular warfare battle that stands out as particularly successful for the Soviet Union, however, is Vietnam. Though the Soviet role was indirect, their support played a crucial role in allowing North Vietnam to outlast the United States, leading to the unification of the country under communist rule. The American defeat in Vietnam was a profound moment in Cold War history, affecting U.S. foreign policy and military strategy for decades to come. The success of Soviet-supported irregular forces in Vietnam demonstrated the efficacy of sustained insurgency, combined with robust external backing, in undermining a vastly superior military power.
Lessons for Modern Competition
The lessons of Soviet and American irregular warfare during the Cold War remain highly relevant in today's strategic competition between Russia and the United States. Modern Russia, much like the Soviet Union, continues to employ a hybrid approach that combines elements of irregular warfare, political subversion, and covert operations to achieve its objectives. The 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent support for separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine are prime examples of Russia's modern adaptation of Cold War-era tactics.
One key lesson is the importance of legitimacy and local support. The Soviet experience in Afghanistan highlights the difficulties of sustaining an irregular campaign without genuine local backing. Conversely, Soviet support for North Vietnam and the MPLA in Angola was successful in large part due to the strong nationalist underpinnings of these movements. For the United States, countering Russian irregular activities today requires a deep understanding of local dynamics and the cultivation of legitimacy among local populations. While the stark ideological differences in the Marxist and democratic-capitalistic have faded, supporting or influencing autocratic regimes beneficial to Russia remains a primary objective. Supporting autocrats may be expedient; however, merely providing military assistance without addressing the underlying political and social grievances that fuel conflict is unlikely to succeed.
Another lesson is the necessity of plausible deniability and the use of proxies. The Soviet Union's reliance on proxies allowed it to expand its influence without overtly risking direct confrontation with the United States. Modern Russia has embraced a similar approach, using private military contractors like the Wagner Group to project power while maintaining official deniability. The United States must recognize this tactic and adapt by enhancing intelligence capabilities, countering disinformation, and working through allied local forces to undermine Russian influence.
The Cold War also demonstrated the value of sustained support in irregular conflicts. Soviet assistance to North Vietnam was instrumental precisely because it was consistent and tailored to the insurgency's needs. In contrast, the United States has often struggled with maintaining long-term commitments, as seen in Afghanistan and Syria. To effectively compete with Russia today, the U.S. must demonstrate a willingness to engage in sustained support for its partners, particularly those facing Russian-backed insurgencies or political subversion.
Finally, the ideological component of irregular warfare remains significant. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union effectively used communist ideology to rally support and build solidarity among diverse movements. While the ideological landscape has changed, Russia today still uses narratives of anti-Western resistance and national sovereignty to justify its actions and garner support. The United States must, therefore, craft a compelling ideological narrative that emphasizes democracy, rule of law, and economic opportunity—values that resonate with local populations and counter the appeal of authoritarian alternatives.
Conclusion
The Soviet Union's use of irregular warfare during the Cold War offers valuable insights into modern great power competition dynamics. Through a combination of proxy support, ideological commitment, and strategic opportunism, the Soviets could expand their influence globally, often at the expense of the United States. However, the limitations and failures of Soviet irregular campaigns—notably in Afghanistan—also underscore the importance of local legitimacy and the dangers of overreliance on conventional military tactics in an irregular context.
As the United States and Russia continue to vie for influence in the 21st century, the lessons of the Cold War are more pertinent than ever. Both nations must recognize that irregular warfare is not merely a military endeavor but a complex interplay of political, social, and ideological factors. By learning from past successes and failures, the United States can better prepare to counter Russia's modern hybrid warfare strategies, ensuring it remains competitive in an increasingly contested global landscape.
Bibliography
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Prados, John. Safe for Democracy: The Secret Wars of the CIA. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2006.
Westad, Odd Arne. The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007.
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