Lessons in Great Power Competition From July to August 1914
STRATEGY CENTRAL
For And By Practitioners
By Monte Erfourth - December 15, 2024
Introduction
In the final days of July 1914, Europe teetered on the edge of an abyss. The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary on June 28 ignited a crisis that grew from a regional dispute into a global catastrophe. Despite frantic diplomatic efforts to avert war, the Great Powers of France, England, Germany, and Russia ultimately found themselves hurtling toward conflict. Their collective failure offers a sobering lesson in how competing national interests, inflexible alliances, and miscalculations can lead to disaster.
While the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand is often cited as the trigger for the war, significant events in the lead-up to the fighting are crucial for understanding today's great power competition. The widely acclaimed, The Guns of August, will be a key source and highlighted in particular passages throughout the article. This article examines how nations, despite arming for war, sought to avoid conflict before World War I began. July of 1914 screams a cautionary tale to modernity, and we should listen.
Great Power Competition Defined
In 2023, the Joint Staff released the Joint Concept for Competing, which defined the term and developed a concept for success. For political purposes, the Joint Staff has been forced to change the traditional term “great power competition” to strategic competition, but they are the same.
The Joint Staff definition: Strategic competition is a persistent and long-term struggle that occurs between two or more adversaries seeking to pursue incompatible interests without necessarily engaging in armed conflict with each other. The normal and peaceful competition among allies, strategic partners, and other international actors who are not potentially hostile is outside the scope of this concept.
The concept of "great powers" emerged in the post-Napoleonic era to describe the most influential European states capable of shaping the international order. The term was first formalized at the Treaty of Chaumont in 1814 and later institutionalized through the Congress of Vienna (1814–1815). These powers, collectively known as the "Concert of Europe," wielded disproportionate political, military, and economic influence and claimed a special right to enforce the postwar treaties. This formal distinction between "great powers" and "small powers" laid the foundation for modern international relations. Over time, this designation expanded beyond Europe to encompass global powers, a shift underscored by organizations like the United Nations Security Council, whose permanent members represent contemporary great powers: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Historically, great powers have been recognized by participating in key international organizations and alliances, such as the NATO Quint, the G7, the BRICS, and the Contact Group. These "great power concerts" serve as platforms for managing international conflicts and shaping the global balance of power. The concept evolved as the international order shifted through events like World War I and World War II, significantly altering the states' hierarchy. Alternative terms such as "world power" or "major power" often appear in literature, underscoring the adaptability of the term as global dynamics evolve. The origins and development of the great power concept provide a critical context for understanding the competitive dynamics that shaped the lead-up to World War I, where rivalry among such states culminated in the catastrophic events of July 1914.
France – July 1914: Walking a Diplomatic Tightrope
France, still nursing wounds from its defeat in the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-71, was committed to the strategic objective of containing German power. French leaders were wary of Germany’s increasing militarization and territorial ambitions, particularly in Alsace-Lorraine. The memory of the German annexation of this territory remained a national wound, fueling French fears of further aggression.
While France did not seek war, it was bound by its alliance with Russia, formalized in the Franco-Russian Alliance of 1892, which stipulated mutual support in the event of German or Austro-Hungarian aggression. French diplomats, led by President Raymond Poincaré, pursued dual goals: reassuring Russia of French solidarity while attempting to prevent Germany from escalating the crisis. However, France’s leaders faced a precarious balancing act, knowing that abandoning Russia could result in isolation and weaken France’s strategic position against Germany.
Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August highlights General Joseph Joffre’s central role in France’s military planning, particularly the reliance on Plan XVII. This strategy prioritized offensive operations, relying on “élan vital”—the belief in French forces' moral and physical superiority. However, this optimism ignored the realities of German defensive capabilities and the transformative impact of modern warfare. Tuchman critiques France’s failure to adapt its strategies to the changing nature of military technology, a miscalculation that would prove costly.
The failure to moderate Russia’s aggressive stance toward Austria-Hungary without appearing to weaken the alliance left France in a dire position. Ultimately, French leaders believed that the alliance's survival was essential to counterbalancing German power, even at the cost of war. The imperative to secure national survival and avoid strategic encirclement left France little choice but to support its ally.
England - July 1914: Reluctant Arbiter
The United Kingdom entered the crisis deeply reluctant to engage in continental conflicts. British foreign policy traditionally prioritized maintaining the balance of power in Europe and protecting vital trade routes and colonial interests. However, by 1914, Britain also had informal commitments to France through military and naval agreements, which created a moral obligation to support its Entente partner.
Sir Edward Grey, the British Foreign Secretary, worked tirelessly to mediate between the Great Powers, proposing conferences and promoting peace talks to prevent escalation. His vision of diplomacy emphasized cooperation and dialogue, but he faced significant challenges. Britain’s lack of a formal alliance with France and Russia allowed Germany to miscalculate its position, assuming Britain might remain neutral.
Tuchman’s account underscores Grey’s isolation as a key weakness in British diplomacy. Despite his efforts, the ambiguity of Britain’s commitments led to misinterpretations by Germany, particularly regarding Belgian neutrality. When Germany invaded Belgium on August 4, Britain’s hand was forced. Belgium’s neutrality, guaranteed by international treaty, was a cornerstone of British strategic interests. For Britain, the decision to fight was driven less by allegiance to France and more by the imperative to uphold international law and protect its position as a global power. England’s failure to clarify its stance earlier arguably emboldened German aggression, but once the violation of Belgian neutrality occurred, Britain’s entry into the war became inevitable.
Germany - July 1914: Ambitions and Miscalculations
Under Kaiser Wilhelm II, Germany sought to assert its dominance in Europe and believed that a localized war in the Balkans could be controlled. The German leadership, particularly Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann-Hollweg, viewed the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia as an opportunity to weaken Russia and test the resolve of the Entente powers. This strategy relied on the assumption that Russia would not fully mobilize and that Britain might remain neutral.
The infamous “blank check” assurance to Austria-Hungary—a promise of unconditional support—emboldened Vienna to act aggressively against Serbia. Germany’s strategic planning, centered on the Schlieffen Plan, envisioned a rapid victory against France through Belgium before turning east to confront Russia. This plan required speed and decisiveness, but it underestimated the opposing powers' logistical challenges and resilience.
Tuchman’s analysis critiques Germany’s overconfidence and lack of strategic flexibility. The Schlieffen Plan’s rigid timelines and dependence on precise execution left little room for adjustment. Germany’s decision to violate Belgian neutrality also alienated Britain and solidified the Entente’s resolve. Germany ensured its encirclement and long-term strategic failure by pursuing a strategy that ignored the broader diplomatic consequences.
Russia - July 1914: Protector or Provocateur?
For Russia, the July crisis was both a test of its credibility as a Great Power and a challenge to its strategic interests in the Balkans. Russia viewed itself as the protector of Slavic nations, particularly Serbia, and feared Austro-Hungarian expansion in the region. Russian leaders, including Tsar Nicholas II and Foreign Minister Sergey Sazonov, faced immense domestic and international pressure to support Serbia.
The decision to mobilize was fraught with difficulty. Partial mobilization was intended as a show of force to deter Austria-Hungary, but it lacked the operational clarity needed to reassure Germany. The subsequent order for full mobilization on July 30—a response to Austria-Hungary’s actions and Germany’s military posturing—escalated the crisis. Germany interpreted Russian mobilization as a direct threat, triggering its military response.
Tuchman highlights the indecisiveness of Tsar Nicholas II and the contradictions in Russia’s mobilization strategy. While intended as a deterrent, mobilization instead heightened tensions, leaving Russia unable to control the narrative or reassure Germany of its intentions. Russia’s strategic calculus was driven by the need to maintain influence in the Balkans and counteract Austro-Hungarian and German ambitions. However, its inability to balance support for Serbia with effective communication to Germany sealed the path to war. Russia’s mobilization was seen as both a defensive measure and a provocation, demonstrating the complexity of its position.
Why Diplomacy Failed
Despite shared interests in avoiding war, the diplomatic efforts of July and early August 1914 failed for several reasons. First, the rigid alliance systems—the Triple Entente of France, Russia, Britain, and the Triple Alliance of Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy—turned localized disputes into global conflicts. These alliances, intended as deterrents, instead acted as tripwires, binding nations to the actions of their partners regardless of their interests.
Second, miscommunication and mistrust plagued negotiations. Germany underestimated Britain’s commitment to Belgium and overestimated its ability to localize the conflict. Russia misjudged the extent of German and Austrian resolve, while Britain’s ambiguous stance created confusion rather than clarity. This lack of clear signaling allowed each power to miscalculate the others’ intentions.
Third, the militarization of foreign policy, exemplified by Germany’s Schlieffen Plan and Russia’s rapid mobilization, left little room for diplomatic maneuvering. Once mobilizations began, the momentum toward war became unstoppable. Finally, nationalist fervor and domestic pressures in all the Great Powers made backing down politically unpalatable, further narrowing the options for a peaceful resolution.
The war’s outbreak was marked by a series of cascading war declarations, each propelled by these diplomatic failures, miscalculations, and key leaders’ rigid personalities. As discussed, the infamous spark was the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary by a Bosnian Serb nationalist on June 28, 1914. Austria-Hungary, supported by Germany, issued an ultimatum to Serbia, which was only partially accepted, leading Austria-Hungary to declare war on Serbia on July 28. Russia, bound by its pan-Slavic commitments and alliance with Serbia, began mobilizing its forces against Austria-Hungary. Germany, interpreting Russian mobilization as a threat, declared war on Russia on August 1 and, two days later, on France after France refused to provide assurances of neutrality. Britain, drawn in by Germany's invasion of neutral Belgium—a key part of the Schlieffen Plan—declared war on Germany on August 4.
The assignation was a convenient pretext for the limited war Germany and Austria seemed eager to prosecute to shore up regional and great power calculations. The misinterpretations and rigidity among the great powers made realistically understanding the true state of affairs nearly impossible. Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II initially hesitated, fearing the international consequences of war, but was pressured by Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von Moltke, who argued that Germany's war plans required immediate and decisive action to avoid strategic disadvantage. The Schlieffen Plan, Germany's pre-existing strategy for a two-front war, dictated an invasion of France through Belgium, leaving no room for delay. Wilhelm's vacillation and Von Moltke's insistence on adhering to the timetables reveal a dynamic of military strategy constraining diplomacy. Austria-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia and Germany's carte blanche support also reflected an overconfidence in quick resolutions and an underestimation of the alliances arrayed against them. Russia, in turn, misjudged Germany’s willingness to escalate, believing its partial mobilization would deter aggression.
Personalities shaped these decisions profoundly. Kaiser Wilhelm's erratic behavior and insecurity exacerbated tensions as he veered between bombastic rhetoric and anxiety over the war's consequences. Von Moltke's inflexibility on military timing pressured Wilhelm into irrevocable decisions, undermining any last-minute attempts at diplomacy. Similarly, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Sazonov and Tsar Nicholas II failed to fully grasp Germany’s resolve, while British Foreign Secretary Sir Edward Grey struggled to communicate Britain’s intentions with sufficient clarity to either deter Germany or reassure France and Russia.
The war began with aggressive offensives. Germany launched the Schlieffen Plan on August 4, advancing rapidly into Belgium and northern France in an attempt to encircle Paris and deliver a swift victory. Austria-Hungary, meanwhile, initiated limited operations against Serbia, only to encounter stiff resistance. Russia, mobilizing faster than anticipated, launched offensives into East Prussia and Galicia, forcing Germany and Austria-Hungary to divert resources. These initial moves underscored the belief among all belligerents that swift and decisive action would secure victory, a grave miscalculation that set the stage for a protracted and catastrophic conflict.
Were the Choices to Fight Rational?
From a strategic standpoint, the decisions to fight were driven by perceptions of national interest, but these perceptions were often flawed. Germany believed war was necessary to secure its position as a dominant power, but its actions led to its encirclement and eventual defeat. France and Russia fought to preserve alliances and territorial integrity, but the costs far outweighed the benefits. Britain, though reluctant, saw intervention as essential to maintaining the European balance of power and protecting its global interests.
Tuchman paints vivid portraits of the leaders whose decisions set Europe ablaze. For example, she highlights Kaiser Wilhelm II erratic personality and overconfidence, which led to inconsistent messaging and poorly managed alliances. Similarly, she describes Sir Edward Grey, Britain's Foreign Secretary, as a solitary and introspective figure whose efforts at mediation were hindered by Britain’s ambiguous foreign policy commitments. In France, General Joseph Joffre’s calm but rigid demeanor dominated military planning, leading to overconfidence in the offensive strategies of Plan XVII. Russian Tsar Nicholas II appears as a shallow and indecisive ruler, unable to manage the competing pressures of domestic unrest and international obligations.
Tuchman critiques the rigid military strategies that left little room for diplomatic resolution. Germany’s Von Schlieffen Plan is a central focus, emblematic of a mindset that prioritized rapid military action over the complexities of diplomacy. The plan’s dependence on violating Belgian neutrality made British intervention inevitable, a fact that German leaders failed to grasp. France Plan XVII, based on the offensive doctrine “élan vital,” ignored defensive realities and underestimated the strength of German fortifications and manpower. Diplomatic failures were equally damning. Tuchman notes that the Great Powers' pre-war diplomacy was often shaped more by pride and posturing than pragmatism. Germany’s “blank check” to Austria-Hungary emboldened Vienna to take reckless actions against Serbia, while Britain's reluctance to articulate its position early in the crisis allowed Germany to miscalculate. Russia's partial mobilization was meant as a deterrent, but it was poorly communicated and only heightened tensions.
In hindsight, none of the Great Powers achieved their objectives. This is a staggering conclusion to one of human history's bloodiest efforts. The war devastated economies, toppled empires, and set the stage for future conflicts. While the decisions to fight were rational within the context of immediate threats and obligations, they failed to account for the long-term consequences, particularly the economic and human costs of prolonged warfare. In each case, the nation’s grand plans to expand their power led to strategic disaster.
Lessons from 1914 – The Original Great Power Competition
The early 20th-century competition between the Great Powers reveals both the pitfalls and potential of such rivalries. On one hand, alliances provided a sense of security and deterred unilateral aggression. On the other hand, they created rigid frameworks that left little room for flexibility. Diplomatic efforts were undermined by mistrust, poor leadership, nationalism, and the militarization of statecraft.
Perhaps most worrisome of the errors made in the prelude to WWI were those guided by the personality and character traits of the key actors. The Kaiser was likely bipolar, Foch was unflinchingly pompous, Nicholas was a nitwit, and Clay was obsessively cryptic. The decisions of these few key individuals, shaped by their personalities and biases, had dramatic and outsized consequences. Effective leadership requires not just knowledge and vision but also adaptability and humility. None of these key figures possessed the “right stuff” to steer their states toward peace.
Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August underscores the importance of clear communication and accurate assessments of adversaries’ intentions. Misjudgments, such as Germany’s assumption of British neutrality or Russia’s belief in its ability to mobilize without provoking Germany, proved catastrophic. Effective diplomacy requires not only clear signaling but also an understanding of the strategic interests and red lines of other powers.
Another lesson is the danger of over-reliance on military plans and technologies without understanding their limitations. The belief that modern warfare would be swift and decisive ignored the transformative impact of technologies such as machine guns, heavy artillery, and trench warfare, which prolonged and intensified the conflict. Today’s great power competition demands a nuanced understanding of emerging technologies, including cyber capabilities and artificial intelligence, to avoid similar miscalculations.
In very misleading ways, many U.S. national security strategists view the current Great Power Competition as beginning in 2018. This belies the fact that it has never stopped, but it is correct that the United States, China, Russia, Iran, and Europe are major actors. This situation mirrors the pre-1914 era, as nations deal with complex alliances, economic ties, and strategic rivalries. Personalities like Putin, XI, Trump, Macron, and Khamenei are a mercurial, calculating, self-serving, and unreliable lot in ways that will shape the intensifying rivalry among the powerful nations each leads. The likelihood of hubris, lack of understanding, and poor strategic decisions by these leaders make this great power competition nearly as volatile as 1914. Similarly, military planning by each of these nations reveals much to be desired in realism and effectiveness. The stakes are even higher today due to the presence of nuclear weapons, globalized economies, and transnational challenges like climate change and impact of powerful computing systems.
The advent of international political systems since WWI has improved communication and diplomatic efforts by offering a forum for discussion and negotiation. The role of international institutions such as the United Nations and NATO aim to manage competition through dialogue and collective security. While not foolproof, these mechanisms provide platforms for negotiation that did not exist in 1914. To succeed in modern great power competition, nations must prioritize strategic clarity, invest in diplomatic infrastructure, and develop a sophisticated understanding of the interplay between military capabilities, technological innovation, and economic resilience. Mitigating the personalities remains an unsolved challenge.
Conclusion
The diplomatic efforts of July and August 1914 were an exercise in how competing national interests, rigid alliances, and ineffectual leadership can transform a regional crisis into a global war. While the Great Powers sought to avoid conflict, their actions and decisions made war inevitable. The failure to achieve peace underscores the importance of strategic foresight, effective communication, and an understanding of technological and military realities.
Barbara Tuchman’s The Guns of August vividly illustrates how misjudgments in leadership, strategy, and diplomacy can lead to catastrophe. The rigidity of military planning, the failure to adapt to technological change, and the neglect of diplomatic opportunities were critical flaws that remain relevant today.
In modern great power competition, the lessons of 1914 remain profoundly germane. Nations must avoid the trap of rigid alliances and zero-sum thinking, instead embracing flexibility and mutual understanding. Clear communication and a willingness to compromise are essential to managing rivalries without escalation. Above all, integrating technological expertise into diplomatic and strategic planning is crucial to navigating the complexities of contemporary geopolitics. By all means, build a world-class military and economy, but invest in diplomacy to avoid the risks and cruelty of war while still getting what you want.
For democracies, excellence in strategy and diplomacy must come with a heightened understanding of risk, boldness in the face of unwarranted aggression, and a desire to maintain liberty and the pursuit of happiness free from the threat of tyranny. Failing to do so may well lead to a modern tragedy. In this decade and current state of great power competition, imagine fighting a four-year war that leaves tens of millions dead and never achieves any nation’s strategic objectives. Instead of changing conditions for an improved state of peace, it would simply leave a devastated world in its wake. Unlike the monarchs who marched their countries to war in 1914, our current leaders have far more destructive means and all the human foibles of their antecedents. As the world faces great power competition in the age of AI and quantum computing, the imperative to heed the lessons of the past has never been greater.
Bibliography
Clark, Christopher. The Sleepwalkers: How Europe Went to War in 1914. New York: HarperCollins, 2012.
MacMillan, Margaret. The War That Ended Peace: The Road to 1914. New York: Random House, 2013.
Hamilton, Richard F., and Holger H. Herwig. Decisions for War, 1914-1917. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004.
Stevenson, David. Cataclysm: The First World War as Political Tragedy. New York: Basic Books, 2004.
Strachan, Hew. The First World War: Volume I: To Arms. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Tuchman, Barbara. The Guns of August. New York: Random House, 1962.
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