By Jeremiah Monk
Introduction
The concept of the “Gray Zone” has reshaped discussions about contemporary conflict within Western military frameworks. The concept was introduced in 2015 by US Special Operations Command strategist Philip Kapusta, who defined it as "competitive interactions among and within state and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war and peace duality." Kapusta framed the Gray Zone as conflicts that do not meet the traditional expectations of warfare or peace, noting that of all the conflicts the U.S. has engaged in over the past century, only five can be classified as conventional wars, while 57 were non-traditional actions. This staggering discrepancy underscores that non-conventional, “Gray Zone” actions are not exceptions but rather the persistent norm in modern warfare.
Kapusta is correct in his theory that conventional war is itself an outlier from the norm. Likewise, the extreme state of “peace” is also rare. Kapusta’s intent was to highlight the regularity of presence in the Gray Zone in order to refocus the strategic conversation away from these two extreme bookends. But by defining the Gray Zone as an intermediate space “below the threshold of war,” Kapusta’s framing unintentionally reinforces the notion of “worst case” conventional warfare as a normative standard, instead of as the divergent condition it actually is.
As an analogy, imagine if you were to define marriage as a “relationship below the threshold of divorce.” Doing so would significantly change the nature of your relationship with your spouse, as you put efforts and resources into preparing for that eventual worst-case scenario. An obviously better approach is to minimize the chances of getting to that “most dangerous” scenario by putting effort and resources into your here-and-now relationship. Regrettably, the Western defense complex does not approach the world this way. There is much less profit in peace, after all.
This article will examine the historical formation of the Western norm of conventional war, the international perspectives that challenge this framework, and the argument that what Western militaries see as “normal” warfare is actually an outlier. This framing enables a rationale for the defense enterprise to develop and posture to meet the outlier threat, often at the expense of the much more likely operating environment of the Gray Zone. We at Strategy Central believe this persistent framing is a strategic error grounded in false logic that inhibits Western militaries in their ability to safeguard national interests in the more common operating environment. We believe Kapusta’s Gray Zone model should be embraced at the default, but doing so will require a fundamental rethinking of Western military strategy.
The Western Norm of Conventional Warfare: Origins and Assumptions
The Western concept of conventional warfare has deep roots in the historical evolution of state-based conflicts, marked by clear battle lines, codified rules, and decisive engagements. This approach stems from centuries of military practice in the West that emphasized formalized, state-led confrontations as the primary means of resolving disputes.
The Legacy of Total War in the West: Western military doctrine was profoundly shaped by conflicts such as the Napoleonic Wars, the two World Wars, and the Cold War. These events established a precedent for thinking about conflict as decisive, large-scale engagements involving state actors. Western societies became accustomed to viewing war as an intense but temporary disruption, a departure from peace that could be declared and resolved through treaties. Such wars conformed to a “total war” model, which involved extensive mobilization and industrial production, further embedding this conventional model into Western defense systems.
The Influence of Industrialization and Technology: The Industrial Revolution introduced military technologies that shifted the nature of warfare from small-scale skirmishes to vast, industrialized conflicts. The development of a defense industry centered around tanks, aircraft, artillery, and heavy weaponry institutionalized the conventional warfare paradigm. This reliance on industrial production for conventional military tools was further solidified during the Cold War, as massive budgets went into preparing for a potential large-scale confrontation with the Soviet Union.
The Binary of War and Peace: Western legal and diplomatic systems traditionally view war and peace as distinct states, with each carrying a specific set of norms. Treaties, declarations of war, and peace agreements have long allowed Western societies to categorize relationships as either hostile or non-hostile, with warfare seen as an “extraordinary” state that requires formal authorization. This binary perspective not only influenced public perception but also simplified military planning, as war and peace were seen as distinct, mutually exclusive states.
International Perspectives on Warfare: Fluidity over Formality
While the Western concept of war and peace as separate states may be deeply entrenched, it is not a universally shared perspective. Other cultures and military traditions often view conflict as a fluid continuum, where direct, conventional warfare is but one of many strategies.
Chinese Military Strategy and the Concept of “Unrestricted Warfare”: Chinese military philosophy, especially as articulated in Sun Tzu’s The Art of War, advocates for strategies that prioritize flexibility, deception, and the achievement of goals without open confrontation. Sun Tzu’s ideas suggest that war is not bound by a binary state of war and peace but is instead a continuous process of strategic positioning. This view persists in China’s modern concept of “unrestricted warfare,” which combines all elements of power—cyber, economic, psychological, and informational—to gain advantage without conventional military engagements. The Chinese model highlights an understanding of warfare that is far removed from the West’s focus on conventional confrontation.
Russian Hybrid Warfare: Russia has long practiced what is now termed “hybrid warfare,” a blend of conventional and unconventional methods aimed at achieving strategic objectives without open confrontation. Russian actions in Ukraine and other areas, such as the use of cyber operations and disinformation, fall into the Gray Zone as they avoid direct, declared warfare. For Russia, hybrid tactics are not exceptions but foundational components of military strategy, designed to exploit the ambiguity of the Gray Zone and achieve objectives without facing Western conventional forces head-on.
Irregular Warfare in Colonial and Post-Colonial Struggles: Many post-colonial nations have used irregular warfare to resist larger conventional forces, as seen in conflicts across Vietnam, Afghanistan, and parts of Africa. Guerrilla tactics and insurgencies allow smaller forces to effectively challenge conventionally superior powers. For these actors, war and peace are not distinct; rather, conflict is a constant element, fought on multiple fronts—political, social, and military. This perspective challenges the notion that war must be formalized or declared to be legitimate and impactful.
Kapusta’s Gray Zone: Reinforcing Western Norms of Conventional Warfare
Kapusta’s Gray Zone concept was developed as a response to the gap between Western military expectations and the irregular, ambiguous forms of conflict that increasingly define global power struggles. He observes that the United States has engaged in only five conventional wars over the last century, with a staggering 57 instances of non-traditional conflict. This data suggests that non-conventional actions are, in fact, the dominant form of conflict, underscoring that conventional warfare is the exception rather than the rule.
Yet, by framing the Gray Zone as a space that exists between war and peace, Kapusta’s definition is based on the notion that conventional warfare is the measurable standard. This framing implies that there exists an established norm of state-on-state, open conflict, as sets that norm as the “worst-case” that other conditions should be measured against, giving it primacy on the spectrum. Thus, while Kapusta intended to establish the Gray Zone as the actual norm, this framing inadvertently validates conventional war as a central condition that looms over the lesser Gray Zone actions, instead of as a state of disruption that occurs when governments fail at their primary stated task of deterring conflict.
Reversing the Definition: Gray Zone as the Norm, Conventional Warfare as the Outlier
Shifting our perspective to be more in line with Kapusta's core argument has profound implications for Western military strategies and force structures:
Conventional Warfare as the Outlier: If the Gray Zone represents the norm, then large-scale, state-based warfare should be seen as an exception. As Kapusta’s data suggests, conventional wars are few and far between, while non-traditional conflicts occur with far greater frequency. Wars like the two World Wars or even the Gulf War are not representative of the majority of conflicts in recent history; rather, small-scale, hybrid, and ambiguous conflicts dominate the landscape.
Gray Zone Activities as the Default State: Most conflicts today fall outside the traditional scope of warfare, manifesting in economic coercion, cyber attacks, disinformation, and other forms of influence that never escalate into open warfare. These Gray Zone tactics are not merely “in-between” states; they constitute the primary arena in which international competition unfolds. This continuous, low-level state of tension and influence mirrors the strategic philosophy of Sun Tzu, who argued for the supremacy of victory without direct battle.
Implications for Western Military Strategy: Recognizing the Gray Zone as the norm calls for a recalibration of Western military priorities. Forces structured primarily for large-scale, conventional battles may be misaligned with the true nature of modern conflict, which increasingly requires unconventional capabilities like cyber defense, information warfare, and economic resilience. By clinging to conventional frameworks, Western militaries risk under-preparing for the forms of conflict that dominate the global landscape.
Adapting to a Gray Zone Reality
This shift in perspective requires Western militaries to reframe their strategic priorities, emphasizing capabilities suited to the ambiguity and complexity of Gray Zone competition.
Prioritizing Non-Conventional Capabilities: Western militaries must invest in cyber, psychological, and information warfare capabilities to effectively compete in the Gray Zone. This shift would enable them to counter modern threats with agile, non-traditional responses.
Adopting Hybrid Warfare Doctrine: Rather than focusing solely on conventional forces, Western militaries should adopt a hybrid approach that integrates unconventional and cyber capabilities. This model would draw upon the strategic insights of Sun Tzu, viewing victory as the result of influence and positioning rather than direct combat.
Redefining Success and Victory: In the Gray Zone, success is often measured not by outright victory but by maintaining influence and preventing escalation. Western militaries must shift from a mindset focused on decisive battles to one that values influence, subtlety, and strategic positioning.
Conclusion: Embracing the Gray Zone as the New Norm
The Gray Zone highlights the limits of the conventional warfare model and challenges deeply held Western assumptions about the nature of conflict. By reframing the Gray Zone as the default state of global competition, we see that what Western militaries consider “normal” warfare is actually the exception. In this context, conventional war becomes the outlier, a rare and extraordinary state that disrupts the underlying continuum of political and economic conflict.
As Sun Tzu argued, “The supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting.” Embracing this philosophy, Western militaries can shift their focus from preparing for large-scale, conventional wars to developing capabilities that enable influence, adaptability, and resilience in the face of persistent, non-traditional threats. Recognizing the Gray Zone as the reality of modern warfare allows Western militaries to align their strategies, resources, and goals with the true nature of 21st-century conflict.
Sun Tzu might also agree that investing in flowers rather than lawyers is a more effective - and much less costly – strategy to mitigate the threat of divorce.
References
Kapusta, Philip. "The Gray Zone." Special Warfare, October-December 2015, U.S. Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, p 19-25. https://www.swcs.mil/Portals/111/October%202015%20Special%20Warfare.pdf
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