Integrated Deterrence and China's Strategic Insights:

Lessons from Ukraine & Asian Pacific Deterrence

Strategy Central

By Practitioners, For Practitioners

  By Monte Erfourth – July 27, 2024

Nervous General finding out what Integrated Deterrence Means for his command:

“Do everything, everywhere, all the time…..perfectly coordinated.”

Introduction

The United States' inability to deter Russia from invading Ukraine in 2022 can be attributed to a series of historical errors, insufficient signaling of consequences, and a lack of consistent and credible deterrence measures across multiple administrations. From President George W. Bush’s weak response to the 2008 invasion of Georgia to the Biden administration’s hesitant gestures of support for Ukraine, U.S. policies created the impression that the United States was not willing to make an assault on Ukraine painful for Russia. The result was a tremendously costly war that could have been avoided.

The failures of U.S. deterrence leading up to Russia's invasion of Ukraine highlight a series of historical missteps, inconsistent policies, and insufficient signaling of consequences. Over multiple administrations, the U.S. demonstrated a pattern of weak responses to Russian aggression, from the Bush administration’s limited reaction to the 2008 invasion of Georgia to the Obama administration’s reluctance to provide lethal aid during the 2014 Crimea crisis and Trump’s mixed messages regarding NATO commitments. The botched withdrawal from Afghanistan further contributed to the perception of U.S. weakness and war-weariness, undermining its deterrence credibility. This cumulative display of indecision and limited action failed to create a credible deterrent effect, ultimately emboldening Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022.

China has closely observed these failures and learned several key lessons about deterrence. Beijing noted the unexpectedly strong and coordinated Western response to Russia's aggression, which included comprehensive sanctions that even impacted a major global player like Russia. This has led China to reassess its vulnerabilities and the potential economic costs of aggressive actions, such as a possible invasion of Taiwan. Additionally, China has recognized the importance of economic resilience and the necessity of forming and maintaining international partnerships to withstand potential sanctions. Xi Jinping has applied these lessons by enhancing China's military-industrial complex, preparing for protracted conflicts, and ensuring strong domestic support for potential military campaigns.

Determining whether deterrence is effective can be challenging. Without being present when leaders decide not to take action due to deterrent activity, it's hard to attribute the cause. Deterrence is a crucial element of U.S. grand strategy, but it can also be complex and frustrating as administrations negotiate between winning and warning or between defense and deterrence. These trade-offs require a clear understanding of our national priorities and the limitations of available tools. China watched for decades as the United States and NATO applied weak deterrent measures against Russia. The missteps leading up to the war in Ukraine exemplify the danger of relying on underperforming deterrent measures. This article explores the historical context and policy weaknesses of the U.S. deterrence with Russia and the potential for failure with China over Taiwan and the Asian Pacific.

 The U.S. – Russian Deterrence Failure

 The West, including the U.S., did not have an unambiguous strategy to deter a Russian invasion of Ukraine. NATO’s strategic focus has primarily been to deter aggression against NATO members, not Ukraine. This lack of a targeted deterrence strategy meant that measures like sanctions and NATO threats were not designed to specifically discourage Russia from invading Ukraine. Russia could have interpreted this lack of clear warning as a tacit acceptance of an invasion. 

Russia had decades of lackluster U.S. responses to Russia's aggressive actions that set a precedent for perceived weakness. For example, during the 2008 invasion of Georgia, the Bush administration limited its response to providing airlift for Georgian soldiers and delivering humanitarian aid, in an attempt to avoid resorting to military involvement and economic sanctions. This pattern signaled to Russia that the U.S. was unwilling to take decisive actions against its aggression in the satellite states of the former U.S.S.R.

Similarly, during the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea, the Obama administration's refusal to provide lethal aid to Ukraine, combined with the employment of only limited sanctions and non-lethal assistance, further reinforced Russia's perception of weak U.S. resolve. Despite internal and congressional calls for stronger measures, the administration prioritized diplomatic and economic measures over military support. After the Georgia episode, the Obama administration pursued resetting relations with Russia, abandoning missile defense plans in Eastern Europe and reducing the U.S. military presence in Europe.

Although the Trump administration reversed the prohibition on lethal aid and delivered Javelin missiles to Ukraine, it restricted their use in combat, effectively removing their deterrent value. President Trump also repeatedly questioned the U.S. commitment to NATO. Trump's transactional approach and threats to withdraw from NATO sent a message to Russia that U.S. support was not guaranteed, undermining the credibility of NATO’s foundational deterrent measure.

In the run-up to the 2022 invasion, the Biden administration hesitated to provide substantial military aid to Ukraine, fearing it would provoke Russia. This included denying requests for defensive weapons like Stinger missiles until the invasion was imminent. Despite demonstrating renewed interest and support for NATO, there was no specific pushback to Russian threats to invade Ukraine.

The botched withdrawal from Afghanistan sent a signal that the U.S. was possibly war-weary and diminished by twenty years of counterinsurgency and terror operations. Despite improved relations with NATO, the years without meaningful deterrence actions and lack of commitment to the long fight in Afghanistan conveyed a lack of commitment to Ukraine’s defense, which may have emboldened Russia.

The U.S. and its Western Allies did not understand Russia's motivations. They, therefore, relied on general deterrence, which was the threat of NATO's collective military power, to deter Russia from invading Ukraine. However, this approach was not explicitly targeted at Russia. Additionally, the projection of military power to deter attacks on third nations, known as extended deterrence, was not effectively communicated or backed by significant actions. The West's threats, including sanctions and promises of defensive support, lacked the immediacy and credibility needed to change the Kremlin’s calculations.

Lastly, economic sanctions were not seen as a credible deterrent for Russia because Moscow believed it could withstand any new economic measures based on its previous experiences with sanctions, particularly after the 2014 annexation of Crimea. The Kremlin expected any sanctions to be limited and bearable in exchange for achieving its strategic objectives in Ukraine.

China’s Initial Lessons Learned

In general, it is understood that China has learned several key lessons about deterrence from the Russian-Ukraine conflict. They have developed a mutually influential relationship that plays off each other’s strategic approach. Beijing has been surprised by the ferocity and unity of the Western response to Russia's aggression. The coordinated sanctions by the U.S., NATO, and other allies demonstrated that even great powers are not immune to economic warfare, provided the coalition enforcing them remains cohesive. This realization has underscored the importance of international partnerships and the collective strength they can wield in economic conflicts.

China also observed that large-scale sanctions can target significant global players, not just smaller or marginal economies. This has prompted Beijing to reassess its vulnerabilities and the potential economic costs of aggressive actions, such as a possible invasion of Taiwan. Moreover, China has studied the specific tactics and capabilities of the Western sanctions coalition. The swift and severe measures, including asset freezes, exclusion from the SWIFT financial messaging system, and export controls on critical technologies, have highlighted the extensive toolkit available to the West. This has driven China to enhance its economic defenses, such as developing alternative financial systems and reducing dependency on the U.S. dollar.

Additionally, Beijing has recognized the limitations of its unilateral economic measures. While China has employed economic coercion against countries like Australia and Lithuania, these efforts have often been mitigated by support from other nations. This has reinforced the understanding that successful economic deterrence relies on the capacity to impose costs and the ability to form and maintain supportive coalitions.

The Russo-Ukrainian conflict has illuminated the broader geopolitical and economic realities constraining China’s ambitions to reshape the global financial system. Despite efforts to promote the renminbi (yuan) and establish alternative payment systems, China remains deeply integrated into the existing international economic order. Russia's challenges in circumventing sanctions have demonstrated to Beijing that true sanctions-proofing is nearly impossible in today’s interconnected world.  Russia has also demonstrated an ability to exploit black market options but cannot replace free and open participation in the global financial and market system.

In general, the lessons from the Russian-Ukraine conflict have driven China to bolster its economic resilience, reassess the potential costs of aggressive actions, and emphasize building and maintaining international partnerships to mitigate the impact of potential sanctions.

Xi’s Strategic Fix to U.S. Deterrence

Xi Jinping took the lessons from the Russian-Ukraine conflict and developed ways to mitigate them in preparation for a Chinese assault on Taiwan. One of the foremost lessons for China is the importance of preparing for a protracted conflict. Observing Russia’s drawn-out and bloody war, Xi took steps to identify and rectify corruption and inefficiencies within the Chinese military. This was most evident by the corruption investigation into the procurement system led by the newly appointed defense minister, Li Shangfu. Even if this has been the elimination of a rival, the effect on others is likely the same. Additionally, China is bolstering its military-industrial complex to ensure a robust stockpile of munitions, missiles, and drones and the capacity to produce them at a large scale.

Another key lesson revolves around the transformative role of drones on the battlefield. The extensive use of surveillance and attack drones by both Russian and Ukrainian forces has prompted China to integrate these capabilities into its combat doctrine. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) aims to learn and apply these modern warfare strategies through joint training operations with Russia.

Xi has also observed that economic resilience is vital in enduring sanctions and maintaining military operations. Despite the West’s comprehensive sanctions against Russia, Moscow’s leverage over global energy markets and efforts at financial decoupling and import substitution have allowed it to sustain its war efforts. In response, China has been intensifying its efforts to shockproof its economy. This includes promoting the renminbi in international trade and expanding land-based infrastructure with Russia to secure vital supplies in case of a U.S.-led naval blockade.

The war in Ukraine has highlighted the necessity of strong domestic support for prolonged military campaigns. Despite initial expectations that Western sanctions would destabilize Russia internally, the Kremlin has managed to maintain solid domestic backing for its war efforts. Xi is confident that framing a conflict over Taiwan as a defensive measure to prevent national disintegration would garner similar support in China. Furthermore, the Chinese government possesses more sophisticated tools than Russia for suppressing dissent and controlling public opinion. Tight control of the narrative and restricted outside influence in Russia and China have proven effective buffers for governmental missteps and the pursuit of party objectives at the expense of their citizens.

Xi has been closely monitoring the West’s commitment to Ukraine. While the initial response from the U.S. and its allies was swift and unified, ongoing political divisions and delays in military support signal weakening resolve. This perceived fracturing of Western solidarity is a critical observation for Beijing, suggesting that the West’s ability to sustain a united front in the face of a prolonged conflict may wane over time. The failures in Afghanistan and Iraq and the hesitation to provide more powerful weapons to Ukraine solidify this perception.

Overall, Xi Jinping has learned that success in modern conflicts requires thorough preparation, economic resilience, effective use of advanced military technology, strong domestic support, and an understanding of the adversary’s capacity for sustained commitment. It sounds more like Clausewitz than Sun-Tzu, but it demonstrates an ability to draw and apply strategic lessons from other maneuvers in great power competition. These lessons shape China’s strategic calculations and approach to potential future confrontations.

The U.S. Political Approach to China

The National Security Council is aware of Xi’s lessons and is attempting to shape policy to best position the U.S. to advance its interests through advantage and influence. The political approach of the United States towards China involves a combination of deterrence, diplomacy, and economic policy aimed at managing the competitive relationship without escalating to open conflict. The Biden administration’s strategy focuses on realistic assumptions about the capacity of the United States to shape China’s political system. Instead of seeking an all-out confrontation, the U.S. aims to prevent Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, maintain its economic and technological leadership, and support regional democracies. This involves intense competition through measures that blunt Chinese activities undermining U.S. interests and building coalitions with allies to secure American priorities.

Deterrence is a critical component of the U.S. strategy. The Biden administration has taken significant steps to enhance its military posture in the Indo-Pacific region, such as expanding military access in strategic locations and upgrading ties with key partners like Australia, Japan, and the Philippines. It has also implemented export controls on semiconductors, restricted outbound investments to China, and provided security assistance to Taiwan, demonstrating a clear commitment to countering Chinese aggression. There remains legitimate concern for what U.S. deterrence is aimed at.  Unfortunately, it is limited to avoiding conflict and has done little to impede the Chinese from aggressively pursuing actions below the level of armed conflict.

Diplomacy works in conjunction with these deterrence measures to manage risks and maintain stability. By directly communicating with Chinese leaders, the U.S. seeks to clarify its intentions, reduce misunderstandings, and prevent escalatory spirals. High-level meetings, such as the summit between President Biden and President Xi Jinping, have led to concrete outcomes like the restoration of military-to-military communications and agreements to address the flow of fentanyl precursors.

Economic policy is also a vital part of the U.S. approach. Efforts to strengthen the American economy through substantial investments in infrastructure, technology, and clean energy aim to enhance the U.S. competitive position. Additionally, by coordinating with allies on economic and technological issues, the U.S. seeks to reduce dependence on Chinese supply chains and prevent China from leveraging its economic power to undermine global stability.

As previously discussed, China’s response to these U.S. measures has been multifaceted. While Beijing continues to assert its interests and expand its influence, it has also taken steps to mitigate the impact of U.S. actions. For instance, China has promoted the use of the yuan in international trade and built infrastructure to secure alternative supply routes. However, China’s economy remains deeply integrated with the global economy, making it vulnerable to sustained Western pressure. Despite these challenges, Chinese leaders have emphasized the need for economic resilience and strategic partnerships to counterbalance U.S. actions.

The U.S. strategy towards China involves a balanced mix of deterrence, diplomacy, and economic policies to manage competition and prevent conflict. This approach recognizes the complexities of the U.S.-China relationship and seeks to achieve American objectives while minimizing the risks of escalation and maintaining global stability.

The DoD Approach: Integrated Deterrence

Diplomacy, Congressional acts, and protectionism are affecting China.  Although not always deterred, they are sometimes contained or blocked from acting.  Is that true from a military standpoint?  To a degree, yes, the U.S. remains the regional hegemon.  However, some severe structural and physical problems exist with the Department of Defense (DoD) approach called integrated deterrence.

DoD employs the 2022 National Security Strategy's concept of integrated deterrence to blend military capabilities across all domains—land, sea, air, space, and cyber—to prevent adversaries from engaging in predatory activities. This approach aims to create a seamless combination of capabilities to convince potential adversaries that the costs of their aggressive actions will outweigh the benefits. The strategy includes cooperation across different branches of the U.S. military, integration with other government agencies, and collaboration with international allies to ensure a comprehensive deterrent posture.

However, the application of integrated deterrence is, at best, aspirational and faces significant challenges. Integrating all forces and capabilities across various domains and agencies (plus allies) into a cohesive deterrent strategy is daunting and unachievable. The U.S. military, traditionally specialized in warfighting, struggles to adapt to a role primarily focused on deterrence, which is inherently a political function. Effective deterrence requires clear communication of intentions and capabilities to adversaries, which can conflict with the secrecy and specialized nature of many military operations, particularly in cyber and space domains. 

The problematic nature of implementing integrated deterrence lies in the inherent tension between forces designed to win wars and those aimed at preventing them. Military forces optimized for combat, such as highly mobile naval units and automated drones, may not effectively signal deterrence due to their flexible deployment and reduced perceived commitment. Moreover, the secretive nature of advanced technologies and cyber capabilities can undermine the transparency needed for credible deterrence, as adversaries may not fully understand or believe in the deterrent capabilities being signaled.

This complexity is further compounded by the bureaucratic hurdles within the DoD and the broader U.S. government. Integrating diverse organizations with different administrative cultures, priorities, and political constituencies is a formidable challenge. Additionally, aligning international allies' strategic goals and operational capabilities with U.S. objectives adds another layer of difficulty. These issues make the seamless implementation of integrated deterrence highly problematic and highlight the gap between the aspirational goals of the National Security Strategy and the practical realities faced by a military primarily designed for warfighting.

Further complicating attaining deterrence effects by the military is the narrow aim of preventing a major conflict.  Very little deterrence has occurred as the Chinese violate international waters or air space, build islands in waters they claim, attack nations with their fishing fleet militias, and harass Taiwan with threatening military exercises that do not mask their hostility.  The failure to respond by the United States set up an eerily similar situation that led Russia to conclude no U.S. response would follow the Ukraine invasion.  The DoD must navigate these tensions to balance the dual roles of deterring adversaries and maintaining the capacity to win wars if deterrence fails. The spectrum of cooperation, competition, and conflict leaves the military confused and conflicted with precisely what it should do in the most critical space in great power competition: The competition to exploit advantages and influence as leverage to advance and protect interests.

Conclusion

The U.S. political approach towards China combines diplomacy, military pressure, and economic policy to manage the competitive relationship without escalating to open conflict. The Biden administration’s strategic objectives are preventing Chinese hegemony in the Indo-Pacific, maintaining American economic and technological leadership, and supporting regional democracies. From a military perspective, this involves enhancing military capabilities in the region, implementing export controls, and providing security assistance to allies. Diplomatic efforts aim to clarify U.S. intentions, reduce misunderstandings, and prevent escalation through direct communication with Chinese leaders. Economic policies seek to strengthen the U.S. position and reduce dependencies on Chinese supply chains.

However, the Department of Defense's (DoD) implementation of the 2022 National Security Strategy's concept of integrated deterrence requires doing everything, everywhere, all the time, and perfectly coordinated. This is an aspirational goal for a professional military, but it is simply not achievable. This impossibility evidences the DoD's confusion about what to do about competition. Instead of competing globally with China, the DoD has focused on a battle over Taiwan that it sees as the full measure of competition. Presumably, because it is the only region where U.S. hegemony is seriously challenged, this conclusion is unsurprising for an organization built to fight and win wars.

The DoD must revise its approach to deterrence, which falls from the ideal to the practical. Effective deterrence requires clear communication of intentions and capabilities, which can conflict with the secretive nature of advanced military operations, particularly in cyber and space domains. The Secretary of Defense must recognize that the bureaucratic hurdles within the DoD and the broader U.S. government, cross-domain coordination, and the need to align international allies' goals with U.S. objectives, all seamlessly implemented, make integrated deterrence beyond the reach of any human organization. A change must be made to provide effective military deterrence beyond avoiding conflict. 

U.S. deterrence against Russia and China has been historically weak over the past twenty-five years.  It failed to prevent Russia’s war of conquest in the Ukraine but might have deterred China from direct armed conflict in the Pacific theater.  At present, it is hard to know if U.S. actions are what have prevented Chinese actions.  What can be said with some certainty is that the U.S. military has not yet determined how to compete below the level of armed conflict, using deterrence as its primary mode, as outlined in the current strategy. Some progress has been made diplomatically and economically.  

But deterrence is not dead or the wrong strategy. The U.S. cannot abandon Ukraine and believe China would not see it as a green light for their expansionist designs. Checking China and Russia means a U.S./NATO win in Ukraine is vital. This is followed closely by a U.S. campaign to check the Chinese fishing boat militia, end fake island expansion, create a real deterrent for Taiwan, and win the game of influence. Even with deterrent success in the Pacific, Ukraine remains the fulcrum of the U.S. deterrent strategy. If Putin achieves a victory in Ukraine, China will see that U.S. efforts to deter and resist Chinese expansionism can be overcome by sticking it out and absorbing the punishment. At that point, what could stop them? War is the only logical outcome.