Congress and the Future of Special Operations

Congressional Call for Center of Special Operations Analysis

By Practitioners, For Practitioners

By Monte Erfourth – September 7, 2024

“A command that resources operations and is assigned to build joint SOF capable of fighting the next war (not the last one) cannot argue for resources without a strategy. Win, Transform, People is not a strategy and cannot be assessed or analyzed.” 

-Former J52 Chief of Plans (2019)

Introduction

The 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section 903, mandates significant reforms to institutionalize the responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (SOLIC). These Congressionally directed reforms include a systematic review and update of Department of Defense (DoD) policies to strengthen the Assistant Secretary’s authority over special operations, the development of a long-term staffing plan, and clarifying administrative roles between the Assistant Secretary and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. The NDAA also requires the establishment of a Center for Special Operations Analysis, which will serve as a critical hub for specialized analysis to support senior leaders in making informed decisions about the organization, training, and employment of special operations forces. The creation of this center is a long-overdue requirement that addresses the growing need for dedicated analytical support within the Department of Defense for special operations.  But it will significantly impact USSOCOM (Special Operations Command).

By enacting Section 903, Congress is clearly directing SOLIC to organize its affairs more effectively. SOLIC needs holistic reform to sufficiently perform the tedious but critical functions of a service-like civilian oversight entity. The legislation is also a direct shot across the bow to USSOCOM, challenging it to empirically justify its resourcing requirements and demonstrate its strategic value by achieving or showing progress towards DoD objectives.

SOLIC will rely on USSOCOM to provide data and analysis to meet the Congressional demand set forward by Section 903. Still, neither is well prepared to respond in 90 days (clocks up this month) with a strategy for the CSOA.  If the past is prologue, this will be just another requirement to either ignore or, more likely, cobble together something far short of what Congress has in mind. However, providing solid data to Congress for people, money, training, and operations should be taken seriously.

Section 903 presents the SOF Enterprise with an enormous opportunity to make a much-needed transformational and bureaucratic shift. This article will explore the opportunity for SOLIC and USSOCOM to build an assessment and analysis program, paired with a USSOCOM operational and service-focused strategy, to determine special operations budgeting and programming, legislative affairs, operations, and manpower requirements. The ability to empirically back SOF budget and manpower requirements can translate into operational capabilities and a well-positioned seat at the Joint Force table.

The Situation

Before delving into what the HASC is asking for, it may be helpful to frame some of the issues SOLIC and USSOCOM must overcome to address what a Center for Special Operations Analysis could be and do for them both.  The thing to see past is that this is Congress telling the special operations community how to win at the interservice game of resourcing.  Remember this quick peak behind the curtain during the section explaining the Congressional requirement.

In an era of limited resources, SOLIC and USSOCOM must assess the effectiveness of SOF in a standardized and consistent manner. However, assessments have not been consistently implemented across the SOF enterprise. This is particularly true of how TSOCs employ resources to achieve strategic or operational effects. Accurate assessments are crucial for determining whether SOF operations are advancing toward specific objectives, but they have not been asked for systematically by USSOCOM. The essential part is having data on progress towards Intermediate Objectives (IMO). With this data, a command can drive a planning process and resource allocation.  Why IMO’s?  They are the intermediary steps toward higher command objectives.  If progress is being made or not due to a lack of resources, this data can and should be used to justify resources.

SOLIC relies on USSOCOM to provide information that it can present to Congress. This is problematic because USSOCOM relies on narrative reporting rather than assessments and analysis. Directorates, including the J3, collect various types of information from across the enterprise. Still, none of this information can capture operational performance or effectiveness because there are no USSOCOM objectives to measure activities against. Operational and service performance are mostly captured quarterly at the Commanders Round Table (CDRT).  The USSOCOM Commander receives oral updates from the operational and component Commanders, which rarely include results supported by verification.  A results-oriented culture is not evident, in large part because the command has no strategy and, therefore, no strategic objectives to strive for.

Section 903 presents an opportunity for SOLIC, USSOCOM, and the operational and component SOF commands to align strategy and analysis for better resource acquisition and application. USSOCOM and SOLIC can develop strategic objectives and demonstrate joint SOF effectiveness and performance towards them.  The information will help develop products for Congress, backing up SOLIC budget and manpower requests with validated data. Reports on global SOF activities alone are insufficient to justify funding. USSOCOM must demonstrate the effectiveness of SOF operations with quantifiable results to secure resources and maintain relevance in inter-service and strategic competition.

What Congress Wants

What does Congress want?  Sometimes, that is unclear or even deceptively, and hazardously, political.  But this time, Congress is throwing special operations a lifeline. SOLIC and USSOCOM have to compete for dollars now and in the future in a way they did not in the past.  Congress is telling SOLIC and USSOCOM that the old-fashioned narrative “we took actions, but the results are uncertain” will not fly in a world where results matter.  In a resource-constrained environment, as Congress is likely to face going forward, results get paid.  How are results determined?  With facts, figures, and some arithmetic.

The critical thing for SOLIC and USSOCOM to figure out is what to measure and how. Empirical information collected and analyzed should support decision-making about the organization, training, equipping, and employment of special operations forces. Behind these time-honored military requirements is the veiled point that, to date, Congress has not had enough or the correct information to make compelling arguments for SOF when faced with competing demands from the other services. Meeting Congressional demands means fulfilling the letter and spirit of Section 903, 2025 NDAA law.  

In short, Congress will need to understand four things:

1. What did the Joint SOF enterprise (as a whole, not by service) accomplish to support NDS objectives for a given period?

2. Were the forces adequately trained, equipped, and funded to achieve objectives?

3. What NDS objectives will Joint SOF achieve over the next five years?

4. What could SOF do with more or less funding and personnel?

The first two are questions about the past, and the last two are about the future. There are many other questions, but these four are fundamental.  From a Congressional viewpoint, they need to know, “What did SOF achieve, what will SOF achieve, and what can SOF do with more or less money and/or more or fewer people?” 

The Center for Special Operations Analysis – Mission & Org

The Senate approved the 2025 NDAA on June 13, 2024.  Section 903 demands that:

“Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary shall submit to the congressional defense committees a plan, including appropriate milestones and timelines for completion, for achieving the requirements… establish a Center for Special Operations Analysis to lead special operations-related analysis for the Department and ensure senior civilian and military leaders have adequate analytical support for decision making related to the organization, training, equipping, and employment of special operations forces.”

The Center for Special Operations Analysis (CSOA) is envisioned as a crucial entity dedicated to advancing special operations' strategic understanding and effectiveness. Its mission should be to conduct comprehensive research and analysis to enhance the strategic capabilities of special operations forces. This includes ensuring alignment with national security objectives and guiding decision-making in training, equipping, and employing SOF to achieve strategic objectives.

Mission:

• Primary. Provide specific operational and environmental assessments and analysis of global joint SOF activities, manpower allocation, and budgetary requirements.

• Secondary. To provide in-depth strategic analysis and insights that inform decision-making processes for special operations.

• Tertiary. Support innovation in strategic planning and execution within special operations by having assessment and analysis personnel participate in planning to build measures directly into SOF strategy.

Organization:

• The CSOA should be organized using a “think tank” model like RAND. 

• The CSOA should include interdisciplinary teams comprising strategists, assessment experts, data analysts, academic researchers, subject matter experts, and divisions focused on strategic research, budgeting, personnel development, equipment, and educational outreach.

• SOLIC should be the SCOA administrative manager, with a center director endowed with enough autonomy to analyze special operations without undue influence.

Intent:

• To serve as the primary assessment and analysis capability of applied joint special operations forces, the effects they create, and the requirements to man, train, and equip them. 

• To cultivate a repository of strategic knowledge supporting joint special operations’ continuous evolution.

USSOCOM and SOLIC:

• Regular information exchanges and joint initiatives should be established to ensure that the CSOA's outputs directly address the strategic needs of USSOCOM and SOLIC.

• Create a layered approach to building assessments at SOLIC and USSOCOM that collects and analyzes required data from the operational elements and components.

This framework would ensure that the CSOA effectively contributes to the strategic advancement of special operations forces while providing Congress with essential information for budgeting, manpower, and strategic considerations.

Analysis Requires a Strategy To Measure Activities Against

To meet Congress's demands and enhance the understanding of SOF capabilities, SOLIC and USSOCOM must collaborate to create a new analytical capability that aligns with legislative requirements. For the CSOA to be a valuable tool for SOLIC and USSOCOM, USSOCOM must develop a global joint SOF strategy built to be measured for performance and effectiveness in achieving strategic objectives, which is crucial for effective resource allocation.  USSOCOM must also develop a “service-like” strategy that outlines the path to building joint SOF relevant to future warfare.

In short, SOLIC and USSOCOM need to develop measurable strategies and work with Congress to clarify relevant data for oversight. These two organizations must be responsible for building operational and service-oriented strategies and creating analytical capabilities to guide the enterprise and track progress.

Moving forward, assessment and analysis must be conducted along two critical tracks:

1. Title 10, Section 164, which designates USSOCOM as a Functional Combatant Command, and,

2. Title 10, Section 167 outlines USSOCOM's organizational responsibilities, including SOF integration, budgeting, programming, force development, doctrine development, education, training, and unique acquisition authority. 

Operational requirements under Section 164 will drive near-term manpower, training, equipment, and force employment found under Section 167.  However, near-term requirements are only one problem to solve. Using a strategy and a future operating concept, long-term requirements must also be identified under Section 167.  For Sections 164 and 167, establish the end state, then work backward to create the steps (IMOs) necessary to get there. 

The operational and component assessment teams should collect data on IMO progress to define effectiveness and performance at that command level and then pass that information to USSOCOM.  This implies that much of what must be done must be completed at USSOCOM, and therefore a Tampa branch of the CSOA may need to collect and analyze data before sending it to SOLIC.

Three USSOCOM Commanders have tried and failed using the “People, Win, Transform” formula (moving the words around does not improve it) instead of traditional strategies to guide the command. This construct cannot substitute for traditional military requirements like mission, objectives, execution, and coordinating instructions.  The USSOCOM mission is unclear, and objectives that reach five years into the future are fuzzy at best and non-existent at worst.  A command that resources operations and is assigned to build joint SOF capable of fighting the next war (not the last one) cannot operate this way………and Congress knows it. So do the services. By combining the effort to build the CSOA with operational and “service-like” strategies, USSOCOM can win the competition for resources and develop and employ the right force for the world of strategic competition.  The bottom line assumption here is that special operations forces are performing; there is just no scientific way to present that fact.

 

Conclusion - Competition is the New Black

While counterterrorism (CT) efforts are ongoing, they are no longer the top national priority. China and Russia are now the pacing and acute threats and drive DoD resourcing decisions. The services and Joint Staff have focused on conventional forces as the primary deterrent for conflict and agent for competition with China and Russia. The services see little to no role for SOF in daily competition, much less conflict. This line of thinking is fundamentally flawed. SOF has much to offer in the “gray zone” of competition and preparation for conflict. The perception that SOF should focus only on counterterrorism and leave strategic competition to conventional forces will leave considerable capability gaps against our nation’s primary rivals.

Another recognized problem confronts SOLIC and USSOCOM in the competition for DoD resourcing.  The armed services were less than thrilled to take a back seat to SOF for resourcing during the global war on terror (GWOT). The services were understandably eager to return as DoD’s primary focus of attention and funding at the end of GWOT. Plus, the allure of getting back to winning in battle was a tonic after years of propping up governments and training foreign forces destined to lose the struggle against terrorists.  The fact that approaches like COIN and CT have consistently produced negative strategic outcomes further entrenches the narrative that SOF cannot be effective in competition because SOF’s ways and means are a proven failure.

Despite contributing to the demise of Bin Laden and the weakening of Al Qaeda, special operations did little to alter the fact that Iran now controls Iraq and the Taliban dominates Afghanistan. This less-than-optimal strategic outcome resulted more from consecutive Presidents’ lack of achievable objectives than the failures of particular approaches. Nonetheless, SOF must demonstrate that it can assume a respected role in strategic competition by supporting conventional forces, aiding allies and partners, collaborating with various government agencies, and conducting effective operations in the “gray zone” against rival powers.

Facilitating an understanding of what SOF can do in competition requires proven, reliable, and repeatable results.  The effects of activities must be observed, reported, and analyzed as close to the action as possible.  Capturing results can only be done with a USSOCOM-driven program of assessments applied to the entire enterprise, which captures the performance and effectiveness of SOF relative to strategic objectives. If strategic objectives are required, USSOCOM must produce an achievable and measurable strategy supporting higher headquarters’ objectives. Combining with SOLIC to build a Center for Special Operations Analysis is a golden opportunity to establish assessments across the enterprise while simultaneously completing a service-like and joint SOF global operations strategy.  Failing to do so may set SOF on a course to irrelevance beyond limited, discrete operations and ever-shrinking manpower and budgets. 

Developing SOF strategies, assessment, and analysis capabilities is critical for an enterprise-wide evolution into a more effective force in great power competition. While establishing a CSOA is necessary, it will only be effective with a reliable data collection system across all commands and components. There is likely to be resistance to exposing the successes and failures of a command to empirical analysis. This kind of transparency could challenge a Commanding Officer's leadership. However, strong leadership from SOLIC and the USSOCOM Commander is crucial in setting a positive example, demonstrating that honest data will be rewarded rather than punished.

Ultimately, USSOCOM must endure discomfort to grow into a headquarters that can compete effectively in the internecine resourcing battles and operate more like a conventional service in its relationship with Congress. A piecemeal approach will not suffice; a coordinated, organized effort with a long-term vision is required to ensure the SOF's relevance and efficacy. USSOCOM must forge a new relationship with SOLIC and with Congress. The path forward may be uncomfortable, but it is an essential step into the future for SOF. It demands a steadfast commitment to analysis, attaining objectives, transparency, accountability.