Strategy Central
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth - November 30, 2024
Introduction
The desire for self-determination has fueled political uprisings, secessionist movements, and conflicts across the globe. Various groups, often marginalized and dispossessed, have sought independence or greater autonomy through a range of means, including violent insurgencies, peaceful protest, and diplomatic negotiation. Among these are the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Basque separatists in Spain, the Kurds in Iraq and Turkey, the Palestinians, and the Hong Kong independence movement. Although their contexts differ widely, their struggles share a common thread: an enduring pursuit of self-rule against what they perceive as oppressive governance. This article examines why various groups have pursued independence, the strategies they have employed, the successes of these efforts, and the lessons that can be learned in both independence movements and counterterrorism. Additionally, insights from the relationship between governance and independence suggest what is possible and what is not achievable in ungoverned spaces.
Historical Context and Motivation for Independence
For the IRA, Basque separatists, Kurds, Palestinians, and Hong Kong activists, a sense of historical grievance, perceived oppression, cultural identity, and marginalization under centralized authorities have driven their pursuit of independence or autonomy.
The Irish Republican Army (IRA) sought to end British control in Northern Ireland and establish a united Ireland. This cause was driven by centuries of British colonial control, discrimination against the Catholic minority in Northern Ireland, and the desire to unify Ireland. The partition of Ireland in 1921 left many Irish nationalists dissatisfied, leading to a violent struggle that escalated into the Troubles of 1969-1998. The Good Friday Agreement of 1998 ultimately resulted in significant political autonomy for Northern Ireland but did not accomplish full reunification, leaving some factions of the IRA unsatisfied.
The Basque separatist movement in Spain, notably represented by ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna), aimed to create an independent Basque homeland across the regions of Spain and France. Basques, with their unique language and culture, felt marginalized by the Spanish state. Under Franco's dictatorship (1939-1975), regional identities and languages, including Basque culture, were harshly repressed, fueling a desire for secession. Despite Spain’s transition to democracy and a level of regional autonomy granted to the Basque Country, ETA continued its violent campaign until formally declaring an end to its armed activities in 2011.
The Kurdish people, an ethnic minority spread across Turkey, Iraq, Syria, and Iran, have long sought a homeland of their own—referred to as Kurdistan. The collapse of the Ottoman Empire after World War I initially presented the possibility of an independent Kurdistan, but those aspirations were quickly thwarted as the region was divided among new national borders. In Turkey, Kurdish identity was forcibly assimilated, with language and culture heavily suppressed. In Iraq, Kurdish regions faced violent repression, most notably during Saddam Hussein’s Anfal campaign in the late 1980s, which included chemical attacks. The Kurds have used different strategies across each country, ranging from armed insurgency to political integration.
The Palestinian struggle is deeply tied to the establishment of Israel in 1948, which led to the displacement of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. The Palestinian leadership has repeatedly rejected an independent state and sought a violent means of destroying Israel. While some groups have pressed for the establishment of an independent state comprising the West Bank and Gaza Strip and equal rights within Israelis, the issue remains contentious. Organizations such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), Hamas, and Hezbollah have pursued a mixture of armed resistance, negotiations, and international advocacy with limited success.
In recent years, the Hong Kong Independence movement has emerged in response to Beijing's increasing control over the semi-autonomous territory, undermining freedoms promised under the "one country, two systems" framework established at the handover from British rule in 1997. The 2019 protests against the proposed extradition bill highlighted the growing frustration of Hongkongers with the perceived erosion of their rights. Unlike the other movements, the Hong Kong struggle is characterized by non-violent mass protests and civil disobedience, yet it faces a formidable adversary in the Chinese Communist Party.
Strategies Employed by Independence Movements
The tactics of these movements vary widely, but most have utilized a blend of irregular warfare, political mobilization, and diplomatic engagement. Irregular warfare, which includes terrorism, guerrilla tactics, and insurgency, has often been deployed to force concessions, attract attention, and disrupt government control.
The IRA, through its Provisional branch, conducted bombings, assassinations, and ambushes, targeting British forces, police, and economic infrastructure in Northern Ireland and on the British mainland. The Basque ETA similarly used car bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations to terrorize the Spanish state and draw attention to their cause.
Kurdish groups employed different strategies depending on their location. In Turkey, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) engaged in guerrilla warfare against the Turkish military, while the Kurds in Iraq oscillated between armed uprisings and cooperation with foreign powers, such as the United States, which supported them against Saddam Hussein.
For the Palestinians, irregular warfare and armed resistance have been integral since the formation of militant groups like the PLO’s Fatah and Hamas. These groups engaged in guerrilla attacks, suicide bombings, and rocket fire against Israeli targets. The First Intifada (1987-1993) relied more on civil disobedience, whereas an armed insurgency characterized the Second Intifada (2000-2005).
The Hong Kong independence movement did not employ irregular warfare. Instead, it relied on mass protests, strikes, and international advocacy. Protesters employed creative tactics such as the “be water” strategy to outmaneuver police and adopted decentralized leadership to reduce vulnerability.
Successes and Failures of Irregular Warfare
The effectiveness of irregular warfare, or terrorism, to achieve political goals is a subject of much debate. Historically, these campaigns have had mixed results, often garnering international attention but falling short of achieving their ultimate political objectives.
The IRA had some success in pressuring the British government to enter negotiations, culminating in the 1998 Good Friday Agreement, which granted significant political representation for nationalists. However, this came at the cost of a decades-long conflict that claimed over 3,500 lives. The use of violence alienated many potential supporters and led to a protracted stalemate until both sides were exhausted.
The Basque ETA ended its violent campaign in 2011 without achieving independence, though it succeeded in raising awareness of the Basque cause. The Spanish government granted the Basque region a high degree of autonomy in the 1979 Statute of Autonomy, but violence ultimately hardened the Spanish state’s resolve against full independence.
The Kurds have seen varying degrees of success. In Iraq, armed struggle combined with opportunistic alliances with foreign powers eventually led to establishing the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), a semi-autonomous region. Conversely, in Turkey, the PKK's violent insurgency has largely resulted in a brutal crackdown by Turkish authorities, leaving little political progress toward Kurdish autonomy.
For the Palestinians, irregular warfare has not succeeded in securing an independent state. The use of violence, particularly by Hamas, has often invited heavy retaliation from Israel and led to a cycle of violence that has significantly harmed civilian populations, damaged infrastructure, and hardened international perception of Palestinian militancy.
The absence of violent tactics in Hong Kong has not translated to political success. Despite garnering significant international attention, the movement has been met with severe repression, including mass arrests, the imposition of the National Security Law in 2020, and the disqualification of pro-democracy candidates. The non-violent strategy has been morally commendable but has had limited success in achieving its goals of autonomy or independence.
Most and Least Successful Tactics
The most successful tactics across these movements have often been political negotiations and international advocacy rather than violence. The Good Friday Agreement is a rare example of an insurgent group (IRA) achieving a negotiated outcome addressing some of its core grievances. Similarly, the Kurdish regional autonomy in Iraq was achieved largely due to international alliances and diplomatic engagement rather than insurgency alone.
Violence against civilians has consistently been counterproductive. The IRA’s bombing campaign alienated segments of the public in Northern Ireland and the broader UK, hindering the movement’s legitimacy. The PKK’s insurgency in Turkey invited brutal state crackdowns, leaving the Kurds in Turkey with fewer rights than they had before their campaign. The Second Intifada damaged the Palestinian cause by increasing international skepticism of Palestinian statehood and justifying heavy Israeli countermeasures. While the Palestinian cause gained support after the October 7, 2023, attack, Israel’s campaign to crush Hamas and Hezbollah as functional entities has been shockingly effective and left the Palestinian cause and people in a precarious position.
The Hong Kong movement’s use of mass protest was initially successful in pressuring the government to withdraw the extradition bill. Still, the subsequent national crackdown demonstrated the limits of non-violent protest against an authoritarian state with a high tolerance for repression.
Effectiveness of Political Movements
Political efforts have been crucial in gaining legitimacy and limited autonomy for these groups. In Northern Ireland, political mobilization through Sinn Féin complemented the IRA’s armed struggle, eventually leading to a peace process that resulted in greater nationalist representation and power-sharing. For the Basques, political parties advocating independence within the Spanish democratic framework have won a significant amount of regional power.
The KRG in Iraq succeeded in achieving semi-autonomy largely through political maneuvering and alliances with the U.S., especially during the Gulf War, the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and subsequent support to counter ISIS. The Palestinian Authority was a product of negotiations during the Oslo Accords, offering a limited form of self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza. However, the ultimate aim of statehood remains elusive. In Hong Kong, political mobilization has faced the challenge of a rapidly shrinking space for dissent. Many of its leaders have been arrested or forced into exile, and Beijing’s political intervention has neutered the once-vibrant democratic process.
Lessons for Counterterrorism
The common lesson across these movements is that irregular warfare alone is insufficient to achieve political independence and often invites severe repression. Counter-terrorism strategies must recognize the underlying grievances driving these movements. Heavy-handed tactics can often exacerbate tensions and increase popular support for insurgents. Conversely, successful counter-insurgency efforts have often involved addressing legitimate grievances through political compromise and reform.
States facing separatist movements that employ terrorism must strike a careful balance between maintaining security and addressing the underlying causes of the unrest. Counter-terrorism operations should aim to minimize harm to civilians and avoid alienating the broader population, as heavy-handed responses often play into the insurgents' narrative and increase support for their cause. Successful strategies often involve a dual approach of security measures to curb violence and political engagement to address legitimate grievances.
Engaging in dialogue with moderate factions, offering pathways for peaceful political participation, and providing incentives for disarmament can help to isolate hardline elements and reduce violence. The success of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the partial autonomy granted to the Basques in Spain underscore the importance of political solutions in resolving conflicts rooted in identity and self-determination. At the same time, states must remain vigilant against acts of terrorism and ensure that security operations are conducted to respect human rights and build public trust.
The future of these independence movements appears to rest on their ability to adapt to changing conditions, embrace political engagement, and maintain international support. Without addressing core grievances, independence movements are unlikely to fade away, and repressive measures will only temporarily contain them.
Separation and Governance Challenges
The examples of autonomy discussed in this analysis all share a common theme: they are movements opposed to a strong central government. Since 2001, the U.S. has focused its efforts on combating terrorism in areas governed by weak or no states. This situation requires a different approach, as there is often no established authority to resist acts of terrorism or counteract propaganda. The Western strategy has been to develop a force capable of containing or defeating terrorists while simultaneously building governance capabilities in ungoverned spaces. Unfortunately, this approach has largely failed.
The concept of "ungoverned space" led to the development of the "no safe havens" theory that coexists with Counter Insurgency (COIN) doctrine. COIN doctrine and the “no safe havens” theory serve as the foundation for creating forces and governance structures that deny terrorist areas free from government control. This approach has been implemented in Iraq, Afghanistan, and various areas across the Middle East and Africa. Even when there is a weak local government to build from, creating a “shake and bake” security force and accompanying governance capability is almost impossible. The notable failures of this theory raise important questions about what we can learn from regions where effective governance has successfully addressed autonomy movements.
As we learned from the examples in this analysis, political redress is the most effective method of resolving autonomous groups' desire for independence. If a given group establishes a presence in and control over a given area and operates with impunity, the “safe haven” approach seems logical. This is even more complicated as there may be no grievance to resolve. However, addressing “safe havens” cannot be done on a global scale or even limited to the Middle East and North Africa. Governance is a solution, but building a government from scratch is not a workable solution unless the local populous wants it and will strive to build it. This is a rarity. The alternative U.S. strategy has been attrition, but this approach cannot adequately resolve underlying grievances or prevent a group from operating in an ungoverned space.
Attrition is likely to perpetuate grievances, and with little chance for a negotiated settlement—especially in regions dominated by powerful terrorist groups—we are left without good answers. If the terrorist group is driven by an ideology, religion, or simple lust for power and control, the “grievance” is likely not something to be solved. Perhaps this reflects the human condition, suggesting that no effective solutions exist in areas devoid of governing authority other than applying the “mow the grass” theory of attrition. If we must accept that no other workable options are available, then we may have to resign ourselves to loss, pain, and suffering as the cost of maintaining the current Global Liberal Internationalist System established and upheld by the United States after World War II. This conclusion is highly unsatisfactory. Nonetheless, the United States, particularly its special operations forces, has embraced the “no safe havens” theory and the attrition it demands as a fundamental principle. With no alternatives, this approach is simply accepted and not questioned.
This is a wicked lessons-learned problem. USSOCOM should be working hard to address this issue as the U.S. military lead for countering terror. But it is not. Perhaps it is an unnoticed problem just waiting for a general officer to discover it and demand a solution. Until then, “mowing the grass” will be the modus operandi of special operational forces. Despite over twenty years of effort at both, no lessons or improved theories regarding governed and ungoverned spaces are being developed. History will likely repeat itself in future CT operations in ungoverned spaces while USSOCOM shrugs at this "hidden" problem.
Bibliography
- Coogan, Tim Pat. The IRA: A History. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002.
- Conversi, Daniele. The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation. Reno: University of Nevada Press, 1997.
- Gunter, Michael M. The Kurds: A Modern History. Princeton: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2016.
- Hinnebusch, Raymond. The Kurds of Syria: Political Parties and Identity in the Middle East. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Milton-Edwards, Beverley, and Peter Hinchcliffe. Conflicts in the Middle East Since 1945. New York: Routledge, 2008.
- Ruan, Qingzhi. Hong Kong and China: A Fragile Relationship. London: Routledge, 2021.
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