By Jeremiah Monk
INTRODUCTION
Section 1254 of the proposed Fiscal Year 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directs the Secretary of Defense (OSD) to develop and submit to Congress a transregional strategy to counteract malign activities by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China.[i] This strategy, due within 180 days of enactment, focuses on addressing the PLA’s efforts to expand overseas military bases, spread misinformation and disinformation, infringe on the sovereignty of U.S. allies and partners, and proliferate Chinese-made military equipment. The Bill requires the designation of lead components within each Geographic Combatant Command (GCC), excluding the United States Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), with the aim to coordinate efforts across multiple regions.
SECTION 1254: GETTING OFF ON THE WRONG FOOT
As currently proposed, Section 1254 (“the Bill”) is packed full of critical shortcomings that will undermine the value of this strategy from inception. The Bill starts with a predisposition to geographic segmentation, completely omitting participation by the Global Combatant Commands. By directing planning to the Defense Department (DoD) without mention of the non-military aspects of the PLA’s malign activities, it orients the strategy to the military instrument of power. These two failings of orientation beget a third, where the strategy will inevitably be created by warfighting commands primarily as a justification for force posture and allocation. Most significantly, the draft Section 1254 misses an opportunity to specifically direct OSD to leverage the global expertise, posture, and planning experience offered by the one military command ideally suited to this task. Each of these points warrants a detailed examination to fully understand the potential implications and to argue for a more comprehensive approach to develop a strategy to counter the PLA.
Of primary concern is the Bill’s focus on GCCs to coordinate efforts against the PLA’s activities. This segmentation by geographic region is inherently flawed, as it risks creating fragmented, unsynchronized, and inconsistent responses. The PLA’s actions are not confined to any single region; they span across the globe, affecting multiple continents and domains. Geographic segmentation can lead to a lack of cohesion and continuity in strategy, leading to uncoordinated effects, an absence of command unity, and a less effective approach to transregional issues. For example, the PLA’s influence extends beyond the Indo-Pacific to regions like Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East, where they engage in activities such as establishing military bases, spreading military technology, and investing in critical infrastructure projects under initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative. A strategy that is developed by commands with regionally limited areas of interest runs the risk of being segmented, and may potentially miss larger systemic context, obscure asymmetric opportunities, and may fail to present an integrated response to the PLA’s global efforts.
Section 1254 also makes the significant oversight of excluding the five Global Combatant Commands, namely USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, USSOCOM, USSTRATCOM, and USTRANSCOM. Each of these commands holds unique equities, capabilities, and transregional and domain-specific perspectives to addressing the PLA’s malign activities, and their inclusion is crucial for a comprehensive and coordinated strategy. USCYBERCOM, for instance, plays a vital role in cybersecurity, essential for countering the PLA’s disinformation campaigns and cyber intrusions. Similarly, USSTRATCOM oversees strategic deterrence, including nuclear and missile defense, which is critical in countering the PLA’s military advancements. By omitting these commands from the planning process, the proposed strategy potentially underutilizes key military resources and expertise and opens critical gaps in the United States’ defense posture. A truly global threat like the PLA requires a unified and all-encompassing approach, leveraging all available assets and expertise across commands. This imperative is specifically recognized by the 2022 National Defense Strategy, which directs the DoD operate in a cross-domain manner.[ii]
The Bill directs OSD to develop the strategy, but OSD does not have the capability or capacity to do so. Nor does the Joint Staff. Therefore, without specific direction, OSD will inevitably delegate this task to the geographic combatant command in which China resides: USINDOPACOM. However, this default delegation would be short-sighted, and would invariably create several additional problems. As USINDOPACOM is tasked with overseeing security in the Indo-Pacific, its constrained regional focus may limit its ability to develop a strategy that adequately addresses the PLA’s larger global activities. The PLA’s reach and operations are expansive, and confining the strategy to the Indo-Pacific could result in a narrow approach that neglects other areas of strategic importance. For instance, the PLA’s activities in Africa, where they have established a military base in Djibouti, or their growing influence in the Arctic, are not fully within the purview of USINDOPACOM. This narrow focus risks leaving other regions vulnerable and inadequately defended, as the PLA continues to expand its global footprint.
Another issue is the potential for an imbalanced allocation of resources as Commands seek to prioritize their regional activities. This predisposition could result in resource requests that are more geared to address regional issues instead of to generate larger, transregional effects. Furthermore, as a warfighting command, USINDOPACOM must also prepare for the potential of armed conflict against China, a task for which there will never be a sufficient amount of available force. As the DoD’s force supply is limited, USINDOPACOM must compete with other commands for allocation. This competition creates a strong motivation for USINDOPACOM to develop this strategy in such a fashion as to justify additional force deployment within USINDOPACOM, particularly those of low density and high demand. Following this path will inevitably divert resources toward regional warfighting preparation in the Pacific, and away from opportunities in other regions to counter the PLA’s malign activities. A more coordinated and intentional approach to resource distribution is necessary to ensure regions have the capabilities necessary to most effectively address the PLA’s wide-ranging threat in the areas where they are conducting malign activities.
Furthermore, should the DoD delegate this task to the USINDOPACOM warfighting command, the resulting strategy could potentially neglect the broader non-military spectrum of challenges posed by the PLA. USINDOPACOM’s primary mission and expertise lie in regional military operations and defense, which could lead to an emphasis on conventional and strategic military responses. However, the PLA’s influence extends beyond military might; it includes significant economic, diplomatic, and informational tactics that China uses to project power and influence globally. This includes leveraging economic investments through initiatives like the Belt and Road Initiative, exerting diplomatic pressure on other nations, and conducting information operations to sway public opinion and obscure China’s true intentions. By focusing primarily on the military dimension, the strategy may overlook these critical non-military aspects, failing to address the comprehensive and multifaceted nature of the threat, and could even effectively undermine diplomatic or economic efforts in other regions. An effective strategy must integrate all elements of national power—military, economic, diplomatic, and informational—to fully counter China’s global ambitions and actions.
THE BETTER OPTION: US SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Fortunately, there is still time for Congress to change the text of Section 1254 to give the strategy a much better chance for success. The addition of one sentence is all that is required:
(d) the Secretary shall task US Special Operations Command with the responsibility to lead and coordinate the development of this strategy.
Why USSOCOM? There are several reasons:
USSOCOM is a Global Combatant Command, with an existing transregional presence, transregional command structure, and global visibility.[iii]
USSOCOM has decades of experience developing, coordinating, and synchronizing transregional strategies, operations, and effects oriented against malign activities.
USSOCOM has well-established relationships and expertise coordinating with other U.S. government agencies, allies, partner nations, Global Combatant Commands, and all Geographic commands, and can bring together a network to address the full scope of PLA military and non-military malign activities.
By law, USSOCOM is the DoD lead for unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense, civil affairs, and military information support operations - the tools available to the military best suited to address malign activities.[iv]
Most of the PLA’s malign activity falls within the “Grey Zone,” where irregular tactics and hybrid warfare strategies intentionally remain below the threshold of open conflict. This realm is best suited for US Special Operations, as warfighting commands like USINDOPACOM focus on the realm of open conflict.
USSOCOM’s ability to operate across multiple regions and domains would ensure a more agile and adaptable strategy that is more responsive to the PLA’s diverse and evolving tactics.
USSOCOM established its China-focused campaign planning team for precisely this purpose nearly a decade ago.
The global reach and experience offered by US Special Operations Command make it a much more compelling choice to lead this effort than any regionally-focused warfighting command. USSOCOM currently has seven Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOCs), an existing planning, command, and control network nested under each Geographic Combatant Command, which could easily be designated as the lead coordination entity for each respective GCC. USSOCOM could then serve as the overarching coordinating authority to synchronize the DoD’s transregional counter-PLA effort, then carried out by the TSOCs. For over twenty years, this approach and structure have proven highly effective in the conduct of the Counter Terrorism fight.
Ultimately, the correct approach to counter the PLA’s malign influence should be transregional, asymmetric, and must stay below the threshold of conflict. It should not be segmented by regions or polluted by warfighting preparation. USSOCOM is the obvious answer to lead the effort, as it is the only command that can offer the existing transregional infrastructure, visibility, authority, experience, and relationships necessary to lead the development of a comprehensive strategy to counter the PLA’s transregional malign activities.
CONCLUSION
As written, Section 1254 of the proposed Fiscal Year 2025 NDAA has significant shortcomings in the Bill’s current form. The reliance on geographic segmentations, the exclusion of essential Global Combatant Commands, the limitations of a regionally focused approach, concerns about resource allocation, and the underutilization of USSOCOM are all critical issues that need to be addressed. However, the Bill has yet to take final form, and there is still time to make a necessary course correction. For an effective counter-strategy against the PLA’s global activities, the United States must adopt a holistic and integrated approach that leverages the strengths of all relevant commands and ensures a balanced allocation of resources.
This comprehensive strategy will be crucial to safeguarding U.S. national security interests in an increasingly complex global landscape dominated by a more assertive and globally active China. Congress and OSD should be wary of taking the easy path of defaulting responsibility for development to USINDOPACOM solely because the Chinese state happens to be within its geographical responsibility. A smarter move for Congress would be to focus the Section 1254 strategy on countering malign actions instead of the actor, then delegate responsibility to the command best suited for the task: USSOCOM.
NOTES
[i]118th US Congress, “S.4638 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2025.” Introduced July 8, 2024. https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-bill/4638/text?s=2&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22National+Defense+Authorization+Act+for+Fiscal+Year+2025%22%7D
[ii] US Department of Defense, “National Defense Strategy of the United States.” Washington, DC, 2022. https://media.defense.gov/2022/Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.PDF
[iii] Jeremiah Monk, “Function… then Form: Rethinking the Operational Command Structure of US SOF.” Strategy Central, Jun 29, 2024. https://www.strategycentral.io/post/function-then-form-rethinking-the-operational-command-structure-of-us-sof
[iv] US Code, Title 10 – Armed Forces, section 167. https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title10/pdf/USCODE-2011-title10-subtitleA-partI-chap6-sec167.pdf
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